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FRENCH LEGITIMISM UNDER THE JULY MONARCHY:

THE FOUNDATION OF THE LEGITIMIST PARTY

1830 - 1834

by



David C. Rolf

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for
acceptance, a thesis entitled
..... JULY MONARCHY: THE FOUNDATION OF THE LEGITIMIST PARTY
..... 1830 - 1834
submitted by David C. Rolf
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of ARTS

DEDICATION

To my family

for never asking "why?"

and for rarely asking "when?"

ABSTRACT

The Revolution of 1830 split French Royalism into two rival political movements: Orleanism, whose adherents had succeeded in forestalling the re-establishment of the Republic by substituting for the Bourbon Kings their cousin Louis-Philippe d'Orléans, and Legitimism, whose adherents refused to recognize the new Orléans King and clung to the ideal of legitimate hereditary kingship in the most direct male line of descent from Hugh Capet, supporting the royal claims of the overthrown Bourbons. While the early development of the former, being closely tied to the history of the regime it created under Louis-Philippe, has been scrutinized closely by historians, the early history of Legitimism is less well-known. This thesis follows the early development of this political movement until the creation of a unified Legitimist Party in 1834 and attempts to provide a more complete account of the origins of that party than has hitherto been available.

In August 1830 there were four political groups opposing the new Orleanist regime which found themselves within what may loosely be called the Party of Legitimism: conservative Legitimism, which had chosen to oppose the regime by political abstentionism; parliamentary Legitimism, and Genoudism (left-wing Legitimism), both of which espoused active political resistance; and Ultra-Legitimism, which hoped to oppose the regime with military resistance. This last, immediately after the Revolution, was the weakest of the Legitimist

factions; thus, the political development of the Party of Legitimism was the result of the interplay between the factions of political abstentionism and political activism struggling to direct the party's reaction to the new regime. This leadership conflict, which at first appeared to resolve itself in favour of the conservatives, by 1832 had created a leadership alliance between the conservative faction and the socially conservative, politically liberal parliamentary faction against the Genoudists on the party's left-wing. That same year, in spite of the objections of the other three factions, an Ultra-Legitimist-led uprising in the Vendée attempted to overthrow the regime but was easily crushed. The failure of the military wing undermined the political credibility of the entire Party of Legitimism and forced even its most intransigent members to acknowledge the de facto existence of the regime.

This recognition of the political realities of France under Louis-Philippe was the first step towards the creation of a more cohesive Legitimist party. The military resistance option, for Legitimists, was discredited and by 1833 they realized that political abstentionism was equally ineffective. Thus, in 1834, a compromise was reached between the conservative Legitimist majority and the advocates of political activism. Rising out of the ruins of the old Party of Legitimism, the Legitimist Party was created to fight the June general elections. The limited success of the Legitimist Party in the 1834 elections, however, marked the point at which its development came to a halt. The compromise between political abstentionism and activism of 1834 would remain the basis for the Legitimist Party throughout the July Monarchy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. F. A. de Luna. His criticisms were invaluable in transforming what was a potential apologia of Legitimism into a Master's thesis.


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The Royal House of France: Bourbon and Orléans



INTRODUCTION

The Revolution of 1830, by overthrowing the Bourbon kingship and substituting for it that of the collateral Bourbon family of Orléans, split French Royalism into two rival political movements. Supporters of Louis-Philippe d'Orléans have gone down in history as "Orleanists", named for the new dynasty. Their rivals, who had remained loyal to the ideal of legitimate hereditary kingship in the most direct male line of descent from Hugh Capet, while they considered themselves the only "true" Royalists, by 1834 had become known as "Legitimists". It was not until 1883, when at the legitimate Bourbon Pretender's childless death his hereditary claims passed to the Orleanist Pretender, that this dynastic rift came to an end. Thus, for over fifty years Legitimism, the belief in the ideal of legitimate hereditary kingship, was a distinct conservative and monarchical political movement in Nineteenth Century France.

Legitimism is unique among the political phenomena of the early Nineteenth Century in that its emergence as a separate political movement neither coincided with nor presaged the establishment of a regime based upon its principles. On the contrary it only began its development as a cohesive political ideology after the collapse of the Restoration Monarchy, the single Nineteenth Century French regime to have been premised upon its ideal of legitimate hereditary kingship. As such the study of Legitimism has suffered, for it appears to exist outside the mainstream of French political development.

That Legitimism should be seen as a retrogressive rather than progressive force against the background of France's historical development from the Monarchy of Bourbon-Orléans through the Second Republic and Second Empire to the Third, Fourth and Fifth Republics was fostered in part by historians of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Such historians, whether of Republican or Monarchist political sentiments, were largely writers of parliamentary histories; thus, when treating the Royalist phenomena of the Nineteenth Century, they favour over the Legitimists, perceived to be completely out of step with their times, those pragmatic Orleanist politicians who figure prominently in the political history of France from 1830 to the 1880's.¹ And it was not until 1954 with the publications of René Rémond's La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours that a dispassionate attempt was made to assess Legitimism's place in French politics. Rémond, in studying the French right, discerned three basic conservative traditions: Orleanism, Bonapartism, and Legitimism.² A few years later André-Jean Tudesq, in Les Grands Notables en France: étude historique d'une psychologie sociale, found significant evidence of Legitimist sympathies among the notables, the very men, aristocrats and bourgeois, whose interests the July Monarchy ostensibly served.³

On the other side of the Atlantic Legitimism has since become the subject of two monographs. Marvin R. Cox has studied the Legitimist Party during the Second Republic, 1848 - 1852, and Robert R. Locke has studied its role during the foundation of the Third Republic in the early 1870's.⁴ And, most recently, in France, Bernard Jacquier has done a regional study of Legitimism in the Dauphiné between 1830 and 1870 and discovered its strength even in a region so noted for its

revolutionary fervor and Republican politics.⁵ However, little has been done on the origins of the Legitimist Party in the years immediately following the Revolution of 1830. It is the intent of this thesis, therefore, to study the foundation of the Legitimist Party in France.

The immediate antecedents of Legitimism may be traced to 1814 and 1815. With the military collapse of the First Empire France's revolutionary experiments with political regimes appeared to have gone full circle. The Bourbon interregnum was over; a Bourbon was once again King of France in fact as well as in name. However, the France of the Restoration was not the France of the ancien régime, and under Louis XVIII the Restoration regime was intent not upon restoring the social and political order of the past but upon reconciling the forms of the old monarchy with the new France.

This reconciliation process necessitated the reintegration of the exiles of the emigration into society essentially without compensation for their lost privileges, although in the 1820's under Charles X there was some attempt made to provide compensation for lost property by way of the émigré indemnity fund. However, according to Rémond, this attempt under Louis XVIII at grafting the returning émigrés onto the social and political structures left by the Empire caused the first recognizable and fully self-conscious right-wing in France to emerge. This right-wing, Ultra-Royalism or Ultracism, was the proponent of a political system the antithesis of the revolutionary-imperial system which Restoration France had inherited in 1814.

The royal charter of 1814, recognizing the realities of the situation, had attempted to strike a compromise between the old and

the new France. Thus, the charter basically only substituted a royal and parliamentary superstructure for the imperial and military superstructure of Napoleon over the foundations laid by the Revolution. Ultracism stood opposed to this Revolution-Bourbon compromise. The ease of Napoleon's return for the Hundred Days in 1815 was proof enough for Ultras of the political dangers of the Restoration compromise. French society needed to be rebuilt upon safer principles than the refined centralization inherited from the Empire and the equalitarian ideals inherited from 1789. Envisaging a return to the idealized past of the decentralized and aristocratic, pre-absolutist monarchy, Ultracism was the party of the counter-revolution.⁶

Against the background of the defeat at Waterloo and the White Terror in France the first general elections for the Restoration Chamber of Deputies in 1815 had returned a majority of Ultras. However, Louis XVIII, intent upon the task of remaining King of France, refused to entrust the government of the country to an Ultra ministry and maintained, against a hostile Chamber, a series of ministries committed to the Restoration compromise. Only after the assassination of the King's nephew, the Duc de Berry, in 1820 did Louis call upon Ultras to form the government of France.

Berry's death had sparked a dynastic crisis. Not only had the young Bourbon prince been the most popular member of the royal family but upon him had rested the family's hopes for a male heir in the third generation.⁷ The shock of his murder combined with a general conservative mood in the 1820's to bring the Ultras to power in 1821. A year later the party had tightened its grip upon the government with the creation of a ministry under the presidency of the Comte de Villèle.

The future of Ultracism appeared secure. Fearing the resurgence of "Jacobinism", conservative proponents of the Restoration settlement supported the Villèle Ministry and the Ultras. Also the Ultras could be assured of a future king of their own political creed; Louis XVIII's health was rapidly declining and his heir-apparent, his brother Charles, was the titular leader of their party.

The succession of the Ultra heir, as Charles X, in 1824 was, however, offset by the defection from the Villèle Ministry of the Vicomte de Chateaubriand. The Viscount carried many men of the right centre with him into opposition, and Villèle was forced to rely more heavily upon the extremists within his own party. Support from these extreme right-wing "Ultra-Ultras" became increasingly conditional as the Villelist Ultras became accustomed to power and seemed to be accepting the Restoration settlement. And in 1827 the Ultra-Ultras revolted against Villèle's leadership. Unable to command a majority in the Chambers against the Liberals and the Royalists of the right centre the Ministry resigned and was replaced by a ministry under the presidency of the Vicomte de Martignac.

For one and one half years Martignac attempted to return to the system of Louis XVIII but six years of Ultra government had seriously weakened the moderate centres upon which such a system relied. The "immoderate excesses and verbal violence" of the right-wing had forced an increasing number of moderates to seek refuge further to the left.⁸ France, by the end of the 1820's had been polarized and the Martignac Ministry found itself trapped powerless between the right and the left. By the summer of 1829 it was apparent that government by the

small centre minority was impossible, and on August 9 Charles X appointed a new ministry.

This was the Polignac Ministry, representative of the fervently Catholic and militant Ultra-Ultras; it was a ministry such as the Ultra majority of 1815 had demanded unsuccessfully from Louis XVIII. However, in 1829 such a ministry was unacceptable to the non-Ultra majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The expected clash between the new ministry and the majority came immediately after the opening of the next parliamentary session.

Charles X, in the speech from the throne on March 2, 1830, alluding to his powers of emergency decree in Article 14 of the charter, demanded that the opposition deputies support his chosen ministers. The Chamber of Deputies replied, with an address voted by 221 deputies, that the King should rather dismiss the Ministry and find one acceptable to the Chamber. Neither side would compromise and the parliamentary impasse was only broken by the dissolution of the Chamber. The Prince de Polignac remained President of the Council and new elections were called. The final test of strength, however, had only been delayed.

The opposition's victory at the polls in 1830 was taken by the Ministry as a direct challenge against the authority of the King, and with the full consent of Charles X it drew up the "July ordinances". The publication of these four ordinances, with which the government hoped to arrange for new elections and a new, more malleable majority, proved to be the last provocation. Anti-government rioting broke out in Paris. Within a week and a half the Restoration Monarchy had been

overthrown, and replacing the Bourbons with their cousin the Duc d'Orléans, the Chambers created the July Monarchy.

The Chambers in creating the July Monarchy also created the Orleanist branch of French Royalism distinct from the "old" Royalism of men who remained loyal to the elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty. Immediately following the Revolution these Bourbon loyalists persisted in calling themselves Royalists, implying that men who supported any other than the most direct legitimate male descendant of Hugh Capet were not true French Royalists. However, for purposes of clarity this study refers to these "old" Royalists as Legitimists, a term which came into use only in mid-1834.

"Old" Royalism or Legitimism gathered together various political opinions. Ultra-Ultras and the political heirs of more moderate Ultracism formed the extreme right and right-wing of Legitimism. The centre was occupied by those political liberals, political descendants of Chateaubriand and the right centre, who would vote for and form the Legitimist deputation in the Chambers of the French Parliament. And on the left-wing there was a nascent popular-monarchist Legitimism which in the 1830's, led by the Abbé de Genoude, would be advocating the union of the principles of hereditary monarchy and universal suffrage and the restoration of the Bourbons by plebiscitary rather than parliamentary means. These diverse political factions formed what may loosely be called the Party of Legitimism. United solely in their loyalty to the ideal of legitimate hereditary kingship, they were separated by their Restoration antecedents and by their differing opinions over the practical future of post-Revolution Legitimism.

In August 1830 there were three perceived courses of action open to the followers of the fallen royal family: military resistance, passive resistance, and political resistance. There were proponents of each among Legitimists of 1830, and Legitimism, in the next four years, would experiment with each of these options before finally settling upon a common Legitimist party strategy of political opposition to the July Monarchy. By the general elections of 1834 Legitimism had chosen its future. Representing a compromise policy of both passive and political resistance the Legitimist Party of 1834, which had emerged out of the amorphous Party of Legitimism, was essentially the same Legitimist Party as that of 1848, which both abhorred and aided the destruction of the July Monarchy to the profit of the anti-monarchist Republicans.

Notes to the Introduction

1 See for example Daniel Halévy, La Fin des Notables, 2 Vols. (Paris: Grasset, 1930 - 1934); Pierre de La Gorce, Histoire de la Seconde République Française, 2 Vols. (Paris: Plon-Norrit, 1904) and Histoire du Second Empire, 7 Vols. (Paris: Plon-Norrit, 1904 - 1906); and Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, 7 Vols. (Paris: Plon, 1884 - 1914).

2 I have used the revised edition, La Droite en France: de la Première Restauration à la Ve République (Paris: 1963) as translated by James M. Laux, The Right Wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966).

3 Published in 2 Vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966).

4 Marvin R. Cox, "Legitimism under the Second French Republic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966). Robert R. Locke, French Legitimists and the Politics of Order in the Early Third Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

5 Bernard Jacquier, Le Légitimisme dauphinois, 1830 - 1870 (Grenoble: Centre de recherche économique, sociale et institutionnelle, 1976).

6 Rémond, pp. 28, 49 - 58.

7 See Genealogical Table, p. x. Louis XVIII's heir was his brother Charles, Comte d'Artois (Charles X). Charles' direct heir was the childless Louis, Duc d'Angoulême, the elder brother of the Duc de Berry. Berry, who had already fathered the Princess Elizabeth, was considered the Bourbons' last hope for a male heir. And, seven months after the Duke's assassination this hope came to fruition with the birth to his widow of the enfant du miracle, Henri, Duc de Bordeaux.

8 Rémond, p. 33.

CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTION OF 1830 AND THE EMERGENCE OF LEGITIMISM

The immediate spark of the Revolution of 1830 was the publication in the Moniteur of July 26 of four royal ordinances. These ordinances, basing their legality upon Article 14 of the charter of 1814, suspended the liberty of the press, dissolved the as yet unassembled Chamber of Deputies, arbitrarily refashioned the electoral procedures, and summoned the new electoral colleges for September. The latest move in the political contest between the Ultra-Ultra ministry of the Prince de Polignac, backed by Charles X, and the non-Ultra parliamentary opposition, the publication of the ordinances resulted in political demonstrations in Paris on Tuesday, July 27 which ended in a clash between the crowds and the police. Blood being spilt on Tuesday afternoon, Paris woke on Wednesday the twenty-eighth in a virtual state of siege.

As the barricades had gone up the city's civil government had collapsed, and the sole legal authority remaining intact rested with the capital's new military commandant, the Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse. Marmont's authority was, however, exercised only in those areas under the guns of the garrison. Fighting between royal troops and the Parisians became general on Wednesday and by late Thursday, July 29, the garrison was in flight, head-long up the Champs Elysées.

Marmont's position in the capital had collapsed, and with it royal authority in Paris disappeared.

The end of Bourbon authority in Paris left the city completely in the control of the insurgent population which was anti-Bourbon in sentiment because of the blood shed in the three days of street fighting, the trois glorieuses. And, what government the capital had was being exercised by a Municipal Commission at the Hôtel-de-Ville which was increasingly pro-Republican. There was, however, another body of revolutionaries in the city determined not to let the Revolution drift towards the Republic.

The erstwhile opposition, non-Ultra deputies who had gathered in Paris after the general elections before the July 25 ordinance of dissolution became public, were essentially social conservatives satisfied with the Restoration settlement. Wary of the Republicans at the Hôtel-de-Ville and fearful of the hostility a new French Republic might elicit from a monarchical Europe, these men sought to preserve the monarchy in France. For some this could be accomplished by the quick abdications of Charles X and his son the Duc d'Angoulême. The Bourbon Crown would thus be able to pass legally to the nine year old Henri, Duc de Bordeaux, the posthumous son of the Duc de Berry, who was a prince too young either to be identified with the Ultra reaction or to bear any responsibility for the recent bloodshed. For others the preservation of the monarchy required a new family of Kings. But on one point they were all in agreement, the fate of the French Monarchy seemed to rest with the non-Ultra and liberal Duc d'Orléans, as either regent for an Henri V or as king.

Secluded in the country at the outbreak of violence, Louis-Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, had been careful not to either condemn or support the revolutionaries during the fighting. However, after the collapse of the royal army in Paris he allowed himself to be coaxed back to the city by the deputies and accepted from them, on July 31, the Lieutenancy General of France. His appointment as Lieutenant General of the Kingdom was sanctioned that same afternoon on a balcony of the Hôtel-de-Ville by the "Republican kiss" of the Général Lafayette.

The Lieutenancy General of France was a vice-regal office which only the King could legally bestow. As such, in law, the deputies could not appoint the Duc d'Orléans to that office. However, when the King, having retreated with his Guard from Saint-Cloud to Rambouillet, saw fit to appoint his cousin Orléans to the Lieutenancy General on August 1 the royal appointment went unheeded. The support of insurgent and increasingly Orleanist Paris had vanquished any hesitancy on the Duke's part. The ambitions so often attributed to his ancestor, the Regent of France from 1715 to 1723, of ascending the French throne seemed finally within reach, and Louis-Philippe would try to make it a reality.

On August 2, 1830, having received no word from the Duke and only bad news from Paris, Charles X abdicated the throne at Rambouillet. And he used his influence over his eldest son, the childless Dauphin, Louis, Duc d'Angoulême, to make him renounce his rights to the throne as well. Charles thus made a final attempt at salvaging the Bourbon Crown. By the organic laws of the French Monarchy the succession thus devolved upon the enfant du miracle of 1820, Henri, Duc de Bordeaux. Charles' last act as King was to write once again to the Duc d'Orléans

to inform him of the abdications and to appoint him, as First Prince of the Blood, Regent of France during the minority of Henri V.

The Lieutenant General of France never proclaimed the accession of his young cousin. Rather, armed with the signed abdication of Charles and Angoulême and holding his office from the revolutionaries of Paris, Louis-Philippe proceeded to open the Chambers' session on August 3. The letter of abdication was accepted by the Deputies and sent to the archives of the Peers, the succession rights of the nine year old Prince Henri were ignored, and the Chambers set about their task of settling the Revolution.

The Chamber of Deputies which met in August was that same unconvoked body which Charles X had tried to dissolve with his second July ordinance. The collapse of Bourbon authority had however left a vacuum which only the elected representatives of France appeared competent to fill. Thus, Louis-Philippe as Lieutenant General had convoked the Chamber elected in June and early July with its opposition majority. The revolutionary turmoil and uncertainty however meant that only 252 of a total of 430 deputies and 114 of 365 peers were in fact present in Paris in early August.¹ Nevertheless these men began the work of creating the future government of France.

On August 7 the final hope of Bourbon France, an Orléans Regency for Henri V, was dashed by the Chambers. By a vote of 219 to 33 the Deputies declared the throne vacant (whether by revolutionary causes or abdication was never clearly stated) and, passing over the hereditary claims of the Duc de Bordeaux, offered it to the Duc d'Orléans. The Deputies then proceeded to revise the charter of 1814, the constitution given France by Louis XVIII.

From the start it became apparent that of the three powers, the King, the Chamber of Peers, and the Chamber of Deputies, the latter had succeeded to a primacy of power. The Revolution of 1830 would mark a significant legal change in the power relationships. No longer would France be governed according to a constitution granted by a sovereign prince but by a constitution created by the representatives of the nation. For similar reasons Henri de Bordeaux had been passed over in favour of Louis-Philippe d'Orléans: Henri's rights were supra-national, stemming from his birth; Louis-Philippe's, according to the Orleanist journalist and politician, Adolphe Thiers, could only be national, stemming from the people.² The Chamber of Peers was emasculated: the 76 peers created by Charles X during his reign were expelled, their peerages invalidated, and the future of the hereditary Chamber itself was to come under review in the first session of 1831. The power to introduce legislation, once restricted to the King, was given equally to the two Chambers, excepting the introduction of taxation proposals which became the sole right of the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Deputies would no longer be appointed by the King but elected from the Chamber. And the pays légal would be expanded: the age required of electors was dropped five years to 25 and that required for deputies was dropped ten years to 30. All these changes, passed by the Deputies on August 7, were ratified by the Chamber of Peers that same evening by 89 to 10, with 15 peers abstaining from the vote. The first steps of a legislative revolution had been taken to legitimize the physical revolution of July.

The changes of August 1830 have been seen as evolutionary rather than revolutionary by some historians.³ However, while the

Revolution of 1830 might not have significantly changed either the social or political bases of the French constitutional monarchy, for both the partisans of kingship and of aristocracy on the right these changes were very revolutionary. Certainly for the latter, the Ultra-Royalists who had been forcibly expelled from power and had had their hold over the aristocratic Chamber of Peers annulled on August 7, the Revolution of 1830 was a revolution. And what of the right centre, the Royalists of the constitutional opposition?

For the men of the Restoration right centre, the followers of Chateaubriand, constitutional monarchy was considered the best guarantee of social and political stability in France. It was this belief which had given them common cause with the Liberals on the left against the ministries of Villèle and Polignac. It had been this belief which had caused the deputies in July to espouse and effect in August the cause of the Orléans Monarchy as the best solution for the Revolution. The right and left centres had a common constitutional vision; however, the events of August 7 had erected a major barrier between the two.

The men of the right centre viewed the arbitrary break in the hereditary royal succession as having shaken the very foundations of the French Monarchy. The declaration of the vacancy of the throne, in destroying the illusory aura of permanence of the kingship, was viewed as a threat to the social and political order of France. For men of the right centre 1830 was a revolution.

Viewing the fall of the Bourbon Restoration Monarchy as a revolution, the right and the right centre drew together under the banner of Legitimism, united in their continued loyalty to the Bourbon

kingship. Opposed in principle to a regime which had broken the legitimate hereditary succession to the throne, the Legitimists of 1830 were faced with three possible courses of action. The idea of military opposition, by uprisings in the Vendée and the Midi, appealed to the extreme right-wing of the Party of Legitimism. However, this option had been discouraged by Charles X, the Duc d'Angoulême, and his wife, the daughter of the guillotined Louis XVI. Alone in her espousal of a military defence of her son's throne, the Duchesse de Berry, in August 1830, could not prevail against the rest of the royal family.⁴ Disappointed by Charles X's decision of August 4 to go quietly into exile from Rambouillet, rather than retreat with his Guards upon the Loire and raise his standard among the sons of the chouans, the Legitimist extreme right nevertheless continued to hope and plan for a Legitimist uprising against the Orléans Monarchy.⁵

The Legitimist majority did not share the military dream of the extreme right-wing, being less inclined to such drastic measures. One way in which Royalists during the Revolution of 1789 had protested against that political upheaval had been to join the emigration and follow the Bourbon brothers of Louis XVI into exile outside of France. In 1830 however, few Legitimists followed their king into exile. Rather, protesting against the Revolution of 1830, many Legitimist sympathizers retired from politics, the civil service, and the army, often leaving Paris for their country estates. France experienced what contemporary observers termed the émigration à l'intérieur.⁶

The new regime, by the law of September 2, 1830, required an oath of loyalty to Louis-Philippe, his legitimate male successors, and the revised charter, to be taken within fifteen days by all deputies,

functionaries, and military officers. Peers of France were given one month to comply with the new oath. However, for many Legitimists the question of whether to take the oath was answered by other than politically pragmatic concerns. The Duc de Montmorency-Laval explained in a letter of August 11, 1830, why he could not take the oath and must therefore resign his seat in the Chamber of Peers.

C'est l'honneur; . . . c'est la conséquence de mon nom, la suite de toute ma vie; . . . ce n'est qu'un juste sentiment de la vénération pour le malheur et d'amour pour une race royale que je croyais devoir servir jusqu'à l'épuisement de mes forces.⁷

Having, in 1814, 1815 and 1824, sworn loyalty to a Bourbon King and his legitimate successors, many men of the right and right centre believed that to swear loyalty to an illegitimate successor such as Louis-Philippe would be to perjure themselves. Faced with the law of September 2, men who for reasons of conscience, like the Duc de Montmorency-Laval, would not swear the oath, resigned. Theirs was the choice of passive resistance to the new order, the internal emigration.

There were, however, men of Legitimist sympathies who chose to take the oath and remain in active political, rather than passive, opposition to the regime. On the whole the political heirs of the liberal tendencies of the Restoration's Constitutional Royalists, believing in the institution of parliamentary government, felt it their duty to remain at their posts in the Chambers or in the administration for the good of France. The oath of loyalty was for these men a formality. It was not viewed as a religious obligation binding them to the Orléans Monarchy and supplanting their allegiance to their Bourbon King. It carried for them as little meaning as the Orleanist majority's broken oaths to Charles X. Pierre-Antoine Berryer, one of

the chief spokesmen for Legitimism in August, pronouncing the "je le jure" required to take his seat as a deputy, on August 11, reasoned that:

La force ne détruit pas le droit; la légitimité du pouvoir est un droit plus précieux pour les peuples que pour les races royales; mais quand la force domine dans un État, les particuliers ne peuvent que se soumettre, et les gens de bien doivent encore à la société le tribut de leurs efforts pour détourner de plus grands maux.

Dans cette seule pensée, je crois de mon devoir de rester uni aux hommes honorables en qui je reconnais des intentions salutaires à mon pays, et je me sou mets à prêter le serment.⁸

This pragmatic stance was to be the basis upon which the Legitimist parliamentary opposition would be built.

Assessing the numerical strength of these internal émigré and parliamentary factions is difficult, even among such highly visible public figures as members of the Chambers. For the internal émigrés who resigned their parliamentary seats the problem exists primarily in distinguishing between men who were expelled, men who resigned, men who resigned before being officially expelled and men who took the oath but refused to take possession of their seats.⁹ In the Chamber of Peers, it is certain that 76 men were expelled on August 7 when the peerages created by Charles X were annulled, leaving 289 men whose peerages dated from the reign of Louis XVIII. Of these, 97 apparently would not take the oath and resigned, leaving 192 men in the Chamber.¹⁰ In the Chamber of Deputies 113 vacancies were left after the Revolution to be filled in by-elections in the Autumn of 1830.¹¹ However, of these 113 the numbers of resignations and expulsions over the issue of the oath are not clearly distinguishable from vacancies created as a result of double elections and the normal process of invalidation for

electoral irregularities. Figures vary considerably among sources but according to the biographies of the men elected to the 1830 Chamber, in the Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 74 deputies either resigned or were expelled for refusing the oath.¹²

The number of Legitimists who remained in the Chambers rather than emigrate to the interior is even less clear. The problem in counting Legitimist peers and deputies stems from the lack of clear party labels. Except for the men who vocally defended the Bourbons and the Restoration it is difficult to distinguish between the passive opponents and the passive supporters of the regime. For the peers remaining in their seats, often military men and ex-imperial officials, it was simple enough to change their loyalties from Bourbon to Orléans, just as they had transferred their allegiance fifteen years earlier from Bonaparte to Bourbon. Nevertheless at least eight men loyal to the fallen dynasty remained in the Peers refusing to tender their resignations.¹³ This small Legitimist peerage, grouping itself around two able speakers, the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé and the Duc de Fitz-James, chose to remain on the parliamentary front line with the hope that they might act as a brake against greater misfortunes.¹⁴ Parliamentary Legitimists, who recognized the basic revolutionary shift of power away from the Crown and the Peers to the "bourgeois" Deputies, these titled notables were seen to make common cause with their colleagues in the Lower Chamber.

The Dictionnaires des parlementaires français contains the biographies of 35 men who sat in the Chamber of Deputies of 1830 - 1831, each of whom is described either as a "légitimiste" or as one who "ne se rallia pas". To this number may be added four more elected in the

by-elections of 1830. This figure, 35 - 39, corresponds approximately to the number 40 given by Charles de Lacombe and to that reported in the Gazette de France in November 1830.¹⁵ However, on January 15, 1831, the same newspaper claimed that there were only 16 Legitimists in the same Chamber. Loose party affiliations and the closeness of doctrine between the men of the old right centre and the old left centre made it possible for numbers of "Legitimist" politicians to rally with ease to the new regime over the winter of 1830 - 1831. The post-Revolution ralliement had ended any hopes that the Legitimists could have held the balance of power in the Chamber, and it left the parliamentary faction of Legitimism heavily dependent upon the oratorical skills and prestige of its leadership.

In 1830, in a Chamber of 430 deputies, this leadership consisted of only five men: Pierre-Antoine Berryer; the Vicomte Blin de Bourdon; the Général Arthur de La Bourdonnaye, Marquis de Blossac; the Comte de Villeneuve-Bargemont; and the Vicomte de Lézardière. However, among these five one stood apart. Pierre-Antoine Berryer, the bourgeois lawyer, had first entered the Chamber in a by-election, on January 4, 1830, as the official candidate of the Polignac Ministry. His oratorical skills, honed before the courts, had been remarked upon immediately by both his political friends and his political enemies and he became one of the leading defenders of the Bourbon Monarchy and the Ministry in the Chamber.¹⁶

Re-elected on July 4 Berryer, along with the veterans of the Royalist parties, MM. de Conny, de La Bourdonnaye-Blossac, de Lézardière, and Hyde de Neuville, spoke out against the August 7 declaration of the vacancy of the throne. Defeated in their attempt to effect the

succession of Henri V, the majority of Legitimists held themselves aloof from the rest of the debates on the seventh. Berryer however continued to debate the revisions of the charter. As he explained on August 11, when he justified his taking the oath, while not recognizing the legitimacy of the new regime, it was his duty as a Frenchman to speak out. In Berryer the small bloc of Legitimists in the Chambers found an eloquent and determined spokesman around whom to rally.¹⁷

To measure the strength of the parliamentary faction beyond the confines of the Chambers is even more difficult than counting the number of Legitimist seats. Electoral results do not greatly illuminate Legitimist and non-Legitimist France. The French pays légal, the notables who made up the political nation, even after the candidacy and electoral requirements were relaxed by the Revolution, was but a fraction of the total population: 166,000 electors in a population of some 32 million.¹⁸ Furthermore, since the regime required its electors to take the oath of loyalty, supporters of the hereditary legitimacy of the Bourbons who were qualified to be electors often felt honour-bound to refrain from exercising their rights. Thus, among the censitaire elite numerical measures of support for Legitimism are unclear. And if assessing the party's strength among the notables is difficult it is impossible among the unenfranchised masses.

It is possible, if one accepts the assessments of contemporary observers, to delineate specific territorial areas which showed marked Legitimist sympathies. In a letter of September 25, 1830 to the exiled Charles X the Comte Ferdinand de Bertier reported that the departments of the Languedoc and of Brittany might be counted upon to support a Bourbon restoration.¹⁹ And Bertier's assessment was concurred

in by a left-wing journal, the Courrier Français, which, in June 1831, saw France divided into three parties: Legitimist in the West and the South, Orleanist "juste-milieu" in the North and Orleanist "left" in the East.²⁰ To provide a further dimension to this territorial picture of Legitimism it is also possible to draw a few conclusions as to the types of men attracted to that political belief.

In the novels of Honoré de Balzac and Henri Beyle (Stendhal) Nineteenth Century French Legitimists were caricatured as the sons of ancien régime aristocrats and old émigrés living in self-imposed exile from society on their country estates or in the aristocratic ghetto of the Faubourg Saint-Germain.²¹ This literary view of Legitimists is based largely upon the Legitimism of Brittany and of the Vendée. Rural society in the West had been little changed by the ravages of the Great Revolution and the Empire. It was still isolated from the centre of power, Paris, and, as a result, western notables continued to exercise much the same influence over the peasantry as their ancestors had before them. Their natural influence over their social dependants, reinforced by memories of the Vendean War of 1791 - 1795, and of the White Terror of 1815, plus a strong conservative and Catholic tradition among the peasantry, served to make the West sympathetic to the Bourbon cause.²² In the South, two forces acted in favour of Legitimism. Renewing the age-old religious divisions of the Languedoc, Catholic discontent sought refuge in the Party of Legitimism as Protestants tended to rally quickly to the Orléans Monarchy. And, as the heir to Ultracism's pre-absolutist decentralization policy, Legitimism benefited from the southern tradition of provincial particularism. The noblesse and bourgeoisie of Toulouse, the bourgeoisie

of Marseille and, to a lesser degree, of Bordeaux, and the Catholic artisan classes dispersed throughout the Languedoc, all espoused the cause of Legitimism.²³ Catholic sentiment and conservative respect for the established social hierarchy also gave Legitimism a foothold in the North, among the noblesse and the lower classes of Flanders and Artois.²⁴

For Roger Price, in "Legitimist Opposition to the Revolution of 1830 in the French Provinces", the major basis for Legitimist strength was:

the existence of a "psychological climate", the product of a long historical evolution which strengthened consensus, and especially . . . the continued recognition of their subordinate status by the mass of the population.²⁵

However, to single out Legitimist notables as the beneficiaries of this "psychological climate" does little to clarify the source of Legitimism's support for, while France was governed in the interests of the propertied classes, as she was throughout the Nineteenth Century, not only Legitimist but also Orleanist and even Republican notables drew upon this same "psychological climate" for their political strength. Nor does this recognition of Legitimism's dependence upon such an undemocratic and inequalitarian social structure explain what made the Legitimist notable a Legitimist and thus willing to exert his influence over the masses in favour of the exiled royal family.

The cause of Legitimism gathered to itself members of the ancien régime aristocracy, but it also attracted members of the imperial nobility, like Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, and Kellerman, Duc de Valmy, and members of the bourgeoisie, like Berryer. What made these notables choose Legitimism rather than rally to the new regime as many of their own families did?²⁶ Tudesq suggests that the division occurred over

differing ideological conceptions about the nature of French society. Legitimism for Tudesq, just as Legitimism qua Ultracism for Rémond, viewed society as a corporate whole. Man was not an individual but rather an integral part of a corporate order which in turn was integrally meshed with others to create society. Opposed to this "Legitimist" view was the political Liberalism of the Orleanists. Society, rather than the sum of corporate orders, was the sum of each individual, each man having specific and unalienable rights.²⁷ This model provides an ideological rationale for the division between Legitimism and Orleanism; however, it was not the most important.

The decision to emigrate to the interior was made by the Legitimist for other than politically pragmatic concerns and these were the concerns which formed the basis for the split between France's two Royalist parties. The Duc de Montmorency-Laval called it a matter of personal and family honour. The Comte d'Adhémar, writing of Legitimism in 1843, described it as "une conviction, mieux que cela une religion."²⁸ Looking back, over the past forty years, Legitimists of 1830 saw twenty-five years of revolutionary anarchy, imperial despotism and a France continually at war with the rest of Europe. Only with the return of the Bourbons to the throne did they see France beginning to regain her lost peace, prosperity and legitimate place among the nations of Europe.²⁹ Thus, the future of France appeared to be tied inseparably to the destiny of the royal House of France, the Bourbons. The fusion of these conceptions of honour and this quasi-religious belief, that the fate of France was inextricably entwined with that of the Bourbons, served to create a party of Legitimism.

Tudesq describes Legitimism as "plus un appel au sentiment que la manifestation d'une idée."³⁰ As such its strength and appeal was not to be easily overcome by the force of argument, whether political or practical. And the emotional appeal of Legitimism was as attractive to the Legitimist notable as it was to his social dependents. Thus, in the months after the Revolution, the emergence of Legitimism, particularly its apparent strength in the West and the South, was a cause of concern for the new government.

This government was built upon a revolutionary coalition of the old left centre and left-wing deputies. Forged in opposition to the Polignac Ministry and the Ultras, after these common enemies had been defeated this Liberal majority began to show signs of disintegration. By mid-August 1830 it was becoming apparent that the Orleanist majority was divided roughly into two equal halves: a faction of "Resistance" which wanted to stop the Revolution where it was as of August 7 and a faction of "Movement" which desired further revolutionary changes.³¹ Over this divided majority the Ministry's hold was far from complete.

Appointed on August 11 under the presidency of the Duc de Broglie, a Liberal of the old left centre, the Ministry found itself trapped in a paralytic situation. To lean in policy towards the faction of Movement would alienate Resistance and also risk a dangerous acceleration of the revolutionary process. To lean towards the faction of Resistance, as it in fact did, would alienate Movement and risk unpopularity among the Parisian population. In consequence it could do little to alleviate the continuing unrest and general discontent which had been set loose in the capital by the Revolution of July.

The economic depression of 1827, which had appeared to be dissipating in the early summer of 1830, had taken a turn for the worse after July.³² Revolutionary instability gave rise to a general loss of confidence and trading at the Bourse had dropped. As capital dried up new jobs failed to materialize for the unemployed, and wages fell for the employed. The government, caught between Movement and Resistance, could do little of consequence, and the lower classes, which in July had acted decisively to rectify their political grievances, expressed their economic grievances in a series of strikes and demonstrations. In Paris the working classes demonstrated before the Ministries and the Chambers. Even the popularity of the new King of the French did not stop the crowds from invading the Palais-Royal in protest over the government's inactivity. And throughout the demonstrations the National Guard, under the command of the Général Lafayette, himself a leader of the faction of Movement, did nothing to interfere with or check the crowds.³³ What would happen if this economic unrest found a political direction?

It had largely been the popular classes of Paris which had overthrown the Bourbon throne. The "men of July", the politicians in power, were not the "victors of July", the men who had chased Marmont's troops up the Champs Elysées and out of the city on the twenty-ninth. Instead, the politicians who had made the revolution of August, in the Chambers, had used the Parisian crowd to scale the heights of power, and they might well fear the power of the crowd if it once found new political leaders to direct its energies. Therefore, while the political situation might appear to have been solidifying around the Orléans Monarchy, the government's and the regime's stability remained

in question as long as popular unrest was rife in Paris. Paralysed by the division within the majority, the Ministry of Resistance under Broglie could count upon the support of the faction of Movement only as long as the vital questions of the revolutionary settlement were not broached in the Chambers.

Uneasy both in its control over the majority in the Chambers and over the city which had created the Revolution, the Ministry might well look upon the Legitimists' apparent predominance in the West and the South with some trepidation. Stigmatized by the government and the Orleanist press as "Carlists", an epithet intended to conjure up in the popular mind the Ultra excesses of the government of Charles X, the men of Legitimism indeed, in August, appeared to be overcoming the surprise which had paralysed the right-wing in July. The government reacted accordingly to counter any possible Legitimist threat to its security. The small Legitimist deputation in the Chambers posed few difficulties. Easily outvoted by the majority, a constant reminder of the fallen regime, this parliamentary rump of Bourbon Royalism might even prove a small guarantee of the majority's continued unity. As for the Bourbons' supporters in the administrative, legal, and military hierarchies, the government instituted a policy of purification, purging suspected Legitimists and replacing them with its own supporters. The scope of purification was such that on September 13, 1830, the Minister of the Interior, Francois Guizot, could report to the Chambers that: 76 of 86 Prefects, 196 of 277 Sub-Prefects, 53 of 86 Departmental Secretaries-General, 127 of 315 Departmental Councilors, 74 Prosecutors-General, Advocates and Substitutes, and 254 King's Prosecutors and Substitutes had been replaced; as well, 103 vacancies

on the bench had been filled.³⁴ Sixty-five of 75 Generals were taken off the active list and "practically the whole diplomatic corps was changed."³⁵ There would be little chance of a Legitimist threat to the regime from within.

One Legitimist voice remained which the government could neither outvote nor purge away, and it proclaimed its presence daily. The Revolution of 1830 claimed to have established two constitutional principles: the sovereignty of the people and the freedom of the press. Every Frenchman, under the provisions of the charter of 1830, could publish his opinions freely and could not be restrained in this except by a trial before a jury of his peers. But above all, censorship was never to be re-established.³⁶ Therefore, while Legitimists might be cashiered from their offices and outvoted in the Chambers, the voice of the press was open to them. They seized upon this constitutional freedom of expression as the last recourse open to them.³⁷

The right-wing press had suffered considerably from the Revolution of 1830 due to its identification in the popular mind with the Ultra government. The Drapeau Blanc, journal of militant Ultracism, and the Universel, semi-official journal of the Polignac Ministry, had both disappeared with the Bourbon Crown.³⁸ Some newspapers, notably the Journal des Débats, at one time the organ of Chateaubriand's right centre, had quietly rallied to the new regime. This decimation of the Royalist press left as post-Revolution survivors only two journals with influential or sizeable subscription lists, the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France.³⁹ Resuming publication after several days of silence during the Revolution these two daily newspapers rallied to the cause of Legitimism and began the Legitimist attack on the new regime.

Within the next twelve months the two major Parisian Legitimist journals were joined by other pro-Bourbon periodicals. In the capital these were the Courrier de l'Europe (which would in 1833 become the Rénovateur), the Écho Français, the Revenant, the Mode, Cancans, Brid'oison and Bagatelle. Outside of Paris twenty-six newspapers bearing the names of the old French provinces sprang into existence to propagate the religion of Legitimism.⁴⁰ The proliferation of these right-wing publications may be seen in two lights in regard to the regime: Irene Collins, in The Government and the Newspaper Press in France 1814 - 1881, considers it as a source of strength for the new monarchy as it kept alive in the popular mind the threat of violent counter-revolution;⁴¹ however, the spread of Legitimist journals outside of Paris may also be seen as evidence of the provincial basis for just such a Legitimist counter-revolution. And despite the dismissal by the two Parisian Legitimist dailies of the idea of a military restoration of the Bourbon Kings, a lead which was followed by the rest of the right-wing press, the new regime's partisans were inclined to view the situation in this latter light.⁴² The Quotidienne in particular was vilified in the Orleanist press as a militant anti-regime publication, the "organe officiel du parti carliste."⁴³

To accept this verdict of the Orleanists against the Quotidienne is, however, to be too simplistic. It is true that under the editorial pen of the Baron de Brian the Quotidienne represented the internal émigrés and the Legitimist victims of purification, but these men were not just the unrepentant Ultras of the Orleanist caricature but also men of the old right centre. The past was far from ideal admitted the Quotidienne on August 10, 1830:

Ce sont quinze ans de fautes qui ont préparé cette grande explosion . . . Ce fut tantôt de l'égoïsme et tantôt de l'incapacité, et à force d'erreurs produits par cette double cause, il se trouva qu'un jour le trône . . . tomba d'une chute tellement précipité . . .⁴⁴

Therefore, Legitimism should not dwell upon, nor attempt to return to, the past. Instead the party must defend religion, morality, general and private interests, and national independence, all the while refraining from declaring itself "en état d'hostilité contre le pouvoir."⁴⁵ The Legitimist choice of opposition à la Quotidienne was to be passive resistance. Brian believed that the Revolution would drift progressively left-ward and he counselled patience as France discovered that the Orleanists and the Republicans could offer her only emptiness, danger, distress and violence. Ultimately the partisans of Henri V and the political truth he personified, Legitimism, would prevail.⁴⁶ The appointed task of the Party of Legitimism was, as a result, to utilize the press to point out the contradictions between the Orleanists' ideals and their actions, between the regime and its revolutionary origins, and perhaps hasten the reawakening of France.

The Gazette de France joined the Quotidienne in rejecting military counter-revolution as the best means by which Legitimists could effect the awakening of France. On August 23 and 27, 1830 it dismissed, in turn, the need for Legitimists to conspire against the regime and the charge that the party was plotting to effect a foreign invasion that would restore the Bourbons by force. Instead the Gazette, under its editor-owner the Abbé de Genoude, espoused a course of action similar to that of the Quotidienne. It would accept the regime's authority but wage intellectual war against its anti-social and anti-religious policies. The Gazette however, unlike the Quotidienne, was

quite willing to carry the defence of its principles into the political arena rather than patiently await the awakening of France. It appealed to its readers to:

Prenez la plume et signalez les fautes, les erreurs et les actes d'oppression de vos adversaires; allez aux élections et efforcez-vous d'y faire prévaloir les hommes sincèrement attachés aux principes d'ordre sociale, de morale et de stabilité.⁴⁷

Only in supporting, with their votes in the electoral colleges, men of the right-wing could Legitimists hope to further their cause.⁴⁸

United in their dismissal of extra-legal counter-revolution the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France came, in the months after the Revolution, to represent two factions of Legitimism. Brian and the Quotidienne, representing the conservatives of the internal emigration, espoused a passive resistance, a non-co-operation bred of contempt for the new monarchy. Genoude and the Gazette, "le journal doctrinaire du parti légitimiste," however spoke for the liberals of the parliamentary faction.⁴⁹ On September 4 the Gazette's staff proclaimed that:

les intérêts de notre pays, l'avenir de la religion parlent plus haut encore à notre coeur que nos sentimens personnels, et ce sont ces considérations puissantes qui nous font répétée aujourd'hui à nos amis, avec la conviction la plus vive, qu'ils doivent se rallier à l'ordre . . . ce n'est pas en quittant la scène politique, qu'on pourra obtenir le maintien des droits de la famille et de la conscience, éviter de nouvelles secours, raffermir le sol ébranlé, et rétenir sur le bord de l'abîme ce qui reste encore de protecteur dans un fantôme de monarchie.⁵⁰

United in their ends yet separated by their chosen means, could these two newspapers and the factions they represented lead the Party of Legitimism in an effective opposition?

Legitimism could hope for significant support in the departments of the Atlantic West and the Mediterranean South, but could

Legitimists find a practical policy around which all factions could rally? Whether devised and implemented by the internal émigrés or by the liberal parliamentary faction such a policy would also have to satisfy the aspirations of the party's extreme right-wing. Expelled from the steps of the throne in 1830, could the Party of Legitimism make the transition and become a viable opposition party under a regime it considered illegitimate and illegal?

Notes to Chapter I

1 Most of the information contained in this and the two succeeding paragraphs comes from the Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, règlements, avis du conseil-d'état (depuis 1788, par ordre chronologique) second edition, Vol. 30 (Paris: A. Guyot, 1838), with editorial footnotes by J.-B. Duvergier.

2 Adolphe Thiers, La Monarchie de 1830 (Paris: Alexandre Mesnier, 1831), p. 57.

3 See for example the conclusions drawn by David H. Pinkney, The French Revolution of 1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 367 and also his conclusion to Chapter IX, pp. 294 - 295. Also Alfred Cobban, "The Middle Classes in France", French Historical Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 41 - 52.

4 Charles de Lacombe, Vie de Berryer, Vol. 2, Berryer et la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 43.

5 See the correspondence between the Comte Ferdinand de Bertier and the Duchesse de Berry between 1830 and 1831, and also the "Rapport du Baron de Bordiné sur les dispositions des provinces de l'Ouest et du Sud-Ouest", La Conspiration des légitimistes et de la duchesse de Berry contre Louis-Philippe 1830 - 1832 (Correspondances et documents inédits), ed. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, Vol. 3, Etudes d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (Paris: Hatier, 1950).

6 The parallel between the emigrations of the two revolutions was drawn as early as September 4, 1830 by the Gazette de France, and the term émigration à l'intérieur was used by contemporaries to describe the phenomena. Rémond, in rehabilitating the Legitimist tradition, has popularized the term's use in modern historiography.

7 Letter of the Duc de Montmorency-Laval to the President of the Chamber of Peers, August 11, 1830, published in the Quotidienne, August 16/17, 1830.

8 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, 1830 - 1834 (Paris: Didier, 1872), pp. 28 - 29.

9 This last case concerns only the Peers, where there were cases of peers accepting the required oath by letter who never took their seats after the Revolution.

10 Vol. 10 of La Grande Encyclopédie: Inventaire raisonné des sciences, des lettres et des arts (Paris: Société anonyme de la Grande Encyclopédie, 1886 - 1902) records that 192 peers remained after the Revolution of 1830. As the Chamber numbered 365 before the Revolution, counting the 76 Charles X peers expelled, there were 97 others who retired (or resigned).

11 André Jardin & André-Jean Tudesq, La France des Notables, Vol. 1, L'Évolution générale 1815 - 1848 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil), p.129.

12 René Rémond, La Droite en France: de la Première Restauration à la Ve République (Paris: 1963) as translated by James M. Laux, The Right Wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), p. 83 reports that there were 52 voluntary resignations from the Deputies, a number repeated by Alfred Cobban, A History of France, Vol. 2, From the First Empire to the Second Empire, second edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 95, apparently coming from S. Charléty, La Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1921), Vol. 5 in the series Histoire de France Contemporaine, ed. Ernest Lavisse, p. 15. Thomas D. Beck, French Legislators 1800 - 1834: A Study in Quantitative History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 109, however, gives the number of unspecified vacancies as 99, while Patrick and Bernard Higonnet, "La Composition de la Chambre des Députés de 1827 à 1831", Revue Historique, Vol. 240, 1968, p. 375, count only 95. My own count, from the Dictionnaire des parlementaires français 1789 - 1889 5 vols., ed. A. Robert, E. Bourlouton, & G. Cougny (Paris: Bourlouton, 1891), comes to 63 resignations and 11 expulsions, a total of 74.

13 This number was, as for the deputies, determined by use of the Dictionnaire des parlementaires, and it must be noted that of these eight Legitimist peers, one, the Comte Lynch, sat only until after the trial of the ex-Ministers of Charles X in December 1830.

14 Following the Duc de Fitz-James' resignation in 1831 the role he had played as a Legitimist leader in the Upper Chamber was taken on by the young Duc de Noailles.

15 Charles de Lacombe, Vie de Berryer, Vol. 1, La Jeunesse de Berryer, second edition (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 412. See also Gazette de France, November 17, 1830.

16 Quotidienne, March 17, 1830. Also see Charles de Rémusat, Mémoires de ma vie, annotated by Charles H. Pouthas (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959), Vol. 2, p. 291.

17 MM. de Conny and Hyde de Neuville resigned without taking the oath. MM. de La Bourdonnaye-Blossac and de Lézardière sat until the general elections of 1831 but did not stand for re-election, although La Bourdonnaye-Blossac did rejoin Berryer in the Deputies in 1837 and sat with the Legitimists in the Chamber until his death in 1844.

18 Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections Since 1789 (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), p. 62.

19 "Rapport de Ferdinand de Bertier au Roi sur les chances et les moyens d'une restauration", September 25, 1830, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 4-15. See Appendix, Map 2.

20 Courrier Français as cited in Gazette de France, June 17, 1831.

21 See the volumes of Honoré de Balzac's "La Comédie Humaine" which are set during the July Monarchy, and Stendhal's Lucien Leuwen, Vol. 1, Le Chasseur Vert.

22 André-Jean Tudesq, Les Grands Notables en France: étude historique d'une psychologie sociale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), Vol. 1, pp. 134, & 145 - 146.

23 Ibid., pp. 148 & 158. Roger Price, "Legitimist Opposition to the Revolution of 1830 in the French Provinces", Historical Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1974, p. 762.

24 Tudesq, Vol. 1, p. 163.

25 Price, p. 763.

26 Tudesq, Vol. 1, p. 110.

27 Ibid., pp. 21 & 218. Also see André-Jean Tudesq, "L'Influence du romantisme sur le légitimisme sous la monarchie de juillet", in Romantisme et politique 1815 - 1851: Colloque de l'École Normale-Supérieure-Saint-Cloud (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969), p. 31.

28 Comte Alexandre d'Adhémar, Du Parti Légitimiste en France et sa Crise Actuelle (Dentu, 1843) as cited in Tudesq, "L'Influence du romantisme", p. 27.

29 See for example H. de Lourdoueix, De la Restauration de la Société Française, second edition (Paris: Bureau de la Gazette de France, 1833) and Alfred Nettement, Exposition Royaliste: 1789 - 1842 (Paris: Bureau de la Mode, 1842) as examples of this view from the liberal and conservative Legitimists respectively.

30 Tudesq, Vol. 1, p. 215.

31 Quotidienne, August 11, 1830.

32 Most of the economic summary in this paragraph is taken from Jardin & Tudesq, Vol. 1, pp. 127 - 131.

33 Charléty, pp. 16 - 17.

34 François Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps, Vol. 2, (Paris: Michel Lèvy frères, 1859), p. 379.

35 Cobban, Vol. 2, p. 95.

36 Duvergier, Vol. 30, pp. 110 - 114 reprints the revisions made to the charter of 1814 in August 1830. Articles 7 and 69(1) deal specifically with the freedom of the press.

37 Gazette de France, August 9, 1830.

38 Edmond Biré, La Presse Royaliste de 1830 à 1852: Alfred Nettement, sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1901), p. 47.

39 Charles Ledré, La Presse à l'assaut de la monarchie (1815 - 1848) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), Table II, uses the figures from the April 8, 1831 letter of the Prefect of Police to the Minister of the Interior in the Archives Nationales 262B, which ranks the Gazette de France consistently as the third largest Parisian newspaper between August 1830 and March 1831, behind the Constitutionnel and the Journal des Débats. The Quotidienne is ranked sixth, after the Courrier Français and the Temps but ahead of the National.

40 Biré, p. 91.

41 Irene Collins, The Government and the Newspaper Press in France 1814 - 1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 61.

42 Histoire générale de la presse française, ed. Claude Bellanger (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969) Vol. 2, p. 127. A common practice among the smaller Legitimist newspapers was the clipping and reprinting of the articles of the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France, a practice which leads Bellanger to describe the actual editor-in-chief of the Écho Français as a "Pair of Scissors". This practice gave the two Parisian dailies a primacy in the Legitimist press, a primacy also indicated by their large provincial circulations. Documents pour l'histoire de la presse nationale aux XIXe et XXe siècles ed. P. Albert, G. Feyel & J.-F. Picard (Collections documentation: Centre de documentation science humaines, éditions du C.N. R.S., [1977]), p. 13 contains a table which shows that 7,720 of 8,606 copies of the Gazette and 3,842 of 5,222 copies of the Quotidienne were sent to provincial readers.

43 Temps as cited in Quotidienne, October 22, 1830.

44 Quotidienne, August 10, 1830.

45 Ibid., August 19, 1830.

46 Ibid., December 26/27, 1830.

47 Gazette de France, August 27, 1830.

48 Ibid., September 19, 1830.

49 H. Avenel, Histoire de la presse française depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos jours (Paris: Flammarion, 1900), p. 317.

50 Gazette de France, September 4, 1830.

CHAPTER II

LEGITIMISM IN THE WAKE OF THE REVOLUTION:

THE EXPERIMENT WITH PASSIVE RESISTANCE

As the dust of the trois glorieuses settled, the left centre and left-wing deputies had effected a political revolution on August 7 and created the Orléans Monarchy. Owing its existence to this left centre - left coalition in the Chambers it would be expected that the new regime would have political difficulties only in its dealing with the right, the men who clung to the ideal of the legitimate Bourbon kingship. However, even while the right was still reeling from the suddenness of the Revolution, the first ministry of the new Monarchy, under the presidency of the Duc de Broglie, began to have difficulties. The revolutionary majority in the Chamber of Deputies was splitting into two rival Orleanist factions.

Elected in mid-1830 this Chamber of Deputies, the last elected under Charles X, had clung to power as the first under Louis-Philippe. Its revolutionary majority had been united against the Polignac Ministry and against accepting a new king from the elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty; however, once the Revolution of 1830 had successfully removed these two common irritants the majority began to fall apart. And the two Orleanist factions, Movement and Resistance, emerged.

Only two things kept the two Orleanist factions together after August 1830: the fear of a right-wing counter-revolution and the very incompleteness of the August 7 settlement. The charter revised on August 7 had created the constitutional Orléans Monarchy. Louis-Philippe's acceptance of the throne on August 9 had given substance to the "Orléans Monarchy"; it remained for the Chamber to give substance to the post-Revolution "constitutional monarchy". The Revolution demanded that there be a change in the electoral franchise. The pays légal would therefore be expanded, but the question, to be decided in the parliamentary session of 1831, was by how much. Until this question was settled by a new law both Resistance and Movement had a stake in remaining together so as not to be left out in the final franchise decision.

Faced with the necessity of maintaining the superficial unity of the majority until at least 1831 the Broglie Ministry, itself split between men of Resistance and men of Movement, hoped to remain in power by dealing only with minor issues, issues to which neither faction would conceivably object. The Ministry, playing upon its revolutionary origins, therefore embarked upon a programme of expunging the Bourbon years from French memory and bringing the country back into line with the heritage of 1789. Thus, the regicides of 1793 would be recalled from exile; the 30 million francs of the émigrés indemnity fund would be absorbed back into the national treasury; the national mourning for Louis XVI's execution in 1793 would be abolished; and the Bourbons themselves would be exiled. Such a programme would eliminate the vestiges of the fallen regime which were most blatantly inconsistent with the new Revolution-created monarchy. It would also,

by focusing attention on the Legitimists, keep alive the threat of counter-revolution against which the majority could unite.

Given this political state of affairs the attempts of the factions of Legitimism at transforming their erstwhile ruling party into a viable opposition party obligingly played into the Ministry's hands. Accepting the defence of Bourbon France, the Party of Legitimism presented a convenient political target upon which the Orleanists could fasten their fears of the counter-revolution. Reviled by the Orleanists in the Chambers and the press as vanquished Ultras and Carlists, the Legitimists, claiming their rights under the charter, spoke out against their attackers. The Gazette de France, on September 2, 1830, asked the men of July, in the name of the Legitimists:

Vous êtes vainqueurs dites vous? vainqueurs de quoi? Avez-vous vaincu des idées? avez-vous détruit des opinions qui ne peuvent mourir? Au contraire, tout ce qui s'est passés a eu lieu pour les opinions fussent libres.¹

And as for the "Carlist" epithet Legitimists asked: "Que signifie cette dénomination?" There could be no "Carlism" because Charles X had abdicated, as had his son the Duc d'Angoulême. The Legitimist King was Henri V, the little Duc de Bordeaux.² The party, accepting the validity of the abdications of Rambouillet, did not desire the restoration of the unpopular Charles or the lack-lustre Angoulême. By Legitimist acceptance of the realities of post-Revolution France, which made both of these Bourbon princes unacceptable, it was hoped that Legitimism would be able to throw off any responsibility by association for the ordinances and the bloodshed of July.

In 1830 the validity of the August 2 abdications was as unquestioned at the Bourbon court-in-exile as it was in France. With the failure of Louis-Philippe to accept the Regency for Henri V that task

had fallen to the young King's mother, the Duchesse de Berry. Only after the failure of the attempted military restoration of 1832, and its dénouement at Blaye, resulting in Berry's alienation from the court-in-exile, would Charles himself deny the validity of his actions at Rambouillet. And in 1835, with the foundation of the journal France, a small truly Carlist faction appeared on the French scene. Nevertheless, in spite of the internal and family politics of the court-in-exile, for most of the supporters of the Bourbons in France Henri was king from 1830 until his death in 1883.³ And, after Charles' death in 1836, while Angoulême did assume the style "Louis XIX" he also recognized the "Henriquinisme" of the majority of French Legitimists.⁴ Angoulême's kingship was nominal; as he said at his father's death, "le roi s'appelle aujourd'hui Louis XIX: la jour où la restauration se ferait, il s'appellerait Henri V."⁵

Defending themselves and their choice of king led, quite naturally for the Legitimists, to an attack upon the Orleanists' own choice. From January 11, 1830, when it was first hinted at in the National, until after the establishment of the Orléans Monarchy (Adolphe Thiers makes allusion to it in La Monarchie de 1830 published in November 1831) the favorite historical justification of the regime was the comparison between the July Revolution and the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. Attempting to disprove any parallel between the events of 1688 and 1830 the Quotidienne, in December 1830, compared the two countries prior to their revolutions. The English had a politically dominant aristocracy, an established and powerful national Church and a political society built upon social and political orders: France, on the other hand, in no way resembled England. The French aristocracy

and clergy were neither politically powerful nor dominant and the Great Revolution had destroyed the French estates and rebuilt society upon the individual. James II, the scion of a Scots dynasty established in England only eighty years, was a Catholic in a Protestant state who had done nothing to increase English power: Charles X, on the other hand, in no way resembled James. The last Bourbon, the scion of a native dynasty established in France for eight hundred years, was a co-religionist of his subjects who, by the liberation of Greece and the conquest of Algiers, had increased French prestige and power. How, the Quotidienne implied, could the English model, so different from the French reality, be used to justify the French Revolution of 1830?

Continuing its study of the Orleanist justificatory model the Quotidienne compared the monarchs established by the two revolutions. William III had been a sovereign prince, a successful military commander and the leader of the English revolution. He owed his crown to no political party. William's crown was his almost by right of conquest, but moreover it was sanctioned by the majority of each of the political orders of England.⁶ None of these qualities could be ascribed to the new King of the French. Louis-Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, had by no stretch of the imagination been a sovereign prince. His military career, climaxing in the revolutionary battles of Jemmapes and Valmy, had ended in his crossing the lines to the Austrian invaders. The King of the French owed his crown to 219 out of 430 deputies and 89 out of 365 peers. Were these 308 men, members of the Liberal opposition, really representative of 32 million Frenchmen? From the Legitimist point of view England and France were unlike before their

respective revolutions, and the revolutions had established very different kings. The 1688 - 1830 parallel was considered nothing but a sham.

The final argument, that 308 men did not represent 32 million French citizens, was to become a cornerstone of the Legitimist anti-Orléans campaign. The July Monarchy claimed its legitimacy on the basis of its creation by the deputies elected as representatives of the sovereign people, an assertion to which the Quotidienne replied on September 22, 1830:

À ce compte là quatre-vingt mille électeurs sont la France!
Ah! . . . que de millions de souverains vous détroniez a-la-fois!⁷

Such a claim to legitimacy was for the conservative Legitimist Quotidienne a presumptuous assumption. On September 30 it wrote:

quant à la royauté nouvelle, qui est née tout-à-coup, comme l'on sait, sans que la nation ait été appelée à y prendre la moindre part, on ne peut lui donner une base qui n'a été pour rien dans sa subite improvisation.⁸

The liberal Legitimist Gazette de France voiced other objections to the regime's claims to legitimacy. As early as August 27, 1830, it questioned the right of 600,000 Parisians to dictate to 31,000,000 other Frenchmen. And again, on August 29, it asked:

pourquoi cette prétention de renfermer toute la France dans Paris? Paris n'est ni un peuple ni une nation, et Paris seule s'est battu; et encore combien de citoyens de Paris ont pris part au combat? Ce n'est certainement pas la majorité. . . . On nous repondre que l'exemple de Paris a été promptement suivi dans la plupart des départemens; mais ne sait-on pas la puissance de la centralisation établi par Napoléon?⁹

Attacking the Orléans Monarchy's pretensions to legitimacy, these two arguments of the Quotidienne and the Gazette would be developed into two major themes of the Legitimist opposition: enlargement of the

franchise and decentralization. As such they would provide the party with policies more liberal and in a sense more revolutionary than those proposed by the ministry, ideal policies for use against the factionalized Orleanist majority.

This factionalization in fact provided the Legitimists with the substance of their favoured opposition strategy, publicizing the failure of the majority to maintain its revolutionary unity. Resistance and Movement were both accused of being merely the expression of two rival interest groups within France. Neither, in the opinion of the conservative Legitimist Quotidienne, could truly claim to represent the interests of all of France. The conflict between the two Orleanist factions was, like the Revolution itself, merely "une guerre de portefeuille" between personally ambitious politicians.¹⁰ The liberal Legitimist Gazette de France summed up the opening rift in the majority by claiming, on September 27, 1830, that the ministry, being of Resistance under Broglie, was denying its revolutionary origins so as to avoid sharing power with Movement, the true revolutionaries. "C'est donc dans l'arbitraire seul que sont placés les ministres" for, at the same time, the Ministry was claiming its revolutionary victory over the right so as to keep the Legitimists out of politics.¹¹ It was the Legitimist strategy to try and push the rival Orleanist factions further apart and hinder any attempts at reconciling Resistance and Movement. Two roughly equal and hostile factions in the Chamber would completely paralyse the government and this paralysis, in the Legitimists' view, would hasten French realization that only Henri V could save the country from anarchy and ensure the future peace and prosperity of the kingdom.

Nevertheless, if the majority was beginning to openly tear apart and if the Legitimists were trying to utilize this for their own ends, the Ministry could still count upon both Movement and Resistance to erase the vestiges of the Bourbon regime from the statutes. The proposals to bring back the regicides and close out the émigré indemnity fund were minor, if emotional, issues with which the Ministry, leaning towards Resistance, could hope to temporarily satisfy the anti-Bourbon, revolutionary sentiments of Movement and the popular classes. The first question, that of the return of the regicides of Louis XVI, was first introduced in the Chamber on September 2, 1830. Both the conservative Quotidienne and the liberal Legitimist deputy Berryer fought against the repeal of the law of January 12, 1816, which had sent the regicides into exile. Such a proposal was inconsistent with the institution of monarchy. The Quotidienne on September 6 exclaimed:

Le meurtre d'un roi peut ne point paraître un crime dans une république, mais qu'un pareil principe soit admis et consacré par un gouvernement et une chambre qui prétendent rester dans la monarchie, c'est ce qu'il est impossible de comprendre.¹²

For Berryer it was the principle of mass amnesty which was incomprehensible. The reintegration of individual regicides was permitted by article 3 of the 1816 law, but why bring them back en masse and in principle sanction their crime? No monarchy, in his view, could sanction regicide and remain stable.¹³ The first major test of the Legitimists in the Chambers since August 7 was, predictably, a failure. France opened her frontiers to the Bourbon-exiled conventionnels by votes of 206 to 31 in the Deputies and 73 to 8 in the Peers.¹⁴

More important, for the right-wing's conception of order, was the question of the émigré indemnity fund. The government, striking

at those most intransigent supporters of the Bourbons, the émigrés of the Great Revolution, proposed to reabsorb what was left of the money set aside in 1825 to compensate the old Royalist émigrés for property losses during the 25 year Bourbon interregnum. On December 9, 1830, Berryer attacked this proposal in the Deputies. It was, he said, a project tantamount to sanctioning that ultimate crime against property, confiscation. It was counter to the guarantees for liberty, order, law and property as set out in both the charters of 1814 and 1830. To end the just compensations being paid to the émigrés, Berryer claimed, would call into question all property rights from land and rentes to the possession of the Crown itself.¹⁵ Supported in his defence of the fund by both the conservative Quotidienne and the liberal Gazette de France the Legitimist orator's arguments availed the party little. The Deputies passed the law by a majority of 248 to 14, the Peers, by 81 to 4.¹⁶ Legitimists at the Quotidienne lamented on December 11, 1830 that:

Le Libéralisme et oppression seront bientôt synonymes en France . . . les amans de la liberté veulussent restaurer le mutisme de l'empire.¹⁷

The reabsorption of the fund back into the national treasury would be one of the regime's first acts in 1831.

Attempting to cover the factionalization of the majority and cling to power by focusing attention away from itself onto minor revolutionary issues, the Broglie Ministry disappeared, before the resolution of the émigré fund issue, in the face of popular pressures. Four of the ministers of the last Bourbon government, the Prince de Polignac, ex-President of the Council, the Comte de Peyronnet, ex-Minister of the Interior, The Comte Guernon de Ranville, ex-Minister

of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction, and M. de Chantelauze, ex-Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, had been arrested following the fall of the Bourbon throne. Paris demanded payment in kind for the blood spilt in July and accordingly, though unwilling to create martyrs for the counter-revolution, the Broglie Ministry had been forced to accept the Chamber of Deputies' recommendation of September 23, 1830, and bring the four ex-Ministers to trial for high treason.¹⁸

The proposed trial of the ex-Ministers for a crime for which the Revolution had already punished the elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty was, for Legitimists, highly irregular. Berryer, speaking in the Deputies on September 27, questioned the legality of the proposal.

On veut que vous accusiez les ex-ministres de haut traison? envers qui? Envers le roi qui a été précipité du trône, ou envers celui qui vous venez d'y appeler? contre l'ordre de choses que le peuple a détruit, ou contre celui dont vous venez de créer? contre la charte dont vous mêmes avez renversé le principe fondamentale, changé le caractère et modifié les dispositions?

Non Messieurs: lorsque le 7 août vous avez écrit en tête de votre déclaration que par suite de la violation de la charte, le trône de Charles X était vacant en fait et en droit, . . . vous avez abandonné le droit d'accuser les ministres de Charles X pour ces mêmes faites, pour ces mêmes violations de la charte.¹⁹

Both the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France concurred with the Legitimist deputy. It would be an argument which often appeared in the pages of the two journals throughout the weeks of the preliminaries and the trial itself.

However, so soon after the July Revolution such legal objections from the right could not outweigh the revolutionary demands of the Paris populace. Goaded by the suggestion in the Deputies in October that capital punishment be abolished, the crowds demonstrated

outside the Palais-Royal on October 17, demanding the ex-Ministers' blood. Three successive days of rioting, finally contained by the National Guard on October 19, pointed up the Ministry's inability to act decisively.²⁰ The political prisoners imprisoned in the Château de Vincennes had not been turned over to the hostile crowd, and the regime had survived, but the credibility of the Broglie Ministry both with Movement and with the crowd had disappeared. In an apparent attempt to assuage left-wing sentiment in the city the Ministry was reshuffled. Broglie, Molé, Louis and Guizot, all men of Resistance, resigned and were replaced by men of Movement.

The new ministry under the actual control of the new Finance Minister, Jacques Laffitte, despite its tendencies towards revolutionary movement, was no less committed to a bloodless dénouement to the Revolution of 1830 than its predecessor had been. Paris, determined to have blood, was to have its thirst for revenge go unslaked. The Court of the Peers on December 21, defended by the National Guard from the hostile crowds which filled the streets around the Luxembourg Palace, sentenced the ex-Ministers to life imprisonment and the loss of their civil rights.²¹ The bloodless verdict produced what Jardin and Tudesq have called "une véritable soulèvement" in Paris.²² Anti-government crowds rioted for two days protesting the verdict and were only quieted through the mediation of non-ministerial politicians of Movement.²³

The regime rode out the crisis, but there had been a subtle change. Five months of popular unrest seem to have cooled the revolutionary ardour of the Parisian bourgeoisie, and the Laffitte Ministry mirrored this change. Moving away from its Movement origins

the Ministry was seen to be approaching the juste-milieu of Resistance. And, indeed, while the general paralytic division of the majority had not changed, Resistance was gaining the upper hand. On December 24 the resignation, arranged by the Ministry, of Lafayette as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard saw the revolutionary left completely ousted from official positions of power. It was tantamount to the use of purification against the left.²⁴ However, if the government was adopting a policy of Resistance and might take the first tentative steps in that direction, Laffitte's Ministry was still not secure enough in power to openly challenge Movement and its popular support..

The power of the popular revolutionary societies supporting Movement became apparent again, two months later. The national day of mourning on January 21 for Louis XVI had passed unobserved and without incident. But the forces of popular vengeance, thwarted in December by the Court of the Peers, found expression in a three day anti-Bourbon and anti-clerical rampage in February of 1831. A Legitimist memorial mass for the father of their King, the assassinated Duc de Berry, at the Church of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois on February 14 had excited what Charl  ty called the "fureur antil  gitimiste" of the Parisians.²⁵ Having sacked Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois on February 14 the rioters burned the Archbishop of Paris' Palace and his country residence at Conflans. Crosses and the royal arms displaying the fleurs-de-lys were pulled down from public buildings. The government, to please the rioters, replaced the "Bourbon" lilies with the "Gallic" cock on the arms of France and used troops to assist the crowd in removing the offensive symbols of the religion of the majority of Frenchmen, the crosses. Apparently powerless to stop the rioting the Ministry turned,

with popular approval, upon the men whose religious ceremony at Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois had touched off the riots.

A Legitimist plot had been uncovered or so the Ministry claimed. On the orders of the Minister of the Interior, the Comte de Montalivet, investigations were begun into the activities of known and suspected Legitimist sympathisers. Prominent Legitimists were placed under arrest and their residences searched. Against the threat of a Legitimist counter-revolution the majority united. There was little outcry in the Chambers when the Legitimist West and South fell, by ministerial order, under a virtual state of siege; or such it appeared to those Frenchmen, known or suspected of being Legitimists, who were subjected to a regime of police surveillance and illegal visites domiciliaires.²⁶

After the December 1830 riots and with increasing regularity after the February riots the provincial news columns of the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France reported the anti-Legitimist activities of the authorities in the West and the South. The Gazette on February 25 asked why should men who it claimed are innocent of rioting and plotting against the government be treated like this? Berryer, in speaking in the Deputies on March 10, turned his remarks towards this state of affairs and against the Ministry.

Je ne comprends pas comment dans cette enceinte où siègent tant de défenseurs déclarés de la liberté, pas un voix ne s'est élevée lorsqu'un jeune ministre a osé nous dire qu'il avait adressé dans les départements douze préfets de rechercher les personnes suspectées d'attachement au gouvernement qui n'est plus, de fouiller leurs maisons, de s'assurer de leurs personnes et de leurs papiers. . . . les dépêches de M. le ministre de l'intérieur, qui ordonnent des persécutions sans dénonciations, sans documents, sans désignation spéciale des individus qu'ils veut atteindre, passent toutes les bornes de précautions ombrageuses, et sont un exemple de tyrannie inconnu jusqu'ici.²⁷

The much vaunted Orleanist liberty was, for Legitimists, an empty

promise as the government set out to prove by "inquisitorial" means the existence of a plot which the Gazette said existed only in the heads of the Ministers.²⁸

What could the Ministry hope to gain from its persecution of Legitimists? The Gazette de France claimed on March 11 that in suspending normal constitutional procedures to deal with an alleged Legitimist conspiracy the Ministry was in fact looking to deal with the threat from the left. There was a strange aura of mystery around the origins of the February riots.²⁹ The original mass for the Duc de Berry had been planned for the anniversary of his murder, February 13. Official pressure on the Archdiocese had caused it to be postponed. It was transferred from the Church of Saint-Roche to Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois and rescheduled for the fourteenth. Why had the anti-Legitimist rioters permitted the celebrants of the mass to leave the church quietly before beginning to sack the building? Where had the crowd appeared from so suddenly on the fourteenth and disappeared to, just as suddenly, on the sixteenth? Had it all been staged by the government? Certainly the arrests which followed the riots imprisoned Legitimists and rioters equally, a fact remarked upon by the Gazette on February 19, and it appeared to be anomalous that the government which had been powerless to stop the riots was powerful enough to risk further disorder by arresting the rioters.³⁰ Was the threat of a non-existent Legitimist conspiracy being used to appropriate power with which to begin to defuse the Parisian revolutionary societies and popular clubs which supported the left-wing? Certainly the threat from the right served the purpose of reuniting the votes, if not the ideals, of the two Orleanist factions.³¹

The benefits of this strategy, if such it was, were lost, for the Laffitte Ministry, which fell on March 12, 1831, over its handling of foreign affairs.³² A new ministry was appointed under the presidency of Casimir Périer. Resistance had secured for itself, in name as well as fact, the government of France. Heir to the divided Chamber, the Périer Ministry pursued both the policy developed under Broglie of non-confrontation and the anti-left strategy which had gained shape under Laffitte in a determined effort to master the Chamber and stabilize the regime.

On March 15, with the tacit support of the Ministry, Jacques Baude, a deputy from the Loire sitting with the Movement faction, proposed that the Chamber outlaw all members of the overthrown royal family. It was an issue ideally suited to elicit an attack from the supporters of the Bourbons, an attack against which the rival Orleanist factions could readily reunite. However, while the Baude proposition did temporarily reunite the two Orleanist factions, it failed to provoke a violent response from the right-wing. Little was to be gained for Legitimism by an emotional defence of the Bourbons. Instead the party argued the issue upon the basis of the Revolution of 1830's own ideal, popular sovereignty.

The Legitimist opponents of Baude's proposition, while believing in the legal hereditary right of Henri, Duc de Bordeaux, to the French throne recognized that "elle ne pourrait avoir l'importance que si une grande nombre de Français croyaient utile à la faire prévaloir."³³ What the people had willed in July 1830, the de facto exile of the Bourbons, needed no legislative sanction. And if in the future the people desired a Bourbon restoration, no law passed by the

Chamber of 1831 would hinder the Bourbon return. The Gazette de France on March 17 ridiculed the proposition's attempt to bind future generations.

Quoi, en cents ans, les législateurs seront tenus de respecter les volontés de M. Baude: et si d'ici là une loi d'élection plus large appelait tous les Français à voter des députés élus de la nation entière, ils devraient se soumettre aux arrêts d'un député nommé par des collèges d'électeurs à cents écus! Tous celà est difficile à comprendre.³⁴

For Berryer, speaking in the Deputies on March 15, the proposition was futile. And it also served to indicate the regime's own weakness and instability. Only a government uncertain of its hold on power would try to secure the present by addressing itself to the unforeseeable future. Were there not more pressing questions to deal with?³⁵

The moderation of the Legitimist argument, which the Gazette de France on March 18 contrasted with the verbal violence of the Orleanists in the Chamber, seemed to give them a first, if small, success on the parliamentary level. The proposition was not voted upon that session but was sent instead to committee for further discussion. However, anti-Bourbon propaganda continued in the Orleanist press. The stay of execution was due, not to the logic of the right-wing's orators and journalists, but to the demands of a more important issue. The need to define the July Monarchy's electoral basis had caught up with Louis-Philippe's third ministry.

The charter of 1830 had given notice of the deputies' revolutionary commitment to an enlarged pays légal for France. However, in lowering the age restrictions on candidates and electors the erstwhile Liberals of the Orleanist majority had deferred the question of the cens until less turbulent times. By the spring of 1831 the times were not less unsettled, but it was becoming obvious that a new Chamber, one

in which the deadlock between the Orleanist juste-milieu and the Orleanist left might be broken, was needed before the government could effectively deal with the problems facing France. Before general elections for a new Chamber could be called the question of the cens had to be decided.

Political liberals, believing in the parliamentary representative system of government, the Orleanist politicians were on the whole social conservatives wary of granting political power to the masses. Having ensured that the primacy of power lay with the elected Chamber, these August revolutionaries were content to retain the restricted franchise of the Bourbon Monarchy which would ensure that the notables retained control of the Chamber. Accordingly, while the new electoral law almost doubled the electorate, from 94,000 to 166,000, the Orleanists merely loosened slightly the franchise restrictions of the Restoration. The new electoral law, of April 19, 1831, required that deputies be paying at least 500 francs of direct taxes each year, as opposed to the 1,000 francs required under the Bourbon Monarchy. And, where the Restoration electors had been required to be paying 300 francs a year, the new law set a minimum cens of 200 francs for electors.³⁶

France under the law of April 19, 1831, remained a censitaire constitutional monarchy. The Republicans of the extreme left and the Legitimists of the right were incensed. Both had advocated universal manhood suffrage for the regime created by the Revolution of 1830, for neither believed that the Orleanist juste-milieu had any support from the mass of the French nation. The extreme left believed that, combined with a system of direct election, universal suffrage would

enable France to evolve democratically towards the Republic. The right, however, had advocated, in the press and through Berryer in the franchise debates in the Deputies, universal suffrage for a number of different reasons.

Conservative Legitimists, while fearing the granting of political power to the masses, had seen universal suffrage as the logical corollary to the revolutionary rhetoric of July. Accordingly, the Quotidienne had written in favour of the concept for it would, it believed, quickly lead France into that state of political anarchy which Legitimists believed would hasten the restoration of the legitimate kingship.³⁷ The Gazette de France and the parliamentary Legitimists had been in favour of universal manhood suffrage for different reasons. There was undoubtedly a certain pleasure for liberal Legitimists in advocating a policy more liberal and consistent with the regime's ideals than the policy of the regime's governing majority. The question of the franchise thus gave the liberals of the Party of Legitimism a chance to publicly prove that theirs was a party of the future rather than a party of the counter-revolution and the past.³⁸ It also enabled Legitimists to claim that theirs was the Royalist party to best serve the interests of all Frenchmen rather than just the interests of a social or business class.³⁹ However, the liberal Legitimist position was not all just political posturing.

The Gazette de France believed that the French were basically conservative and Monarchist, rather than Republican, and would prefer the legitimate kingship restored. It had thus been advocating universal manhood suffrage since November 17, 1830. Universal manhood suffrage was, according to the Abbé de Genoude, one of the fundamental laws of

the old French Monarchy.⁴⁰ The absolutist Bourbons had trampled on the rights of all free Frenchmen to vote, but:

on se rappelle que Louis XVI, dans sa convocation des états-généraux de la France, avait voulu que tous les Français fussent admis à concourir à la nomination des députés.⁴¹

And Genoude would have had the Party of Legitimism model its franchise policy after the system used in 1789 which he claimed would enfranchise six million Frenchmen.⁴² However, the majority of Legitimists in 1831 either did not share Genoude's faith in the conservatism of the French masses or were wary of the possible consequences of universal suffrage upon the social order. Therefore, under the influence of the more pragmatic politicians of the parliamentary faction, universal manhood suffrage as advocated by the Party of Legitimism was to be combined with a system of indirect election.

On February 25, 1831 Berryer presented the Legitimist counter proposal to the censitaire electoral system of the Orleanists. Declaring a cens restriction to be "une injustice monstrueuse", Berryer proposed that each Frenchman 25 years of age and over who had been enrolled as a taxpayer for at least one year be given the vote. To assuage fears on the part of conservative notables the Legitimist deputy further proposed that a system of indirect elections be introduced along with universal manhood suffrage: All Frenchmen would vote for communal assemblies, these assemblies would elect delegates to a national electoral college and the college would elect the Chamber of Deputies.⁴³ However, even such a system of indirect election was unacceptable to the Orleanist deputies: "Les doctrinaires ont repoussé la proposition . . . la gauche est restée neutre."⁴⁴

Less socially dangerous than universal suffrage, with an historical tradition of its own and with direct bearing upon the Legitimists' own provincial and rural power base, was the issue of decentralization. Tied to the franchise issue, the rights of the departments and communes to local self-determination also enjoyed Legitimist advocacy. And they were also denied by the regime. The Vicomte de Bonald, with the Comte de Maistre the leading Ultra theoretician of the Restoration, had claimed that:

La commune est l'élément politique d'une nation monarchique, la véritable famille politique, et c'est aussi avec la constitution de la commune ou son affranchissement, qu'a commencé en France la forme régulière et mieux déterminée de la constitution de l'État.⁴⁵

Falling heir to this conception the Legitimists at the Gazette de France had objected in August 1830 to Paris dictating the overthrow of the Bourbons to the rest of France. So too, on May 7, 1831, the Quotidienne objected to a political system which imprisoned all governmental and administrative authority in Paris leaving the provinces only "le rôle secondaire de satellites."⁴⁶ To be consistent in form with its origins in a popular revolution, according to the Legitimist political writers, the July Monarchy ought to give the 44,000 communes of France the freedom to elect their own governing officials. Free from the central government's interference and control would the communes elect Orleanists or men in opposition to the Orleanist regime? Legitimists were certain it would be the latter; thus they would gain concrete proof of their claim that the regime was not an expression of the will of the French nation.⁴⁷ However, understandably, the Orleanists would do nothing that could have conceivably weakened the new regime and their own hold on power within that regime. The Party

of Legitimism would have to be content with any particularist sympathy and support that it might have won by its advocacy of decentralization.

Having settled the franchise question in a manner designed to ensure the Orleanist hold over the Chamber of Deputies the P  rier Ministry next turned its efforts towards ending the regime's tradition of weak governments. Prorogued on April 20, the Chamber which had made the revolution of August was dissolved on May 31 and a general election was called for July 5. In the face of increasingly open opposition from the deputies and journalists of the left-wing, P  rier instructed his Prefects to use their influence to guarantee that the elections returned suitably conservative deputies, men of Resistance and the juste-milieu, like the Ministry itself.⁴⁸ P  rier wanted an end to the dangerous paralysis of a divided majority which had plagued the first two July ministries. Would he be successful?

This question, while of interest to the Legitimists because it would have a bearing upon how long the regime might last, was of less import to the party than the question of how it would conduct itself during the election campaign. Would it fight the campaign directly, in the electoral colleges, as advocated by the liberal Legitimist factions? Or would the party follow the lead of its conservative faction, of the internal   migr  s, and watch from the sidelines as the juste-milieu and the left fought it out at the polls? The issue, over and above the elections, was the future of the Party of Legitimism's own unity.

This unity was in fact a fragile fa  ade. Like their Orleanist rivals, Legitimists were split between two basic factions, conservatives and liberals. Each hoped to lead the party towards the common goal, a

Bourbon restoration, but each had chosen a different route of opposition. Founded upon a disagreement over the acceptability of the July oath of loyalty this divergence of opinion persisted in showing itself under the hard light of political reality. In September 1830 the Abbé de Genoude had strained the party's unity by pointing out that since 1815, unlike other Legitimist newspapers, the Gazette de France had never advocated any other system for France but that of parliamentary monarchy. Genoude's newspaper was firmly against Legitimism withdrawing voluntarily from the political arena. As a result the Gazette called upon Legitimists to take part in by-elections, starting in October, called to fill the 113 vacancies in the Chamber created by the Revolution. And this position was openly opposed by the Quotidienne, which advocated that the party follow the example of the internal émigrés and abstain from the by-elections.⁴⁹

For these by-elections the Broglie Ministry had implemented a policy by which, unlike during the Restoration, electors as well as deputies would be required to take the oath of loyalty. Having identified Legitimism with the landed wealth of the West and the Midi the government was making a conscious effort to strike down all possible Legitimist opposition. Fearing an alliance of Legitimist electors and Movement candidates the government's solution was to try to force Legitimist notables to abstain from the elections. If a majority of Legitimists would exile themselves from the Deputies, as in August 1830, because of the prerequisite oath, then requiring the same oath of electors ought to prevent Legitimists from even appearing in the electoral colleges.

Both the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France had attacked this requirement as inconsistent with the regime's principles of legitimacy. The Gazette, on September 1, had asked: "Ce serment est-il une abdication que fait chaque citoyen de la souveraineté qui lui est attribuée?"⁵⁰ How, the Quotidienne reasoned on October 12, could the Ministry claim that the King and the charter were the creations of the sovereign people and then turn about and force the electors, the representatives of the same sovereign people, to bind themselves to that King and charter by an oath? And again, on a more practical level, the Baron de Brian also had exclaimed:

Ehe! M. le ministre, les serments librement prêtés à Charles X prince légitime, lui ont été fort inutiles. Croyez-vous que ceux que vous faites prêtés à Louis-Philippe lui serviraient à grand chose, le jour où il aurait besoin de les invoquer?⁵¹

Nevertheless, in spite of this polemic, nothing could be done to force the government to lift the new oath requirement.

Agreed over the illegality of the government's requiring the oath of the electors, the two Legitimist dailies had not agreed upon whether or not their readers should or could take the oath. The Gazette de France had maintained that, for all men interested in the future order and prosperity of France, acceptance of the electoral duty, and its accompanying oath, was essential.⁵² The Quotidienne, on the other hand, while it had recognized that there was the possibility that Legitimists could take the oath and vote, believed that Legitimists should not take the oath.⁵³ And indeed the majority of the party's supporters seemed to have listened to the conservatives of the Quotidienne. The appeal of the Gazette and the parliamentary Legitimists had been unsuccessful.

Liberal Legitimist hopes for the by-elections had come to grief in the electoral colleges. Of the 113 by-elections only four returned Legitimists to the Chamber. Representing arrondissements isolated from one another by the length and breadth of France these successful Legitimist candidates represented but isolated successes for the liberal faction of the party.⁵⁴ Whether according to the government's plan or as a concerted conservative-led electoral boycott, French Legitimist electors had stayed away from the electoral colleges.

The Gazette de France having failed in its attempt to lead the party to the electoral colleges had lashed out at its conservative rival on January 1, 1831.

Nous ne sommes point avec la Quotidienne qui veut, avec le principe du pouvoir antérieur, la restauration de 1814 et de 1815.⁵⁵

And on January 7 it published an article, "Aux Électeurs", in which it remonstrated with those Legitimists who had abstained from the by-elections.

Rien ne soit plus funeste à la cause de l'ordre et aux intérêts de la France, que l'abandon qui serait fait par les hommes de la droite en s'abstenant d'exercer les droits qu'ils tiennent, non d'un pouvoir ou d'une constitution particulière, mais de leur position sociale, de leur fortune et de leur titre de citoyen.⁵⁶

However, chiefly concerned with maintaining the fiction of Legitimist unity, the Quotidienne had refrained from replying to the charges of having counter-revolutionary desires and of having jeopardized the cause of order and the future prosperity of France. And the outbreak of the February riots, the imposition of an anti-Legitimist police regime in the West and the Chamber's debates on the franchise question intervened to push the practical differences between the two factions into the background in the late winter and spring of 1831.

Disappointed by the final outcome of the franchise debate and sensing the approaching election the Gazette de France early in April reopened its campaign to get Legitimists to vote. On April 19, 1831 it announced that:

Nous n'avons cessé d'engager [les hommes de la droite] à chercher dans les voies parlementaires le triomphe de leurs opinions. Ils peuvent reconnaître aujourd'hui que toute idée contraire serait préjudiciable aux intérêts de leur cause. Quelques esprits ont pu croire que le salut de la France pouvait venir par d'autres voies, le temps a marché et il a été perdu pour eux. Plus il marcherait mieux on comprendra qu'au fond de tous nos intérêts, il n'y a que la ligne de la Gazette.⁵⁷

And again in an article, "Aux Royalistes", on the twenty-fifth:

Ce serait une véritable expatriation volontaire ou forcée, si par une cause quelconque des citoyens étaient privées ou se privaient eux-mêmes des droits. . . Vous dont les noms ont été et sont encore l'illustration de la France ancienne et nouvelle; vous grands propriétaires, . . . c'est à vous qu'il appartient de défendre contre une tyrannie nouvelle . . . ces populations expropriées.

Hommes de la droite! au nom de la patrie, présentez-vous aux élections; c'est votre droit, c'est le poste de l'honneur, c'est le dernier espoir du pays, vous êtes son ancre de salut.⁵⁸

It was an impassioned appeal. Would the Legitimists who had not heard it in October hear it now in time for the general elections?

The answer was not long in coming from the Quotidienne, speaking for the party "dont elle est l'organe", on May 18, 1831.

Dans la langue des honnêtes gens, qui est la nôtre . . . un serment est toujours un serment.

Des personnes se sont qui ont dit: "Le serment imposé aux électeurs et aux députés est un contre-sens et un absurdité, une violation de la souveraineté du peuple!" Ces personnes là avaient raison: . . . Mais ceux qui ont conclu que ce serment n'engageait à rien . . . ceux là sont tombés dans une grande erreur.

Le principe de la monarchie, c'est l'honneur . . . Aujourd'hui, comme autrefois, quand tout est perdu, l'honneur resté sauf peut sauver le reste: le déshonneur pour le royalisme serait un

suicide. . . . Combattre le libéralisme à coups de faux sermens et d'arrières pensées, c'est lui laisser l'avantage des armes.⁵⁹

To emphasize their point the writers of the Quotidienne, twelve days later, summarized their position for their readers.

Si les parjurés du libéralisme ont fait triompher sa cause, en profanant la saintété de la foi jurée, les parjurés du royalisme tueraient le serment et le royalisme avec lui. . . . Que si l'on voulait encore nous reprocher de condamner les royalistes à un éternel îlotisme en France, nous répéterions encore que c'est une question de temps et de convenance que nous soulevons.⁶⁰

For the conservatives of the Quotidienne, speaking for the internal émigrés, no Legitimist could honourably take the oath and therefore all must abstain from the new elections. They were confident that it would not be long before the juste-milieu and the left led the country into anarchy from which only the right-wing, its honour intact, would be able to save France. On that day, bearing the banners of hereditary legitimacy, the men of the right would return to public life.

In this belief the Quotidienne spoke for the majority of Legitimists in the early summer of 1831. An article, reprinted from the Legitimist Ami de l'Ordre (Nantes) by the Quotidienne, on May 28 gave notice that the conservatives' lead would be followed by the electors of the western departments, an assessment with which the Legitimist Gazette de Bretagne (Rennes) concurred.⁶¹ Evidence of provincial adherence to the conservative Legitimists' proposal to abstain as a party from the elections appears regularly in the provincial news columns of both of the two major Parisian dailies between May and the July elections.⁶² The Baron de Brian recognized his newspaper's leadership role when he observed on June 10 that:

La Quotidienne n'a point oublié quelle réserve lui est imposée; elle sait qu'envers ses amis comme envers ses

adversaires, elle se trouve dans cette position particulière qu'elle doit parler officiellement de l'avenir.⁶³

Even the Gazette de France was forced to acknowledge the Quotidienne's electoral leadership. The writers of the liberal Legitimist journal reluctantly informed their readers on June 15 that:

Nous croyons que l'idée de s'abstenir est celle qui a prévalu; et en effet puisque la plus grande partie était résolue de ne point aller dans les collèges, tout ce qu'auraient pu faire les autres devenait non seulement inutile mais nuisible à la cause de l'ordre.⁶⁴

The ex-King Charles X never ordered his grandson's adherents to abstain from the electoral colleges.⁶⁵ The court-in-exile was, in fact, surreptitiously advocating Legitimist electoral participation to elect Legitimists or even Republicans so as to weaken the Orleanist government.⁶⁶ But to no avail. The results of the election were conclusive; Legitimists all but disappeared from the Chamber of Deputies after July 5, 1831.

It was a great moral victory for the conservative Legitimists. Refusing to abjure their loyalty to the House of Bourbon, the men of Legitimism had refrained from exercising their electoral duties and had saved the party's honour. They also had left the Chamber of Deputies caught in its pre-election paralysis. Having washed their hands of the Revolution-created political regime they had placed their party above reproach for the political anarchy which in their opinion was inevitable. In the struggle between the Ministry and the Opposition the Quotidienne triumphantly proclaimed that "il n'est heureusement question ni de côté droite ni de royalistes."⁶⁷ However, men of the right did continue to sit in the Deputies.

The Courrier Français, cited by the Gazette de France on July 22, described the new Chamber as consisting of 227 Opposition deputies,

203 Ministerials and 22 political unknowns. This left 7 seats whose occupants, neither juste-milieu or left-wing opposition, were right-wing opponents of the regime.⁶⁸ Chief among these deputies-elect of the right was Pierre-Antoine Berryer. Berryer's double election, in his old seat in the Haute-Loire and in the Bouches-du-Rhône, ensured that the leading orator of the parliamentary Legitimists would not pass unnoticed in the new Chamber. Indeed his Marseille election, which had been accompanied by violent Legitimist demonstrations, served to focus attention upon the continued parliamentary presence of the right. Berryer was, as a result, reviled in the Orleanist press as the candidate of the Bourbon court-in-exile at Holyrood, Scotland.⁶⁹ And at the same time, for his persistence in following the parliamentary route of opposition, he was viewed as a renegade by the conservatives in his own party.

As the conservative faction of Legitimism hardened its position against Legitimists taking the oath it turned against those men who had seemingly perjured themselves by swearing it. Accordingly Berryer became, in the pages of the Quotidienne, simply "une député, l'une de ceux qui formaient le côté droit sous l'ancien gouvernement."⁷⁰ The controversy over the Legitimist parliamentarian's Marseille election, followed with some interest by the Gazette de France, was virtually ignored by the Quotidienne.

In conservative circles the seven right-wing deputies were guilty of insubordinately ignoring the desire of the majority within the Party of Legitimism to abstain from the electoral process. Their insistence on carrying the party's opposition into the Deputies over the objections of the conservative faction had struck a serious blow

at the façade of Legitimist unity. The obvious division within the party left the Legitimists open to attack from the Orleanists. If the men of the right continued to sit in the Chamber had there been a boycott by Legitimists of the elections? If there had been no boycott then the new Chamber was an accurate representation of the French electorate. And if the Chamber was an accurate representation of France then the destruction of the right-wing was proof that the Orleanist factions and not the Legitimists represented France. Frustrated in their attempts to break the deadlock between themselves in the Chamber the Orleanist factions could at least claim the decimation of the right as a small but welcome electoral victory.

Before this attack the Gazette de France fell into line behind the Quotidienne. On July 14 the liberal Legitimists of the Gazette attempted to disabuse the Orleanists of their "anti-right" victory.

Nous pouvons assurer que l'opinion monarchique en masse s'est retirée des collèges . . . Il y a peut-être eu quelques exceptions mais elles sont personnelles.⁷¹

The Quotidienne had been more emphatic two days earlier in disavowing the deputies-elect of the right. On July 12 it had claimed that:

la vérité est que les royalistes n'ont point pris part aux élections . . . Si donc quelques personnes s'étaient séparées du parti royaliste pour accepter une candidature, elle n'auraient pu obtenir un certain nombre des voix que par le concours des gens du juste-milieu.⁷²

The conservative Legitimists and the party's major weapon, the press, thus defending themselves from the Orleanists, separated themselves from the Legitimist parliamentary rump which had clung to its seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

The liberal Legitimists of the Gazette de France never did quite forget their earlier alliance with the liberals of the parliamen-

tary faction. Although it maintained an uneasy partnership with the conservatives at the Quotidienne, the activities of the erstwhile Legitimist deputies in the Chamber, and especially of Berryer, remained of interest and were carefully reported by the Gazette. Nevertheless, even while reporting on August 10 that Berryer had taken possession of his seat for the Haute-Loire, the Gazette remarked that: "il n'y a pas un seul royaliste dans la chambre des députés."⁷³ The party line initiated by the Quotidienne and its internal émigré supporters was held to.

Legitimism had officially disengaged itself from the political arena of the Palais-Bourbon. Under the leadership of the conservative-internal émigré faction it chose a politically passive form of opposition to the Orleanist regime. A week after the opening of the new Chamber's first session the Quotidienne, of August 16/17, reviewed the party's hopes for the new, common strategy.

Qu'avons nous dit aux royalistes, huit jours avant les élections? Absentez-vous. Laissez vos adversaires se débattre, soyez seulement spectateurs de cette lutte ouverte entre deux partis également impuissans. Vous verrez sorti de ce conflit une chambre presque également partagée, où les forces et les faiblesses se neutraliseront; sans majorité de gauche pour vous opprimer par des mesures violentes, sans majorité des centres pour vous faire subir l'ignoble despotisme du juste-milieu.

On sait maintenant ce qu'est la chambre; elle l'a assez fait voir hier, et nous pouvons demander aux royalistes s'ils ont lieu de regretter d'avoir refusé d'y prendre place.

La France avait peut-être besoin d'avoir devant elle une chambre exclusivement libérale. Ce sera pour le pays un grande et salutaire enseignement.⁷⁴

Putting their faith in the inability of any ministry to govern effectively with a Chamber divided against itself, the conservative Legitimists would wait. They believed that time would vindicate

their principles and programme in the eyes of France. Only the Legitimists, bringing with them universal manhood suffrage, decentralization and Henri V, could ensure peace and prosperity for France and an end to the Revolution-created anarchy in government.

Notes to Chapter II

1 Gazette de France, September 2, 1830.

2 Ibid., October 24, 1830 and Quotidienne, October 22, 1830. Called Carlists by the supporters of the new Orléans Monarchy, men of Legitimism immediately after the Revolution preferred to call themselves Royalists and men of the Right.

3 Two public demonstrations of this "Henriquinisme" occurred; one in the lifetime of Charles X and the other during the "reign" of "Louis XIX". The first, in Prague in September 1833, marked Henri's entry into his fourteenth year, the traditional date of the coming of age of Bourbon Kings. Over 400 Frenchmen journeyed to Prague to pay their homage to Henri V. The second, a levée at Henri's hotel on Belgrave Square in London in October 1843, was considered by both the English and French governments as Henri's first act as Pretender. See Marvin L. Brown, The Comte de Chambord: The Third Republic's Uncompromising King (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 26 & 41.

4 Gazette de France, February 8, 1831. "Un journal libérale" seems to have dropped the term Carlist in favour of its own term, Henriquinist (Henri-V-ist rather than Charles-ist).

5 Louis Véron, Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris, Vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1856), p. 389.

6 Quotidienne, December 1, 1830.

7 Ibid., September 22, 1830.

8 Ibid., September 30, 1830.

9 Gazette de France, August 29, 1830.

10 Quotidienne, September 27, 1830.

11 Gazette de France, September 27, 1830.

12 Quotidienne, September 6, 1830.

13 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, 1830 - 1834 (Paris: Didier, 1872), pp. 33 - 34.

14 Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du conseil-d'état (depuis 1788 par ordre chronologique), second edition (Paris: A. Guyot, 1838), with editorial footnotes by J.-B. Duvergier. Vol. 30, pp. 174 - 175.

15 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, pp. 57 - 67.

16 Duvergier, Vol. 31, footnote 1, pp. 1 - 2.

17 Quotidienne, December 11, 1830.

18 The relevant reports of the Chambers, as well as preliminary hearings and transcripts of the trial of the ex-Ministers, are collected in Procès des Ministres de Charles X, new edition (Paris: Lequien fils, 1831).

19 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, pp. 39 - 40.

20 Indicative of this paralysis was the inability of the Minister of the Interior, François Guizot, to fire the Prefect of the Seine, Odilon Barrot, for having openly abetted the rioters in October. Protected by the faction of Movement Barrot kept his position in spite of the displeasure of the Resistance men in the Ministry. See Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Plon, 1884), Vol. 1, p. 117.

21 Procès des ministres, pp. 693 - 694.

22 André Jardin & André-Jean Tudesq, La France des Notables, Vol. 1, L'Évolution générale 1815 - 1848 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973), p. 128.

23 Thureau-Dangin, Vol. 1, pp. 146 - 147.

24 Jardin & Tudesq, Vol. 1, p. 134.

25 S. Charléty, La Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1921), Vol. 5 in the series Histoire de France Contemporaine, ed. Ernest Lavisse, p. 24.

26 See for example the reports in the Quotidienne for February 22, 26, and 27, as well as March 1, 1831.

27 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, pp. 107 - 113.

28 Gazette de France, February 28, 1831.

29 Alfred Cobban, A History of France, Vol. 2, From the First Empire to the Second Empire, second edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 100 - 101.

30 Gazette de France, February 19, 1831.

31 Ibid., February 4, 1831. The left-wing deputies had, in the discussion over the new Municipal Organization Law, joined with the right-wing in speaking against the continued control of the central government over the purely local affairs of the communes; however, the left had refrained from adding their votes to those of the right and

the new law passed in the Deputies on February 8, 1831 by 152 to 86. It became law on March 23, 1831. See Duvergier, Vol. 31, footnote 1, pp. 83 - 90.

32 Charl  ty, pp. 35 - 36.

33 Gazette de France, March 17, 1831.

34 Ibid..

35 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, pp. 117 - 119.

36 Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections Since 1789 (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), p. 62.

37 Quotidienne, March 2, 1831.

38 Gazette de France, December 29, 1830; January 1, February 3, March 2, 1831.

39 Alfred Nettement, Appel aux royalistes contre la division des opinions (Paris: Dentu, 1844) second edition, p. 156.

40 The Gazette de France, in establishing its view upon the franchise, took great pains to recall the historical traditions of pre-absolutist France. It is a rare week for the Gazette, after November 17, 1830, that there is not at least one article dealing with Genoude's franchise proposal or its historical justification.

41 Gazette de France, April 6, 1831.

42 Ibid., January 24, 1831. Also see Nettement, Appel, p. 39.

43 Gazette de France, February 26, 1831.

44 Quotidienne, February 27, 1831.

45 Cited in Nettement, Appel, p. 26.

46 Quotidienne, May 7, 1831.

47 Gazette de France, May 3, and 11, 1831.

48 Cobban, Vol. 2, p. 102.

49 Quotidienne, September 7, 1830.

50 Gazette de France, September 1, 1830.

51 Quotidienne, October 4, 1830.

52 Gazette de France, September 23, 1830.

53 Quotidienne, October 18, 1830.

54 The Comte Joseph Decaze won a seat in Tarn, in the South; M. Le Bastard de Kerquifennec won in Finistère, in the extreme West; M. Morel won in Nord, on the Belgian border to the North; and M. Caroillan de Vandeul won in the Haute-Marne, bordering upon Lorraine in the East.

55 Gazette de France, January 1, 1831.

56 Ibid., January 7, 1831.

57 Ibid., April 19, 1831.

58 Ibid., April 25, 1831.

59 Quotidienne, May 18, 1831.

60 Ibid., May 30, 1831.

61 Ibid., June 3, 1831.

62 See for example the extract from the Journal de Toulouse cited in the Gazette de France, May 12, 1831.

63 Quotidienne, June 10, 1831.

64 Gazette de France, June 15, 1831.

65 Charles de Lacombe, Vie de Berryer, Vol. 2, Berryer et la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 113.

66 "Note transmise à Ferdinand de Bertier par Blacas de la part de la duchesse de Berry", May, 1831, La Conspiration des légitimistes et de la duchesse de Berry contre Louis-Philippe 1830 - 1832 (Correspondances et documents inédits), ed. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, Vol. 3, Études d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (Paris: Hatier, 1950), pp. 75 - 76.

67 Quotidienne, July 17, 1831.

68 Courrier Français as cited by Gazette de France, July 22, 1831. These seven men were M. Decazes (one of 5 deputies for Aveyron), the Marquis Gras de Préville (one of 6 deputies for Bouches-du-Rhône), M. Le Bastard de Kerquifennec (one of 7 deputies for Finistère), M. Charlemagne (one of 4 deputies from Indre), M. Berryer (one of 3 deputies from Haute-Loire), the Baron de Roger (one of 5 deputies from Loiret), and M. Duchafflault (one of 5 deputies from the Vendée). See Appendix, Map 3.

69 Ami de la Charte (Puy-de-Dôme) July 15, 1831 as cited in Quotidienne, July 18, 1831.

70 Quotidienne, February 27, 1831.

- 71 Gazette de France, July 14, 1831.
- 72 Quotidienne, July 12, 1831.
- 73 Gazette de France, August 10, 1831.
- 74 Quotidienne, August 16/17, 1831.

CHAPTER III

CONSERVATIVE-LED LEGITIMISM

AUGUST 1831 - APRIL 1832

The composition of the new Chamber of Deputies which met in late July 1831 appeared to fully vindicate the electoral strategy of the conservative-led majority within the Party of Legitimism. One year after the political revolution of August 1830 the erstwhile revolutionaries in the Chamber were openly divided into three factions over the nature of the regime with which they had supplanted the Restoration Bourbon Monarchy. The men of the juste-milieu, who controlled the Ministry, envisaged a constitutional monarchy. But the theoretical supremacy of the Crown in a constitutional monarchical system was anathema to the men of the left opposition who advocated the revolutionary supremacy of the elected Chamber, in theory as well as fact. And, in the middle ground between these two political descendants of Resistance and Movement, sympathizing with the theoretical position of the left but recognizing the benefits of the pragmatic position of the juste-milieu was the tiers parti.¹

The leadership of the tiers parti had been excluded from power with the formation of the P  rier Ministry. Thus, while the men of the tiers parti, being members of what was essentially a parliamentary faction of the juste-milieu, generally supported the policies of the government; because of personal rivalries their support for P  rier's ministry was not unswerving. This fact was brought home to the

government immediately upon the opening of the Chamber's first session on July 23, 1831. Facing strong opposition from the left, only after the second ballot, on August 2, was the Ministry's candidate for the presidency of the Deputies finally elected.² The majority of four votes, dependant upon the tiers parti, was, however, considered by P  rier to be unworkable. And on August 3 the Ministry resigned.

The ministerial crisis lasted barely two days; for while the left opposition had proved strong enough to precipitate the Ministry's resignation it had not been strong enough to form its own government, and on August 4 P  rier returned to office. The conservative Legitimist Quotidienne delighted in the whole affair explaining to its readership that very evening that:

Le parti du juste-milieu avoue en se r  tirant que la France n'est pas avec lui.

Non moins mod  ste, le parti de la R  volution . . . fait aussi l'aveu que la France n'est pas avec lui. . . . nous voyons les deux factions, qui se disputent le pouvoir depuis un an confesser leur mutuelle impuissance, . . . les hommes de la R  volution et ceux du juste-milieu . . . rendent [   la France], pour la premi  re fois, un v  ritable service. Ils lui donnent depuis deux jours le spect  cle de leur mis  re.³

Here, in the Quotidienne's opinion, was positive proof for France that Orleanism, divided against itself, would never be able to supply the stable and strong government which the country needed. Nor was this ministerial charade the only incident which appeared to vindicate the Legitimists' claims.

The charter of 1830 had left undecided the future of the hereditary Chamber of Peers created by Louis XVIII in 1815. And in the Autumn of 1831 this question focused public attention on the weakness of the Ministry's hold over a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. P  rier and the juste-milieu, viewing the hereditary upper

Chamber as a guarantee of the post-Revolution social and political status quo, preferred to retain the Peers as it was. However, the left opposition considered the hereditary political powers of the Peers to be a contradiction of the principles of the Revolution of 1830. And, unfortunately for the Ministry, the left was finding support for its argument among the deputies of the tiers parti.

The tenuous hold of the P rier Ministry on a majority in the Chamber of Deputies was fast slipping away over the question of hereditary tenure in the Upper Chamber. Thus, on September 14, 1831, it reintroduced the motion of banishment for the Bourbons and the sequestration of their French properties. Sponsored by the Comte de Briqueville the proposition was a calculated attempt at reviving the earlier revolutionary unity of the Orleanist factions. By playing on the popular fears of a Bourbon counter-revolution the Ministry could hope, not only that the tiers parti would rally to it but, that the left opposition would turn its attentions away from the juste-milieu government and onto a Legitimist scapegoat. However, by the end of 1831, this time-worn tactic, used by both Broglie and Laffitte, had out-lived its effectiveness.

The Quotidienne had recognized the government's ploy on September 19.

Le juste-milieu semble vouloir se venger sur la branche a n e de toutes les fautes qu'il a commises, de tout le mal qu'il a fait, et de toute l'impopularit  dont il lui faut supporter le poids.⁴

The Party of Legitimism would, as a result, refrain from presenting itself as a too easy target for the government and limited itself to repeating against the Briqueville proposition the same arguments it had used earlier against the Baude proposition.

Neither were the politicians on the opposite end of the political spectrum taken in by the Ministry's strategy. The left opposition refused to let itself be side-tracked away from the question of hereditary peerages. For seventeen days in October ministerial orators were forced to defend the hereditary Chamber of Peers against the attacks of an anti-heredity majority in the Deputies. But to no avail. On October 18, 1831, by 386 to 40, the Deputies voted to change the hereditary tenures of the Upper Chamber to life-only appointments.⁵

The P rier Ministry had been decisively defeated in the Chamber over the heredity of the Upper Chamber. However it remained in office, the only ministerial combination which was acceptable to the factionalized Deputies. In fact a stronger, more cohesive ministerial majority rose, phoenix-like from the October 18 defeat. The heredity of the Peers had been the last of the unresolved revolutionary questions; with its settlement the difference between the supporters of the P rier Ministry and the tiers parti became essentially one of personalities. Both blocs of deputies represented the conservative Orleanism which had grown out of the revolutionary politics of Resistance. Together they were the juste-milieu.⁶ And together they turned to face a serious challenge to the juste-milieu from outside of the political arena of the Palais Bourbon.

On Monday, November 21, 1831, a clash between a bourgeois legion of the Lyon National Guard and striking silk workers resulted in the spilling of blood. The day-old strike erupted into a full scale insurrection. After three days of confused street fighting the city's garrison had been expelled. By November 23 Lyon, the second city of France, was in the hands of its insurgent population.⁷

The Legitimists at the Gazette de France were quick to point out what they perceived to be remarkable similarities between the Lyon uprising of 1831 and the Paris Revolution of 1830. In both cases the people had been forced to resort to arms to rectify their grievances. And in both cases after only three days the people had triumphed over the government's troops.⁸ There was however, one major difference between Lyon in 1831 and Paris in 1830 which the Gazette had chosen to ignore. The Parisian trois glorieuses had been politically motivated. The Lyon insurrection, having its roots in the economic slump which had plagued the last years of the Restoration, was economic in motivation.

A wage dispute between workers and manufacturers in Lyon, simmering since mid-October, had been successfully mediated by the Prefect on October 25. However, eight days later the new wage tariff had been almost universally rejected by the silk manufacturers. The workers had responded by calling a strike on Sunday, November 20. Provoked by the bloodshed on the twenty-first the Lyonnais rebels had had no quarrel with the government; after winning control of the city they had been content with merely reinstituting the Prefect's wage settlement. Nevertheless, the insurrection was a serious challenge to the authority of the P  rier Ministry and to the regime itself.

Under successive ministries of Resistance the Orl  ans Monarchy had drifted towards the right since the revolution of August. It had sought support not only among the revolutionaries of the old Restoration left centre but also among the "Legitimists" of the old right centre.⁹ Largely successful in appealing to the politically cautious men of property who made up these centres, the regime's government could not permit a popular demonstration such as Lyon's to go unpunished. To do

so would raise inconvenient doubts as to the juste-milieu's determination and ability to keep order in France. Thus, on December 5, 1831, an army commanded by Soult, Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, and Ferdinand d'Orléans, the Prince-Royal, occupied Lyon by force and restored the pre-insurrection status quo.

The Legitimist press immediately lashed out at the Périer Ministry. The Quotidienne, on December 6, claimed that by condemning the Lyon rising the Ministry was also condemning the July Revolution. And the Gazette de France followed suit that same day by comparing the politics of Périer, who had successfully suppressed the popular rising in Lyon, with the politics of the Prince de Polignac, whose attempted suppression of the popular rising in Paris a year earlier had not succeeded. The occupation of Lyon was seen by the Legitimist opposition as having publicly given the lie to the principle of sovereignty of the people upon which the regime had built its claim to legitimacy.

For sixteen months the Legitimist opposition had used incidents like the occupation of Lyon to publicize the growing disparity between the Orleanist government's policies and the Orleanist regime's revolutionary origins. As late as October 1831 this approach had been used by the Gazette de France against the Périer Ministry. Périer was held up to ridicule for acting as if the July Revolution had never occurred while mouthing platitudes about popular sovereignty.¹⁰ However, while this kind of attack had been at least embarrassing and uncomfortable for the Broglie and Laffitte Ministries, Périer's handling of Lyon indicated that this tactic no longer had any effect whatsoever.

The decisiveness of the military suppression of Lyon gave to men of property a promise of stability which had long been lacking in

France. In the belief that a strong government built upon the centres would confound its enemies on the political extremes, P  rier was divorcing his Ministry from the immediate revolutionary past. P  rier's December commitment to the maintenance of the status quo, coupled with this divorce resulted in an increase in the credibility of the juste-milieu. Refusing to concern itself with the discrepancies between its policies and the Revolution's principles the P  rier Ministry rallied support for the juste-milieu and began the task of stabilizing a conservative Orleanist regime.¹¹

The juste-milieu under P  rier's stewardship thus experienced a growing unity, in marked contrast to that of the Party of Legitimism. The public split between the parliamentary Legitimist faction and the conservative-led party appeared to have grown wider since the July 1831 elections. Berryer had publicly supported the Ministry over the question of the hereditary Upper Chamber. And the party had openly condemned the attempt to save the hereditary Peers.¹²

Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on October 5, 1831 Berryer had claimed that an hereditary peerage was a guarantee of order. It acted as a brake upon the elected Chamber to ensure that political change came in an orderly fashion and was not dictated by the transitory whims of the masses.¹³ However, using similar reasoning, the Party of Legitimism's majority had argued for an end to the hereditary Chamber of Peers. According to the Gazette de France, without this last vestige of the legitimate monarchy the regime would, ipso facto, be a republic.¹⁴ A republic would breed the anarchy Legitimists had been prophesizing since the Revolution. And, as they also believed that only the legitimate king could save France from political anarchy, Henri V's

restoration would thus be secured. The destruction of the hereditary Peers was a step forward into the Legitimist future. Besides, explained the Gazette on December 29, it was ludicrous for a regime that had destroyed the legitimate throne to retain an institution "à qui le trône légitime avait donné la vie."¹⁵

The furor in the Chamber and the press over the heredity issue had appeared to separate the Legitimists into two blocs, the small, parliamentary faction and the conservative majority. However, the conservative-led party's unity was in itself deceptive and masked a fundamental rift within Legitimism. Both the Gazette de France and the Quotidienne had been anti-heredity but for incompatible reasons.

The constitutional ideal of the Gazette de France was a romanticized vision of pre-absolutist France. The end of the hereditary Chamber of Peers would mean an end for the last of all foreign, meaning English, constitutional forms imposed upon France by the foreign conquerors.

Il ne reste plus pour la France que la constitution française c'est-à-dire la royauté héréditaire et les états-généraux.¹⁶

The Legitimists at the Gazette thus worked for and heralded the law of December 29, 1831 as a step towards a Legitimist restoration and the establishment of their constitutional ideal.

Conservative Legitimists, such as those at the Quotidienne, did not share however the constitutional vision of the Gazette de France. For them the past to be restored was not some idealized form of monarchy from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries but the practical reality of the Bourbon Restoration Monarchy which had given them social and political preeminence in a modern France.¹⁷ Conservative Legitimists had had no constitutional problems in accepting an hereditary Upper

Chamber; they had been principally interested in the question because of the embarrassment and trouble it caused the P  rier Ministry.¹⁸

The Gazette de France's acceptance of conservative leadership within the Party of Legitimism had always been questionable. With the conservative Legitimists' success in sponsoring a Legitimist boycott of the elections the liberals at the Gazette had acquiesced and followed the party line. They had been united in their opposition to the Ministry's attempt to keep the hereditary Chamber. However, once that issue was settled, the fa  ade of Legitimist unity faded fast.

The chief architect of this dissolution of the conservative-led party was the owner-editor of the Gazette de France, the Abb   Antoine-Eug  ne de Genoude. Genoude had first attracted attention during the Restoration as the editor of a small Ultra-Royalist newspaper the   toile. A supporter of the Comte de Vill  le's government, in 1824 as a result of the Ministry's policy of buying up opposition newspapers and transferring them to Villelist journalists, he came into the proprietorship of the Gazette de France. Merging the   toile with the Gazette Genoude created a journal which was, quite naturally, "tout d  vou   au parti Vill  liste."¹⁹

The Villelist politics of the Abb   de Genoude were based upon his personal belief that representative monarchy was the natural form of government for France. Under such a system the interests of the Crown and those of the people, represented in Estates, were kept in balance to the benefit of all. Thus the Gazette de France had opposed the Martignac Ministry for threatening to weight the balance in favour of the elected representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. And it had opposed the Polignac Ministry for having tipped the balance in favour

of the King. In Genoude's opinion only Villèle had had the ability and the desire to maintain the necessary equilibrium and make the system work.²⁰

Having been in opposition before the July Revolution, after a three day hiatus, the Gazette de France reappeared on July 31 provisionally accepting the Revolution which would restore the balance upset by the Ultra-Ultra Ministry of the Prince de Polignac. However, applying Genoude's belief in a balanced monarchical system to the new regime, the Gazette lost little time in going into opposition to the Monarchy of Louis-Philippe. On August 10 it denounced the Revolution for having committed the same mistake as Polignac. In correcting the Ultra-Ultra error the Revolution had overbalanced the system in favour of the elected Chamber.

The deposition of the elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty, for the Gazette de France, had added immeasurably to the Revolution's crime. Only the legitimate Kings could command and maintain the prestige necessary if the Crown was to effectively balance the people's representatives. Thus the Gazette placed itself not just in the opposition but in the Legitimist opposition. However, built on Genoude's Villelism the Legitimism propogated by the Gazette was of a different strain than that held to by the conservative majority within the party of Legitimism.

The Abbé de Genoude, in the "Programme de la Gazette de France" published on December 28, 1831 sketched the outline of his Legitimist beliefs. On the surface the Gazette appeared to advocate nothing which had not been accepted as Legitimist policy: Henri V, universal manhood suffrage, decentralization, and the establishment of order and

liberty in France. However, there was an aspect of Genoude's Legitimism which ran counter to the sensibilities of the conservative Legitimists.

Genoude, more than any other Legitimist leader, had taken to heart his own arguments about the enfranchisement of every tax-paying Frenchman of twenty-five years or over. Thus, after the passage of the law of April 19, 1831, when the conservative Legitimist majority accepted the new status quo with what was considerable relief, only the Gazette de France seriously was continuing the fight. This in itself would have been enough of an irritant to the socially and politically cautious conservative majority; however, Genoude also had brought to the debate the self-righteousness which had sustained his newspaper in opposition after the fall of Villèle.²¹ As a result conservative Legitimists failed to enthusiastically endorse the Gazette's "Programme". The Quotidienne, secure in its position as arbiter of conservative Legitimism, did not even acknowledge the "Programme"'s existence.²²

Genoude's first attempt at providing a complete Legitimist platform for public debate had failed ignominiously in December 1831. On March 28, 1832, prompted by election rumours, he tried again. Based on the historic constitution of the French Monarchy which the Gazette de France claimed had been sanctioned by the French nation over the centuries, the March "Déclaration" was a constitutional blue-print for the future Bourbon restoration.

Six points were set forth in the "Déclaration". France would be a monarchy, her crown hereditary in the most direct male line from Hugh Capet, and the king would be inviolable. There would be communal

and provincial assemblies, empowered to deal with all local matters, elected according to the formula for nearly universal suffrage by which Louis XVI had called the Estates General in 1788. Freedom of the press, of the individual, of religion and of conscience would be guaranteed, as would equality of opportunity and the independence of the judiciary. And there would be a restoration of the national Estates General freely elected; no oaths would be required of the voters.²³

Again, there was nothing on the surface which would seem to warrant the conservative Legitimists rejecting the "Déclaration". However, the simple attempt by Genoude and his writers to consolidate and revise the hitherto uncollected Legitimist policies marked a major divergence in political out-look between the conservatives and the followers of the Gazette de France, the Genoudists. Also, determined to be heard this second time, Genoude had thrown down the gauntlet. In a post script to the "Déclaration" he had added the admonition that only those men "en qui la corruption des partis s'est invétérée resteront en dehors de cette action."²⁴ As a result the storm of conservative Legitimist reaction was not long in breaking.

Politically cautious conservative Legitimists were extremely annoyed by the unilateral publication of the "Déclaration". Claiming to be above factional arguments the Quotidienne refrained from commenting editorially upon Genoude's ideas; however, it did publish, on March 30, an unsigned letter attacking the Genoudist initiative in setting forth such a constitutional programme.

Les royalistes [écrit le correspondant anonyme] devaient attendre . . . Ni nous, ni nos amis n'avons eu la prétention de régler, pour ainsi dire à l'avance, par une déclaration toute personnelle, ce qui ne doit être réglé que par le concours de tous les pouvoirs et de toutes les lumières du pays.²⁵

According to the Quotidienne's correspondent, it was a presumption beneath the Party of Legitimism to produce on its own such a constitutional blue-print for the future. And, if the "Déclaration" was the effective political manifesto of Genoudism, the anonymous letter of March 30 was the counter-declaration of the conservative majority.

The Gazette de Bretagne (Rennes) spoke for the majority within the Party of Legitimism when it commented on the "Déclaration" in mid-April 1832.

Nous devons rompre un silence qui pourrait être pris pour une adhésion tacite à la déclaration . . . Nous royalistes et catholiques des provinces, confians dans la justice éternelle de notre cause, nous ne croyons pas nécessaire de mesurer à l'avance le plan, la forme et les proportions du nouvel édifice. Qui pourrai d'ailleurs assurer que ce plan fut celui du parti national? . . . ne cherchons pas à devancer l'oeuvre de temps et LA LOI ÉTERNELLE.²⁶

Conservative Legitimists, by the end of April 1832, had almost unanimously rebuffed the leadership initiatives of Genoude, and the Quotidienne chose this time to make its move against its rival.

Since before the Revolution of 1830 the two dailies had been political rivals. Now, on April 26, 1832, judging the Gazette de France to have been weakened by the "Déclaration" and by the journal's evangelical advocacy of universal suffrage the Quotidienne attempted to administer a coup de grâce and discredit completely the Genoudist daily in the eyes of Bourbon loyalists. Striking at the very heart of the Genoudist system the conservative Legitimist daily attacked the Gazette's interpretation of history.

Genoude had built his system upon an interpretation of French history which attributed all the ills of modern France to Louis XIV's assumption of absolute power.²⁷ The Genoudist vision of monarchy was one in which the Crown and the Estates General worked together as equal

partners in harmonious equilibrium. Louis XIV had ignored the Estates and unbalanced the system. However, this reasoning made Louis XVIII an accomplice in his ancestor's crime because the charter of 1814 had had no other authority behind it than that of Louis acting as a fully sovereign prince. But, for a good Legitimist, to blame the late, legitimate King of France was unthinkable and Genoude had twisted his reasoning to accommodate loyal sentiments. The blame for the charter of 1814 was placed instead at the feet of the foreign invaders.²⁸

It was this twist which became the Quotidienne's target in April 1832. The charter, it claimed, had been granted by Louis XVIII and by Louis alone acting as a sovereign. To imply otherwise and say that it was forced upon France and the royal House of France by the bayonets of the foreigner was a slur upon the honour of the nation and the dignity of its legitimate Kings.²⁹

In responding to the Quotidienne's attack the Gazette de France compared conservative Legitimism with Orleanism as the two worst enemies of the best interests of France.³⁰ Conservative Legitimists were, claimed Genoude, Bourbon absolutists desirous of a restoration of the imbalanced constitutional system created by Louis XIV.³¹ However, despite the invective, Genoude was unable to forestall the Quotidienne's achievement of its goal. The Gazette could not argue with such irreproachable Legitimist authorities as Louis XVIII and Charles X, invoked by the Quotidienne on April 26, and was forced to publicly extend the blame for the Restoration's constitutional imbalance to the House of Bourbon.

On the surface it appeared to be a small victory for the conservative Legitimist daily over its rival but its importance lay

in the light it threw upon the intra-party differences. By May 1832 it was obvious that conservative Legitimism stood ready to defend the political memory of the Restoration, as well as the social settlement which had survived 1830 essentially intact.³² Genoudism, on the other hand, blamed the Restoration for having frustrated a true restoration of France's ancient constitutional equilibrium.³³ The conservative faction was also intent upon withdrawing the party from all aspects of political life under Louis-Philippe. The Genoudists did not hesitate in advocating full Legitimist participation in the July Monarchy's politics. Caught in the middle between the two were the parliamentary Legitimists.

Parliamentary Legitimism, by its very nature, stood for Legitimist involvement in the politics of the Orleanist regime. It thus shared a certain liberal affinity with the Genoudists which the Gazette de France had recognized immediately after the Revolution. Both factions had tried to stem the tide of the émigration à l'intérieur only to be frustrated by the efforts of the conservative Quotidienne. And when the Gazette temporarily had acknowledged the leadership of the conservative Legitimists, following the 1831 elections, it had never taken as seriously as the Quotidienne the break between the parliamentary faction and the conservative-led party. Thus, facing the censure of the Legitimist majority over the publication of the "Déclaration" the Gazette had turned for support to the leader of the "other" liberal Legitimist faction, the parliamentary orator, Berryer. However, it came away from the Chamber of Deputies empty handed.

On April 23, 1832 Berryer had written, in response to the Abbé de Genoude's appeal for an endorsement, that he could not commit

himself to the "Déclaration".

Je ne crois pas qu'il soit utile que je vous adresse une adhésion que je m'efforce de proclamer chaque jour à la tribune ou au barreau; mais vous me trouverez toujours prêt à manifester mon ardent désir d'une entière union des royalistes . . . j'applaudis aux courageux efforts de la Gazette de France.³⁴

The liberal politician, like the conservative journalists, would not accept the leadership initiatives of Genoude and rejected any arrangement which might have brought the parliamentary and the Genoudist factions together. For the fact was that in 1832 the parliamentary Legitimists were fast effecting a rapprochement with the conservative Legitimists.

Apart from a common acceptance of the need for Legitimists to participate fully in the political life of the regime there was, in fact, little to unite the two "liberal" factions of Legitimism. The parliamentary Legitimists were in fact closer to the conservatives on most issues. Concerned with the maintenance of the social status quo in the present both factions, in contrast to the idealism of the Genoudists, envisioned a restoration of the Restoration, which would also guarantee their political dominance. Their differences had arisen over the best means by which to effect this restoration and, in the face of the Genoudist leadership challenge in 1832, these differences were suddenly perceived as less than important.

The thaw in parliamentary - conservative relations was marked, in February 1832, by the creation of a Royalist steering committee in Paris. Made up of the conservatives, the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre and the Maréchal Duc Victor de Bellune, and the internal émigrés, Chateaubriand and Hyde de Neuville, this committee also included the parliamentary Legitimists, Berryer and the Duc de Fitz-James.³⁵ This

internal rapprochement was also perceptible from the outside, in the press.

The Rénovateur, financed by Fitz-James and modelling its opinions on the Restoration liberalism of Chateaubriand, was markedly parliamentary Legitimist in its orientation when it appeared in print in Paris on March 26, 1832. Nevertheless, that arbiter of conservative Legitimist taste, the Quotidienne greeted it warmly. Commenting upon the Rénovateur's prospectus, on March 19, the conservative Legitimist daily wished the new comer the very best of luck and success. The appearance of the Rénovateur was important not only because, by the Quotidienne's blessing, it indicated a burgeoning alliance between the conservative and parliamentary factions but also because it was a parliamentary Legitimist newspaper. The faction whose ideal for the Legitimist opposition was a numerous, well-organized deputation in the Chambers had broadened the scope of its activities to include the press. In doing so it had recognized and accepted the fact that the press was the party's major weapon.

The charter of 1830, by guaranteeing the right of every Frenchman to express his opinions freely in an uncensored press, had given opponents of the July Monarchy a powerful weapon. However, it was a two-edged sword which unless wielded with care could cut both ways. Censorship had been abolished by the Revolution but there remained in force, on the statute books, laws of the Bourbon Monarchy which that of Orléans saw fit to retain. They were laws protecting the King's reputation and that of his government; they were laws which the new regime had not failed to use against a too bold Legitimist press.

The first test of the government's determination not to let the Party of Legitimism have a free hand attacking it in the press had come in September 1830. In resigning from the Chamber of Peers the Comte de Kergorlay had had published a letter attacking: the revolutionaries, for deposing the legitimate King in the name of a charter which guaranteed that King's inviolability; Louis-Philippe, for accepting a revolutionary crown rather than the regency for the legitimate King, Henri V; and the Chamber, for claiming for itself constituent powers and revising the charter of Louis XVIII. Kergorlay also publicly refused to give his allegiance to Louis-Philippe and the revised charter.³⁶ The Broglie Ministry had reacted immediately and charged Kergorlay and MM. de Brian and de Genoude, as the editors of the two Legitimist dailies which had originally published the letter, with inciting hatred and lack of confidence in the King's government.³⁷ They were also charged with offending the rights that the King held from his birth.³⁸

At their trial, on November 24, 1830, the jury had found the three Legitimists guilty as charged. Kergorlay had been sentenced to six months in prison and fined 500 francs. Brian and Genoude had both received one month and 150 franc fines.³⁹ The government had committed itself to striking back against its press opposition. And, as if the prison terms and fines were not proof enough of this determination, the law of December 1, 1830 was hurriedly passed stiffening the penalties for press offences against the Crown.⁴⁰

The government's use of the courts in an attempt to contain and even silence the Legitimist opposition was stepped up considerably under Périer. As his Ministry found its feet the Attorney-General, Jean-

Charles Persil, began what appeared to be, according to the left opposition National, a personal war against the Legitimist press.⁴¹ The Baron de Brian, as editor-in-chief responsible for the Quotidienne, spent so many months in prison that the actual editorship of that conservative Legitimist daily devolved upon Alfred Nettement.⁴² The editor of the satiric Cancans, Pierre Bérard, actually wrote and published a number of issues during his two extended terms in the Ste-Pélagie prison.⁴³ However, Persil's efforts did not have the desired effect. A stint in Ste-Pélagie came to be regarded as a coming of age within the Legitimist press opposition; it was proof of one's devotion to the cause.⁴⁴ Prison, for Legitimist journalists, became the post of honour in battle against the illegitimate Orleanist regime.⁴⁵

The inconvenience of prison aside, conviction at the hands of Persil did present a second, more serious danger for the journals of the Legitimist opposition. Bankruptcy, the result of crippling fines, threatened the entire Legitimist press from the smallest provincial news sheet to major dailies such as the Quotidienne. However, rallying to the cause, Legitimists from across France donated money to help pay the legal costs and penalties. The offices of the provincial gazettes became collection points for money which then found its way into the coffers of journals which had offended the regime.⁴⁶

The Legitimist subscription money, collected to save the party's own press from bankruptcy, also helped to sustain the smaller and generally poorer journals of the Republican opposition.⁴⁷ In 1831 the left-wing press had become more vocal in its attacks upon the increasingly conservative regime, and, as a result, had begun to feel the financial burden which accompanied the Attorney-General's attention.

Feeling the wrath of the juste-milieu equally, both Legitimist and Republican presses joined forces over the issue of freedom of the press.⁴⁸ The spectre of a Carlo-Republican alliance which had haunted Broglie returned to stalk the juste-milieu of M. Périer.

United in arguing for a free press, both nursing grievances against a regime which both believed had betrayed them, the Party of Legitimism and the Party of the Republic might well have joined political forces. Indeed, observers at the time were quick to believe that they had. Heinrich Heine, the expatriate German poet living in Paris in the early 1830's, described to his German readership just such an alliance of the political extremes:

the Republicans would prefer Legitimacy, the Legitimists the Republic to the mud-hole of the juste-milieu which lies between, and in which both are now friends. A common torture binds them in one; they share not the same heaven, but the same hell.⁴⁹

Such an apparent friendship however did not translate into an effective political alliance. On the Legitimist side the idea of collaborating with the Republican enemies of monarchy on the left was never really considered by the leadership of the party.⁵⁰

All factions of the Party of Legitimism had rejected as incompatible with their loyalty to the Bourbons a political alliance with the anti-monarchist left. However, the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists and the Genoudists could not agree over the nature of the relationship to be cultivated by the party with a much more acceptable potential ally. There had been a very close and special bond between the Bourbon throne and the Catholic Church, the memory of which survived the Revolution to act both as a negative and a positive force upon the fortunes of the supporters of Bourbon legitimacy.

During the final years of the Restoration the gallican union of Church and State, the altar and the throne, had come under attack from within the Catholic Church. Liberal Catholics had recognized the trend towards anti-clericalism among the French urban population and assumed a proportional relationship between this trend and the growing unpopularity of the Ultra-dominated throne.⁵¹ As a result, once the Revolution of 1830 had separated Church from State, these liberal Catholics broke away from the traditional politics of the Church, rejected the cause of the legitimate monarchy and supported the new Orleanist regime.⁵²

The defection of articulate, politically active French Catholics from their traditional support of legitimacy had been a severe blow to parliamentary Legitimism. Sharing the ultra-montanism and the political liberalism of the liberal Catholics, the parliamentary faction could have used support against the conservative Legitimist advocates of the internal emigration.⁵³ Nor had the break really helped the liberal Catholics. Both the parliamentary and the conservative Legitimists were in complete agreement that things political and partisan should be kept separate from things spiritual and personal.⁵⁴ By breaking with Legitimism the liberal Catholics had broken with the two political factions most interested in making this distinction. And the factionalization of ultra-montane Catholics resulted in their failure to effect the desired divorce between Catholicism and Legitimism.

In the popular mind there was no distinction made between the parti carliste and the parti prêtre.⁵⁵ And the mutually supportive role played by Legitimism and Catholicism did not help to create the impression that they were two distinct traditionalist forces rather

than one and the same. The Catholic South and West overlapped too closely the Legitimist West and South. Nor did the quick advocacy of Legitimists for Catholic religious freedom and the public sympathy shown by the higher clergy for the Bourbons help to foster the idea that there had been a separation.⁵⁶ However, the most vocal deterrent to a divorce between Legitimism and the Church was the Legitimist Gazette de France.

The Genoudist daily was loudly and insistently gallican in its religious views. The gallican union of Church and State was an integral part of that historic constitution of France which Genoudism wanted to re-establish. And, as the anti-Legitimist and anti-clerical populace was not inclined to recognize the split between the ultra-montane conservative-parliamentary majority and the gallican Genoudist minority, the Gazette de France served to keep alive suspicions that there was still a working political entente between Catholicism and Legitimism.⁵⁷

The gallicanism espoused and proclaimed by the Genoudists became just one further irritant separating their faction from the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists. The conservative-parliamentary leadership alliance, being ultra-montane, desirous of preserving the social status quo of post-Empire France and of restoring the Bourbon Restoration Monarchy, may almost be seen as a direct response to the leadership challenge of the gallican popular monarchists in the Genoudist faction. But if forged to forestall the party of Legitimism's left-wing the conservative-parliamentary alliance barely had time to solidify before it was faced with an equally serious leadership threat rising on the party's extreme right wing.

The voice of intransigent Ultracism had long been muffled by the Bourbon court-in-exile. Neither Charles X nor his son Angoulême had encouraged the militant counter-revolutionary aspirations of the Legitimist extremists. However, under the clandestine patronage of the Duchesse de Berry, the dream of a military restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy had been carefully nurtured in France by the Comte Ferdinand de Bertier and the Maréchal Comte de Bourmont. By the spring of 1832, with the mother of their boy-King as their leader, the Legitimists of the extreme right were ready to make their play for power. In doing so they challenged not only the conservative-parliamentary leadership but, if they should fail, they were playing with the very existence of the Party of Legitimism in France.

Notes to Chapter III

1 S. Charléty, La Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1921), Vol. 5 in the series Histoire de France Contemporaine ed. Ernest Lavisse, p. 59. Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Plon, 1884), Vol. 1, pp. 378 - 379. See also Quotidienne, August 14, 16/17, 1831; and Gazette de France, August 18, 1831.

2 Gazette de France, August 2, 1831. Of 358 votes cast, 181 were for the ministerial candidate Girod de l'Ain, 176 were for the left's candidate Laffitte and one vote went to Dupont de l'Eure.

3 Quotidienne, August 4, 1831.

4 Ibid., September 19, 1831; and Gazette de France, September 29, 1831.

5 Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du conseil-d'état (depuis 1788 par ordre chronologique) second edition (Paris: A. Guyot, 1838), with editorial footnotes by J.-B. Duvergier, Vol. 31, p. 472. The Chamber of Peers ratified the decision on December 28, 1831 by 102 to 68 (37 peers abstained) and it became law on December 29. Fourteen peers, including the parliamentary Legitimist, the Duc de Fitz-James, resigned in protest.

6 Douglass Hall McNeally, "Constitutional Monarchy in France 1814 - 1848" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963), p. 255. Charléty, p. 60.

7 This and the two succeeding paragraphs are based upon Robert J. Bezucha, The Lyon Uprising of 1834: Social and Political Conflict in the Early July Monarchy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 60 - 66.

8 Gazette de France, November 30, 1831.

9 The success of this may be seen in the decimation of the parliamentary Legitimist representation in the Deputies between August 1830 and January 1831.

10 Gazette de France, October 1, 1831.

11 Charléty, p. 58. The key role of Périer in stabilizing the Orleanist juste-milieu was readily recognized and acknowledged by his contemporary political enemies. See Quotidienne, April 12, 21, and May 21, 1832.

- 12 Gazette de France, October 7, 1831.
- 13 Oeuvres de Berryer, Vol. 1, 1830 - 1834 (Paris: Didier, 1872), pp. 146 - 165.
- 14 Gazette de France, October 10, 1831.
- 15 Ibid., December 29, 1831.
- 16 Ibid., December 31, 1831.
- 17 Courrier Français as cited in Quotidienne, April 3, 1832.
- 18 Quotidienne, October 9, 1831.
- 19 Irene Collins, The Government and the Newspaper Press in France 1814 - 1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 42 - 44, 53 - 54.
- 20 Gazette de France, August 3 and 4, 1830: and H. de Lourdoueix, De la Restauration de la Société Française, second edition (Paris: Bureau de la Gazette de France, 1833), p. 547.
- 21 Edmond Biré, La Presse Royaliste de 1830 à 1852: Alfred Nettement, sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1901), p. 108. See also Histoire générale de la presse française, ed. Claude Bellanger (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), Vol. 1, p. 127.
- 22 The conservative inspired boycott of elections was still proving to be in operation in spite of the Gazette de France's September 2, 1831 effort to get Legitimist electors to vote in the commune elections. In Var, 87 of 230 electors voted; Quotidienne, September 14, 1831. In Bordeaux 222 of 838 electors voted; Gazette de France, October 6, 1831. And in the by-election for the Deputies in Marseilles 55 out of the 248 registered electors cast ballots; Quotidienne, September 14, 1831.
- 23 Gazette de France, March 28, 1832.
- 24 Ibid..
- 25 Quotidienne, March 30, 1832.
- 26 Gazette de Bretagne (Rennes) as cited in Quotidienne, April 17, 1832. See also Gazette d'Anjou in the same issue. Gazette de Normandie as cited in Quotidienne, April 7, 1832. And Ami de l'Ordre (Nantes) as cited in Quotidienne, April 23/24, 1832.
- 27 Lourdoueix, pp. 540 - 541. See also Charles de Lacombe, Vie de Berryer, Vol. 1, Berryer et la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 35.
- 28 Gazette de France, April 26, 1832.

29 Quotidienne, April 28, 1832.

30 Gazette de France, April 28, 1832.

31 Ibid., April 27, 1832.

32 Quotidienne, April 28, 1832.

33 Gazette de France, December 12, 1832.

34 "Lettre à M. de Genoude de Berryer fils", April 23, 1832, in ibid., April 22/23, 1832.

35 Baron Hyde de Neuville, Mémoires et Souvenirs, Vol. 3, Charles X - La Duchesse de Berry - Le Comte de Chambord, third edition (Paris: Plon-Norrit, 1912), p. 493. Vicomte René de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, with notes by Maurice Levaillant and Georges Moulinier (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), Vol. 2, p. 523. Lacombe, Vol. 2, pp. 43 - 44.

36 Quotidienne, September 25, 1830. Gazette de France, September 27, 1830.

37 Article 4 of the law of March 25, 1822.

38 Article 9 of the law of May 17, 1819.

39 Quotidienne, November 25, 1830. For Brian, convicted separately a day earlier on a separate charge of inciting lack of confidence in the government for having printed the street rumour of the October riots that Louis-Philippe had fled Paris during the rioting, this second conviction increased his sentence to 7 months and the Quotidienne's fines to 1,150 francs. Quotidienne, November 24, 1830.

40 Duvergier, Vol. 30, pp. 274 - 275.

41 National and Orléanais as both cited in Quotidienne, April 13, 1832.

42 Between November 1830 and the end of 1832 Brian and the Quotidienne were convicted 9 times; sentenced a total of 25 months, 14 days and fined 19,125 francs. In 1833 2 convictions added 7 months and 3,000 francs to the totals. And in 1834, the year Brian resigned, 3 convictions added a further 2 years and 8,000 francs. Biré, p. 71.

43 Cancans correctionnel, Cancans en prison dédié à la liberté de la presse, Cancans à Sainte-Pélagie. See also Evelyn B. Gordon, "The Significance of Political Caricature During the Reign of Louis-Philippe, 1830 - 1835" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 211, footnote 23.

44 See for example the Quotidienne of September 13, 1831 and its comments on the Gazette du Midi (Marseille), or the issue of November 7, 1831 welcoming the Mode to the front ranks of the Legitimist opposition.

45 Revenant (Paris) as cited in Quotidienne, March 15, 1832.

46 The lists of donors to the party's coffers, published between 1831 and 1832 in the two major Legitimist dailies, provide some indication of the type of people attracted to the cause of Legitimism. Interestingly for a party identified closely with the ancien régime aristocracy only 21% of those listed had aristocratic pretensions (used the particle "de"), and of these only 40% actually bore titles.

47 National and Orléanais as cited in Quotidienne, April 13, 1831. Gazette de France, November 1, 1831.

48 See remarks about the Globe, the Tribune, and the Révolution in the Gazette de France, October 31, 1831. And also those referring to the Tribune, the National and the Courrier Français in the Quotidienne, November 14, 1831.

49 Heinrich Heine, French Affairs, translated by Charles G. Leland (New York: Croscup & Sterling, 1892), Vol. 2, pp. 125 - 126, as cited in Gordon, pp. 208 - 209.

50 Gazette de France, December 25/26, 1831, and March 9, 1832. Quotidienne, January 25, 1832.

51 Thureau-Dangin, Vol. 2, pp. 245, 253 - 254.

52 Avenir, as cited in Quotidienne, June 23, 1831.

53 Comte de Falloux, Mémoires d'un Royaliste, third edition (Paris: Librairie Academique Didier, Perrin et Cie., 1888), Vol. 1, p. 177.

54 Ibid. And Quotidienne, June 23, 1831.

55 Charléty, p. 70.

56 André-Jean Tudesq, Les Grands Notables en France: étude historique d'une psychologie sociale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 213.

57 Gazette de France, August 2, 1831 and April 26, 1832.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHALLENGE OF ULTRA-LEGITIMISM

THE VENDÉE UPRISING OF 1832

The development of Legitimism as a political movement under the July Monarchy was essentially as a result of the interplay between the advocates of passive resistance and those of political resistance. The shape of the Party of Legitimism was to be determined by those Legitimists who, refusing to emigrate to protest the Revolution of 1830, had opted for whatever legal means of opposition to the new regime that their consciences would permit. However, on the extreme right of the party, clinging to the dream of a military reversal of the revolutionary verdict, were the political heirs of the Ultra-Ultras, men who may be called the Ultra-Legitimists of the Orleanist regime.¹ This extreme fringe of Legitimism would, in the Vendée in 1832, attempt to make its dream a reality. And in doing so it was, for a brief time, a major influence upon the Legitimist political movement. Therefore, while the Vendée uprising would prove unsuccessful and the Ultra-Legitimist faction would disappear, to understand the general development of Legitimism in France it is necessary to look at its brief, extra-legal phase and at Legitimists of the extreme right.

The Bourbon army camped at Rambouillet on August 2, 1830, had been but a shadow of the army driven out of Paris by the revolutionaries. Mass desertions had left the Swiss and the Royal Guards as the sole military props of the crumbling Bourbon Monarchy.² However, these

troops were the elite units of the French army and their continued loyalty to the legitimate King had been the cause of considerable concern among the revolutionary leaders in Paris. In order to end the threat of civil war posed by the Guards corps, the National Guard and a column of irregulars, fresh from the street battles of July, had been quickly dispatched from the capital. But there had been no battle; Charles X had recognized the physical odds against him and decided against an armed defence of his grandson's crown.

A majority of French Legitimists had accepted the royal lead. Ultra-Legitimists, however, drawing their inspiration from the romantic history of the Vendée and the chouannerie, had believed that the West would have risen in defence of the legitimate King if only Charles had retreated with the Royal Guards upon the Loire.³ As it was, support for a Legitimist rising in the West had dissipated following Charles' peaceful acceptance of exile. And by mid-November the Comte Ferdinand de Bertier wrote to the Duchesse de Berry that:

le silence prolongé du Roi [Charles] et de la famille royale achève d'énervier les Royalistes . . . le grand nombre serait porté à croire que la partie est tout à fait abandonnée.⁴

Bertier claimed that in August there had been at least 1,500 gentlemen ready to take up arms in the West but by November he could only vouch for 450. Nevertheless, nurtured by men such as Bertier, the old Chevalier de la Foi and Ultra-Ultra, this hard core support for the Ultra-Legitimist choice of resistance did not completely fade away.

It was essential to the continued existence of Ultra-Legitimism in France that the Bourbon court-in-exile show some leadership initiative to encourage its loyalists in the West. Bertier recommended two courses of action which would encourage Ultra-Legitimists. First, the

Bourbons should try to forestall recognition of the Orleanist regime by the European powers. And second, they should find sympathetic allies who would back their legitimist convictions with armies. Both these tasks, in Bertier's opinion, could be accomplished by pursuing an active dynastic policy. Bourbon Spain should be called to the support of her French cousins. Henri V should be married to a Russian Grand Duchess. And, Mademoiselle, the young King's elder sister, should be married to a suitably influential prince. Thus, with Spanish troops in the Midi, Russian troops on the Rhine, and either Catholic southern Germany or northern Italy neutralized, could success be assured to an Ultra-Legitimist rising in the West.⁵

Little evidence of concrete leadership from the exiled Bourbons was forthcoming. Both Charles X and his son Angoulême remained unconvinced of the chances of a successful military restoration. However, the hopes of Ultra-Legitimism for a royal leader were not completely misplaced.

Marie-Caroline de Bourbon, Duchesse de Berry, Regent of France,⁶ had been born a Princess of Sicily. As such Madame had impressive connections with the courts of Europe: Her brother was the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, her sister was Queen of Spain, a cousin reigned in Vienna and her aunt, Marie-Amélie, was Louis-Philippe's own Queen of the French. The widow of the assassinated Duc de Berry, mother of the Bourbon heir, she had made a triumphal tour of the West in 1828 and was well remembered by the peasantry. The Duchess was thus an ideal patron for the Ultra-Legitimists, a position she readily assumed soon after taking up exile in England.

On September 4, 1830 the Duchesse de Berry had written Bertier in her dual capacity as a born Bourbon princess and the mother of the legitimate Bourbon King of France.

C'est dans mon coeur tout français que je puiserai toutes mes inspirations, si j'attends du Ciel d'aider la cause de mon fils qui est la sienne propre, je suis bien résolu de mon côté de tout faire pour aider la providence.⁷

Thereafter Bertier and the Duchess exchanged correspondence and when Charles X moved with his grandson Henri to Holyrood Palace in Scotland Berry remained in southern England. Under her patronage Ultra-Legitimist activities took on a vigor long lacking.

A survey of the obstacles confronting Ultra-Legitimism was undertaken for the Regent in the Fall of 1830 by a Breton nobleman, the Baron de Bordiné. After a reconnaissance tour through the West and the South, Bordiné estimated that Brittany, with approximately 25,000 Legitimist supporters, was held for the regime by a garrison of only 16,500; the Vendée, with another 25,000 Legitimists, was held by only 5,000 regular troops; Bordeaux was not hostile to the cause; Toulouse was Legitimist to the core and could easily expell its two-regiment garrison; and Marseille would rise upon command in spite of the strength of her Orleanist garrison.⁸ But apparent numerical superiority masked some very real weaknesses which Bordiné also took pains to report.

The Legitimism of the West, as seen by Bordiné, was a party of politically cautious, wealthy and aristocratic landowners, while the Legitimism of the South was a party supported by conservatives and Catholics from all classes, ready to rise but physically lacking the resources to do so. Divided thus by regional differences the party was also divided into rival factions of which Ultra-Legitimism was but

one and a small one at that.⁹ Indeed, the majority of Legitimists, as represented by the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France, had put aside the possibility of armed resistance and committed itself to legal forms of opposition. It was obvious to Bordigné that any extra-legal method of restoring the Bourbons, such as an uprising, would have to be planned and executed by the Ultra-Legitimists on their own.

The fact that the small Ultra-Legitimist faction could not rely upon the more moderate factions of Legitimism raised, in Bertier's opinion, the necessity of co-ordinating a foreign war with the proposed civil war.¹⁰ However this drastic expedient did not sit well with some Ultra-Legitimists. Bordigné in his report wrote that Legitimist reliance upon foreign intervention would be a cardinal error.

La France ne veut ni des honteux excès de l'anarchie, ni des désastres sanglantes de Waterloo. La Monarchie serait sacrifiée à la peur de l'un ou de l'autre de ces maux.

Quelques troupes auxiliaires peuvent nous être utiles: mais l'étranger entrant en masse et nous dictant des lois ne peut rien pour notre avenir.¹¹

The dictates of national honour and pride, voiced by the Baron, clashed with the very real physical need for outside assistance, perceived by the Count, and served to further fragment an already small faction.

Few and divided among themselves Ultra-Legitimists nevertheless attracted the unflagging attention of the Orleanist government. The Broglie and Laffitte Ministries, in trying to stay the overwhelming pressure for further revolutionary change coming from the men of Movement, had sought to raise up the spectre of militant counter-revolution. And in the existence of the Ultra-Legitimists the government had its proof. Here were the "Carlists"; men who had not repented of the ordinances and the bloodshed of July, men who were plotting civil

and foreign war. And, in spite of the denials of the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France, the government was able to use the "Carlism" of the Ultra-Legitimist faction to brand all supporters of the exiled Bourbons as militant counter-revolutionaries.¹²

The spectre of "Carlism" raised by the ministries against the men of Movement also dictated the government's reaction to the entire Party of Legitimism. Known Legitimists in Paris, under the watchful eye of the Orleanist government and police, were generally left, more or less, at liberty to propagate their politics. However, Legitimists living beyond the immediate reach of Parisian authority were all painted with the same "Carlist" colours and began to experience what Bertier had termed "une espèce de terreur", the visites domiciliaires.¹³

Visites domiciliaires, police raids upon the residences of Legitimist sympathizers, either with or without legal warrants, began in November 1830 and were stepped up in December during the trial of Charles X's ministers. Originally directed only against known Legitimists, the practice was expanded following the riots in February 1831 to include the surveillance of suspected Legitimist sympathizers in the West. The Comte de Montalivet, Minister of the Interior, admitted in the Chambers that he had given his western prefects virtual carte blanche powers to uncover any "Carlist" conspiracies.¹⁴ And, in May there was a legalization of this suspension of normal civil procedures when the Périer Ministry imposed an extraordinary governing commission on Brittany.¹⁵

The Legitimist press in Paris, quite understandably, was outraged by the government's treatment of the Legitimists in the West as if they were all Ultra-Legitimist militants. However, it was more

than just anger over the suspension of the civil rights and liberties of the western Legitimists which concerned the Paris Legitimists. The Quotidienne particularly was concerned that the substitution of "la force militaire" for the due process of civil justice would create a hostility among the Bretons and men of the Vendée which would make the Legitimist West and Ultra-Legitimist West fly into revolt to redress its wrongs.¹⁶

This fear, that Paris would force moderate Legitimists into the Ultra-Legitimist faction, was well-founded. The growing dissatisfaction with the regime was evident in the desertions among army conscripts in the West. Conscription had traditionally been hated by the peasantry of the Breton and Atlantic departments, but, in the summer of 1831 a new and alarming pattern of desertions was taking shape. Deserters in the West no longer were merely relying upon the silence of the sympathetic, conservative and Catholic peasantry for their freedom but began banding together in armed groups.¹⁷ So too, the extension of visites domiciliaires to the South had increased the militancy of the anti-Orleanist population.¹⁸

The spectre of "Carlism" was fast taking on a reality which, whether prior to or having been created by the government's invocation, was out of proportion to the original strength of its Ultra-Legitimist model.¹⁹ On September 5 the Gazette de France had hoped to reassure the authorities that in spite of all appearances a majority of Legitimists were still not Ultra-Legitimists.

Les royalistes qui voudrait tenter des coups décisifs, se sépareraient réellement de leur parti et ne mériteraient pas qu'on attachât à leurs efforts une grande importance.²⁰

However, the Gazette's disclaimer had fallen upon deaf ears.²¹ The

increased activity of the Ultra-Legitimist faction contradicted the interpretation of the non-Ultra-Legitimist journal.²²

The Comte de Bertier had not been idle during the winter of 1830 - 1831. He reported to the Duchesse de Berry in January of the new year that two Legitimist armies stood ready to take the field in the Breton and Atlantic departments; a third, at Bordeaux, would join the future revolt if foreign troops landed in its support; and three others were in the planning stage at Toulouse, Marseille, and Lyon. The major difficulties in the South were the lack of money and the absence of a military tradition similar to the Vendée's. These problems Bertier hoped to overcome with Neapolitan money and Spanish regulars.²³ However, in the midst of his scheming, the riots of February broke out, sparked by the mass at Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, and Bertier was forced into exile in order to avoid arrest.²⁴

Travelling through Belgium to England Bertier joined the circle around the Duchesse de Berry at Bristol. And, upon his arrival, the Ultra-Legitimist activities of the Bourbon Regency increased; a fact which did not escape the attention of the French government. Working with the Maréchal Comte de Bourmont, Charles X's last Minister of War and the conqueror of Algiers, and with the Duc de Blacas, civilian advisor to the Duchess and Charles X's personal agent in the councils of the Regency, Bertier helped draw up detailed plans for a military restoration of Henri V. Approved by Berry the plans called for the rising, under the military command of Bourmont, to begin with the Regent's own landing on the French Mediterranean coast.²⁵ Accordingly, on June 17, 1831, the Legitimist Regent left England. Her public destination: Nice in the Duchy of Savoy.

Berry's arrival on the continent raised Ultra-Legitimist hopes, which, in turn, increased the severity of the police regime in the West and the South. It also set in motion the machinery of international diplomacy. The petty states of Germany and Italy were cautioned that any assistance given the Duchesse de Berry would displease the King of the French.²⁶ As a result her progress south was slow and any momentum generated by her departure from England was soon dissipated.

By July 17 both Bourmont and Blacas had given up hope that an attempt could be made in 1831. Bertier too recognized the hopelessness of trying to raise the Ultra-Legitimists so late in 1831 and retired for the winter to Aix-les-Bains in August.²⁷ Berry herself, after lingering on the Italian-French frontier during the Autumn, spent the winter in Rome and visiting her brother's court in Naples.²⁸

Ultra-Legitimism within France, frustrated twice in as many years by a lack of effective leadership, waned and began to lose support among the disaffected Legitimists. At a time when activity among the Legitimist factions of legal opposition was building over the Genoudist challenge to the conservative Legitimist leadership Ultra-Legitimist activities appeared at a stand-still. And then came the arrests.

On February 2, 1832 fifty-three men were arrested in a café on the Rue des Prouvaires in Paris. They had been plotting the assassination of the entire Orléans family. A heinous Legitimist plot, claimed the Orleanist Constitutionnel, had been aborted by the police.²⁹ Or had it?

The Gazette de France, quite naturally, denied any Legitimist connection with the Rue des Prouvaires' plotters in its issue of

February 3. Even the official newspaper, the Moniteur of the same date, merely referred to the affair as: "une conspiration de gens désespérés de tous les partis."³⁰ And the Quotidienne reported during the would-be assassins' trial, on July 15, that the entire episode bore the distinct mark of police agents provocateurs. Indeed there was something out of the ordinary when, of the fifty-three potential murderers of the Orléans King, only twenty-seven were condemned: six to be deported; twelve to five years in prison; four to two years; and five to one year.³¹ The penalty for attempted regicide under Louis-Philippe in this instance was remarkably light.

The tenuous connection of Legitimism to this affair, bordering as it did upon the comic opera, was chiefly an embarrassment to the party.³² However, the Rue des Prouvaires affair did have a concrete effect upon the Party of Legitimism in France. There was to be no Ultra-Legitimist representation on the Royalist steering committee established in Paris in February, 1832, and, the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists and the Genoudists hardened their opposition to all extra-legal forms of opposition. Writing on behalf of all non-Ultra-Legitimist factions of the party, the Vicomte de Chateaubriand informed the Ultra-Legitimist Duchesse de Berry that France would never accept as valid means of political change conspiracy, insurrection and foreign war.³³ Nevertheless, Berry summoned the exiled Ultra-Legitimist leadership to the Italian town of Massa where, on March 25, it was decided to reschedule the Ultra-Legitimist enterprize for the late Spring of the year.³⁴

At the time of the Massa conference the internal situation of France favoured the decision to reschedule the Ultra-Legitimist rising.

Across France, in Paris, Lyon and Grenoble, in the provinces of the West and the Languedoc, civil disturbances proliferated.³⁵ Cholera had broken out in Paris in mid-February and was raging throughout the country.³⁶ Striking particularly hard in the cramped quarters of the urban poor, the epidemic served to increase the level of social tension. And on March 15, Périer himself admitted to the Chambers that all was not well in France, where "la résistance s'organise partout."³⁷ It seemed obvious to the Ultra-Legitimists at Massa that France was upon the verge of general anarchy and ripe for the taking.

But if France appeared vulnerable to Berry and her Ultra-Legitimist advisers the fact was not lost upon their Orleanist enemies.³⁸ Already in mid-March the Ministry had increased its anti-Carlist campaign against the Legitimist press and Legitimist sympathizers.³⁹ And, on April 14, 1832 the Chamber was prorogued. The Ministry had freed itself from the cumbersome task of stage-managing a majority in the Deputies.

In clearing the field for its defence against the "Carlist" assault the Ministry even addressed itself to the psychological side of the struggle. The sum of 12,000 francs, sent by the Duchesse de Berry through Chateaubriand, to be used to alleviate the sufferings of Parisian cholera victims, was repeatedly refused by all levels of Orleanist officialdom.⁴⁰ The juste-milieu was taking no chances that even a modicum of sympathy would develop in favour of the exiled Bourbons.

The Périer Ministry, in readying itself against the likelihood of a Bourbon counter-revolutionary attempt, had allies in a most unlikely sector. The Baron Hyde de Neuville, who had himself been

active in the Royalist underground during the Empire, wrote at this time to the Comte de Mésnard, an Ultra-Legitimist friend, expressing the conservative-parliamentary faction's concerns.

La direction à donner aux royalistes, c'est de leur prescrire d'être sage, de ne prendre part à aucune intrigue, à aucune conspiration; d'attendre tout au temps, de la force des choses, et surtout de ne point compromettre l'admirable Vendée en provoquant en ce moment, si peu propice, une levée de boucliers qui, suivant moi, n'aurait aucun effet. Je crois que Madame est mal conseillée; on lui fera faire des fautes, et, en vérité ces fautes peuvent tout perdre.⁴¹

Conservative-parliamentary Legitimists such as Hyde de Neuville might share Ultra-Legitimism's loyalty to the exiled Kings and its dream of a Third Restoration, but they had abjured the sword as a means of achieving that restoration and heartily disapproved of the Massa decision. They were joined in this intra-Legitimist opposition by the Genoudists of the Gazette de France.⁴²

The advice of more moderate Legitimists and the preparations of the juste-milieu government notwithstanding, Berry and her followers were not to be deterred. On April 30, 1832, Marie-Caroline, Regent of France and Navarre, landed in France just west of the port city of Marseille. Legitimist Marseillais took to the streets and the white flag and golden lilies of the Bourbons flew once more on French soil. The enterprize had begun.⁴³

It had begun, but it had had a less than auspicious beginning. Not all Berry's entourage had been able to land before her ship, the Carlo-Alberto, was captured by French naval authorities. Nor did the city of Marseille welcome the Legitimist Regent. In fact, Berry's landing had merely touched off a street riot easily contained by the garrison troops and the "Legitimist" Languedoc had remained completely quiet.

On the first day of May the only real evidence of the Ultra-Legitimist beginning was the "Manifesto of the Regent", proclaiming the restoration of Henri V and the restoration of both the provincial Estates and the Estates General, which was circulating haphazardly across the South.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, as the cavalry patrols ordered to watch the roads leading out of the Languedoc towards the Vendée well knew, Berry was still on French soil. The spark of Ultra-Legitimist revolt might yet catch on the tinder of the disaffected West.

While Berry was making her way secretly across France the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists found themselves in a dilemma. Until Marie-Caroline surfaced again they could join with the Genoudists and denounce all recourse to arms as means of effecting political change.⁴⁵ However, how were they to respond once Berry, the mother of their King, called them to her aid? Would they accept the consequences of their chosen dynastic allegiance and take up the sword as commanded? Or would they defy the Legitimist Regent and refrain from compromising themselves and their faction in an attempt which their political judgment told them must fail? The only possible solution to the conservative-parliamentary faction's predicament was to persuade the Duchess to call off the rising and leave France.⁴⁶

The man chosen to accomplish this task and save the moderates of the Party of Legitimism from having to choose between emotional attachment to the Bourbons and the political realities of 1832 was Pierre-Antoine Berryer. Accordingly, when the Duchesse de Berry finally wrote to the Paris Committee of her safe arrival in Brittany and affirmed her intentions of raising the West on May 24, the Legitimist deputy and member of the Committee left for the West.⁴⁷

Arriving in Nantes on May 20 Berryer met in secret with the Maréchal de Bourmont and on the twenty-second convinced the military commander that the attempt must be cancelled. Bourmont sent out orders postponing the rising pending Berry's approval of the parliamentary Legitimist's arguments.⁴⁸ He then sent Berryer on to the Regent.

Berry, in hiding outside of Nantes, was harder to convince than the Marshal. The failure of the South to rise, the strength of the Orleanist troops in the West and the Paris Royalist Committee's certainty that a rising would fail carried no weight with the Bourbon Princess. However, the repression which would fall upon loyal Frenchmen in the event of a military defeat, coupled with the death-dealing ridicule which such a defeat would bring upon the cause of Henri V, swayed her. Confronted with Berryer's arguments Berry agreed. The rising must be cancelled.⁴⁹ Berryer set out for Paris.

The meeting between the Legitimist deputy and the Legitimist Regent marked a victory for conservative-parliamentary Legitimism over Ultra-Legitimism. But it was a fleeting victory. Left alone after Berryer's departure the Duchess had second thoughts. A new date, June 3, was set for the rising.⁵⁰ And with new orders the confusion of postponements and cancellations was complete. The stage was set for disaster.

Ultra-Legitimist plans to raise the West en masse were made impossible. Instead there were several small risings easily contained by the military authorities in Brittany. The departments of the Sarthe, Mayenne and the Vendée had risen in arms as originally planned.⁵¹ By June 2 Sarthe was quiet but Finistère, Côtes-du-Nord, Ille-et-Villaine, Morbihan and Loire-Inférieure had risen.⁵² And by the fourth this

revolt had been localized in the Vendée and Loire-Inférieure, at which time Deux-Sevres and Maine-et-Loire rose according to Berry's last orders.⁵³ All was over by the eighteenth when the Moniteur was able to announce "le rétablissement successif de la tranquillité sur tous les points."⁵⁴ The Ultra-Legitimist enterprize had failed and the West lay under a state of siege.

In Paris the worst fears of the Royalist Committee had been realized immediately following the first outbreaks in the West. The Vicomte de Conny, an out-spoken conservative Legitimist, was arrested on May 31, 1832. The residences of the Duc de Fitz-James and Berryer were searched by police and the only reason that the latter did not join Conny in prison was his continued absence from the city.⁵⁵ He was arrested in Angoulême on June 7.⁵⁶ With Berryer's arrest the other members of the Committee were implicated by his personal papers and MM. de Chateaubriand, de Fitz-James and Hyde de Neuville followed him to prison on the seventeenth.⁵⁷ The visites domiciliaires, long prevalent in the West, for the first time were directed against the upper echelons and the moderate leadership of the party in Paris.⁵⁸

Fighting against the Ultra-Legitimists in the West the government had moved quickly to secure the conservative-parliamentary leadership in Paris. However, one faction of the Party of Legitimism was singled out as different and was not included in the anti-Legitimist reaction of the juste-milieu government. The Genoudists at the Gazette de France had loudly and explicitly divorced themselves from all who chose the sword as a political weapon.⁵⁹ And their protests had been believed by the government.

The Orleanist government, in early June, had found itself faced with armed enemies on the extreme right and the extreme left. Sparked by the public funeral of the old revolutionary and left-wing deputy, Lamarque, Republicans in Paris had rioted in the streets on June 5. That night barricades went up and the capital was witness to a brief, unsuccessful rising. After a day of fighting the army was in complete control of the city; armed opposition was ended and the press opposition, muzzled by police order on the evening of the fifth, remained silenced under martial law. Only the Gazette de France had been permitted to continue publication as the regime crushed both the Ultra-Legitimist uprising in the West and the Republican rising in Paris. Genoudists had no sympathy for armed rebels of the right or the left.⁶⁰

The same could not be said for the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists. Freed from police padlocks on June 8, the Quotidienne evinced considerable sympathy for the Republican rebels in its description of the events of the fifth and sixth in Paris. There had been:

un combat terrible dans les rues; le courage se montrant des deux côtés; des citoyens et des soldats compatriots s'entre-georgeant. Le surlendemain, la mise en état de siège, des visites domiciliaires, des arrestations, une quasi-terreur repandue partout, et ne se dissipant, . . . qu'en reconnaissant promptement l'impossibilité où était le petit parti qui l'avait rêvée de la soutenir.⁶¹

It was a sympathy not for their methods but based upon a recognition of the frustration and anger out of which the revolt had sprung. The same empathy also softened the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists' opinion of the Ultra-Legitimist survivors in the West.

Périer had died on May 16, carried away by the cholera epidemic, but, while his Ministry had survived under the titular presidency of

the Maréchal Soult, the government lacked any leader of his political stature. Thus, uncertain as to its hold on power, the Ministry was determined to cling to its only proven supporter, the army. The state of siege, declared in the West and in Paris, was not lifted once the fighting stopped. Only on June 29, the Supreme Court of Appeal having overturned the Ministry's June 5 declaration of martial law, was civilian government and justice restored in the capital.⁶² The West would have to wait just over twelve months, until June 10, 1833, for similar consideration.⁶³

The prolongation of martial law in the West may be ascribed to two factors. Unsuccessful as the Ultra-Legitimist rising was it had scared not only the juste-milieu but also the left opposition.⁶⁴ Indeed, after the fact, the general commanding against the Ultra-Legitimist rebels, Dermoncourt, wrote that:

Si Marie-Caroline avait peut rassembler 5 ou 6,000 hommes, et, quarante jours plus tôt celà était possible, ses amis et ses ennemis qui hésitaient, se fussent décidés, et peut-être ne dirait-on pas aujourd'hui que son entreprise était une folie.⁶⁵

The Vendée rising of 1832 was accordingly perceived as having been a serious threat to both the status quo of the juste-milieu and the aspirations of the left opposition. Neither of the Orleanist factions considered prolonged military repression as too harsh for the reactionary West.

A further factor contributed towards the maintenance of the western state of siege. Bourmont had escaped safely back into exile; however, the Duchesse de Berry remained at large on French soil, having disappeared among the Breton peasantry. With the principal Ultra-

Legitimist leader at liberty would the West remain quiet once the heavy hand of the Orleanist army was lifted from it?

The search for Berry lasted throughout the summer of 1832. And the longer she evaded the authorities the more of an embarrassment she was to her uncle's government. Finally, on November 7, the Duchess was arrested in Nantes; safe for five months among the peasantry of the West, she had been betrayed by a member of the small court she had gathered about her in Italy.⁶⁶ However, once in custody she continued to pose problems for the July Monarchy's rulers. Having captured Marie-Caroline de Bourbon what were they to do with her?

The Orléans Monarchy, by the law of April 12, 1832, had banished the elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty. However, there had been no penalties provided for the violation of the exile decree.⁶⁷ The French government had thus to decide the fate of the Duchess without the help of prior legal guidelines. The apparent choices open to the Orleanists seemed to be: court-martial for taking up arms against the government; a civil trial before the Court of the Peers for high treason; imprisonment; and deportation. The last of these options, the most inconclusive method of dealing with the Ultra-Legitimist Duchess, was quickly dismissed.

To try Berry, whether by military or civil courts, posed two problems. A trial, particularly in public before the Peers, would provide the prisoner and her followers with the ideal forum in which to attack the Orléans Monarchy's legality. And, could the sister of the Spanish and Sicilian monarchs, the niece of the Queen of the French be tried and convicted like a common criminal? The choice of the government was therefore the least of the four bad choices; Berry would

be imprisoned in the citadelle at Blaye and perhaps with time her support would disintegrate and fade away.⁶⁸

Before the arrest and imprisonment of Berry the Party of Legitimism had in fact appeared to be breaking up into ineffectual and rival factions. The rising had shattered the always fragile illusion of the party's unity. Crushed under the Orleanist military regime in the West, Ultra-Legitimists keenly resented the interference of the Royalist Committee in Paris and blamed the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists of the Committee for having created the chaos of conflicting orders.⁶⁹ This resentment was returned by the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists who blamed the Ultra-Legitimists for the rising on two counts. It was, they considered, inopportune and its defeat, inevitable in their opinion, had hurt the credibility of the entire Party of Legitimism while strengthening that of the regime.⁷⁰ And both these factions had come under severe criticism from the Genoudists.

By the winter of 1832 only one force was holding the party together, Berry. Whatever their respective feelings about the rising both Ultra-Legitimists and conservative-parliamentary Legitimists could rally in defence of the person and reputation of the mother of their King.⁷¹ And prolonged success in evading arrest had created a romantic aura about the person of the Duchess. Even the Genoudists, their fears of further extra-legal attempts quieted by the passage of time, felt the attraction of the Duchesse de Berry's mystique.

A truce developed between the factions which was cemented by Berry's arrest. Its leadership decimated by exile and imprisonment the Ultra-Legitimist faction, out of necessity, was forced to turn to

the prominent among the conservative-parliamentary Legitimists for political direction. And both the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France could make common cause over the imprisonment of Berry without charges and without trial. Three days after her arrest the Quotidienne was once again able to say, with considerable sincerity, that it spoke for "le parti royaliste tout entier."⁷² Berry, arrested and imprisoned, thus acted as a catalyst in the development of a new Legitimist unity.

After the Vendée Rising a romantic myth had grown up around the Bourbon princess. She was the weak, defenceless widow who had braved fire and sword in an heroic attempt at winning back her childrens' patrimony. Basely betrayed to her enemies and imprisoned without trial by them, the Duchesse de Berry became something more than just Marie-Caroline de Bourbon. She was, for Legitimists, the living incarnation of the principle of legitimacy trampled by the tyranny and illegality they associated with the Orléans Monarchy.

Berryer, speaking on January 5, 1833 in the Deputies, summed up the Legitimist defence of the Vendée Rising and its royal commander.

Trouvez donc douze jurés qui déclarent dans une cour d'assises que la duchesse de Berry a été rébelle envers le gouvernement dont Louis-Philippe est le chef. Elle ne s'est point mise en état de révolte, mais en état de guerre. Deux puissances, deux principes ont lutté l'un contre l'autre, celui du droit royal et celui de la Révolution.⁷³

Espousing this legal rationale, post-Vendée Legitimism sought to rebuild the party shattered by the Ultra-Legitimist attempt. During the winter of 1832 - 1833 this reconstruction attempt centred around the defence of Berry. And apart from the oratorical eloquence of Berryer in the Chamber the most influential defence of the Duchess came from the pen of Chateaubriand.

The Vicomte de Chateaubriand's Mémoire sur la captivité de Madame la duchesse de Berry melded both the legalistic argument of Berryer and the emotional appeal of Berry's myth. It asked, on behalf of all Legitimists, by what law she was incarcerated at Blaye. Was not her crime only that she had failed to do in 1832 what the Orleanists had successfully done in 1830? Was it not tantamount to an admission of its own criminal origins for the regime to punish Berry's "crime"? Thus went Chateaubriand's argument.⁷⁴ But, fully cognizant of the power of the Duchess' mystique, the Viscount concluded his tract with an appeal to Legitimist emotions and loyalty.

Invoking his personal prestige as a writer and politician, Chateaubriand publicly bore witness to his faith in Legitimism. His conclusion to the Mémoire sur la captivité was addressed to the Duchesse de Berry:

Illustre captive de Blaye; MADAME! que votre héroïque présence sur une terre qui se connaît en héroïsme, amène la France à vous répéter ce que mon indépendance politique m'a acquis le droit de vous dire: Votre fils est mon roi!⁷⁵

And Legitimist France heard the appeal. "Madame, votre fils est mon roi!", swept across the country by the Legitimist press, becoming a rallying cry for post-Vendée Legitimism.⁷⁶ A stream of letters and petitions of protest against Berry's incarceration was received by the Parisian Legitimist press, some reaching the floor of the Deputies through Berryer.⁷⁷

Thus Berry's presence in France, before and immediately after her arrest, had helped to draw together the rival factions of the Party of Legitimism. And her importance to the unity of the party did not diminish over the winter of 1832 - 1833. It was therefore with con-

siderable alarm that the Legitimist press reported a deterioration in the health of the prisoner of Blaye.⁷⁸

Blaye, guarding the entrance to the Gironde, exposed to the Atlantic weather, was considered less than salubrious by the Duchess' supporters. And rumours that Berry was suffering from stomach disorders caused them to fear the worst. Had not Louis-Philippe's own brothers, the Duc de Montpensier and the Comte de Beaujolais, both died of stomach illness brought on by their imprisonment in Marseille during the Great Revolution? Now his niece, the mother of the legitimate Bourbon heir, was being slowly killed by her detention.⁷⁹

The flurry of Legitimist accusation concerning Berry's health brought neither denials nor an amelioration of the prisoner's regime from the Soult Ministry. In fact, the Orleanist press was silent on the entire matter. The left-wing press, spearheaded by the Republicans, on the other hand was more than willing to discuss the concerns of the Legitimists. It had a theory of its own to explain Berry's stomach pains, pregnancy. Still the official press maintained its silence. But the Legitimist press was outraged.

Youthful adherents to the cause of Legitimism rallied to squash the pregnancy theory in blood. On February 1, 1833 an open letter appeared in the Gazette de France. Signed by nine young Legitimists it challenged all and sundry who chose to propagate the Republican "libel". And on February 2 a duel took place between Roux Laborie fils, a young Legitimist journalist, and Armand Carrel, the editor of the National. Both gentlemen were wounded, but it was Carrel who received the more serious stroke. While he lay close to death hostilities between the two political parties broke out in earnest.

After the wounding of Carrel the office of the Quotidienne, the journal associated with the more intransigent men of the right, was invaded by an angry crowd. A list of sixteen gentlemen was produced and the conservative Legitimist newspaper was called upon to supply, from its readership, an equal number of men who would meet the Republican challengers.⁸⁰ While it decried mass combats in the Nineteenth Century as anachronistic affairs, the Quotidienne accepted the task. It was, after all, a matter of upholding the honour of Legitimism.⁸¹

The blood feud lasted throughout the first week of February, its passions even touching the responsible politicians of the two political parties before the Orleanist authorities decided to put an end to the affair.⁸² The official crack down on the illegal duelling permitted calmer heads to prevail, and as the dust settled it was apparent that the only spoils to be had from the episode had fallen to the juste-milieu.⁸³ The phantom of the Carlo-Republican alliance could finally be laid to rest.

If the juste-milieu had gained, only the cause of Bourbon legitimacy had really lost from the affair. The bloodshed and journalistic invective served to focus public attention on Berry. And, as the Legitimist press continued to champion her pure reputation, it thus came as a blow to the credibility of Legitimism and the pride of its adherents when the pregnancy theory was proved to be true.⁸⁴

In the Moniteur of February 26, 1833 the Duchesse de Berry publicly acknowledged that during the winter of 1831 - 1832 she had secretly married the Neapolitan Count Hector Luchessi-Palli. The sudden revelation of her morganatic marriage, carrying with it an

implied affirmation of her pregnancy, boded ill for Legitimism's future in France. The Duchess of romantic myth had served as an inspiration to the party, a rallying point for the party's post-Vendée development. However, a Marie-Caroline pregnant of a morganatic marriage was far too human to remain the sanctified focus of Legitimism's unity. Her son's followers needed to find another, political raison d'être.

Notes to Chapter IV

1 Comte de Falloux, Mémoires d'un royaliste, third edition (Paris: Librairie Académique Didier, Perrin et Cie., 1888), Vol. 1, p. 220. The term "Ultra-Legitimist" was not used by contemporaries for the men of the extreme right; however, they were referred to as men who were "fidèles à l'esprit des ordonnances et aux penchants des Ultras." Falloux, Vol. 1, p. 49.

2 Louis Blanc, Histoire de dix ans 1830 - 1840, eighth edition (Paris: Pagnerre, 1849), Vol. 1, p. 401.

3 "Rapport de Ferdinand de Bertier au Roi", September 25, 1830, La Conspiration des légitimistes et de la duchesse de Berry contre Louis-Philippe 1830 - 1832 (Correspondances et documents inédits), ed. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, Vol. 3, Études d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (Paris: Hatier, 1950), pp. 4 - 15.

4 "Ferdinand de Bertier à la duchesse de Berry", November 16, 1830, ibid., pp. 35 - 42.

5 [Note], December 16, 1830, ibid., pp. 44 - 45.

6 On December 14, 1830, in England, Charles X confirmed Berry's office as Regent "au cas où elle débarquerait en France", and on December 27 when Charles reconfirmed his abdication he again recognized that Berry was the rightful Regent of France during the minority of her son Henri. André Montagnon, Les Guerres de Vendée, 1793 - 1832 (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1974), p. 319.

7 "La duchesse de Berry à Ferdinand de Bertier", November 16, 1830, La Conspiration des légitimistes, p. 16.

8 "Rapport du baron de Bordiné sur les dispositions des provinces de l'Ouest et du Sud-Ouest", [October - November, 1830], ibid., pp. 20 - 35.

9 Ibid.

10 [Note], December 16, 1830, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 44 - 45.

11 "Rapport du baron de Bordiné", ibid., pp. 20 - 35.

12 Gazette de France, August 5, 1831. Quotidienne, August 27, 1831.

- 13 "Ferdinand de Bertier à la duchesse de Berry", November 16, 1830, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 35 - 42.
- 14 Moniteur, February 19, 1831.
- 15 Quotidienne, May 23/24, 1831.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Blanc, Vol. 3, pp. 12 - 13.
- 18 Quotidienne, August 23, 1831. Gazette de France, September 3, 1831. Courrier Français, Mémorial Bordelais and Indicateur (Bordeaux) as cited in the Gazette de France, September 18, 1831.
- 19 Quotidienne, September 24, 1831.
- 20 Gazette de France, September 5, 1831.
- 21 Supplément of the Quotidienne, September 5, 1831.
- 22 Révolution (Paris) cited in ibid., October 1, 1831.
- 23 "Ferdinand de Bertier, à la duchesse de Berry", January 8, 1831, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 47 - 54.
- 24 Bertier de Sauvigny, ibid., p. x.
- 25 Ibid., pp. x - xi. "Résumé des conference avec M. le maréchal de Bourmont à Bath", April 25, 1831, ibid., pp. 66 - 69. The plans also called for extensive reforms to be undertaken by the restored Bourbon Monarchy, which, except for a heavy emphasis upon the aristocracy and the army rather than upon the extension of the franchise, were almost identical to the Genoudist programme of March 1832. The popular monarchy of Genoudism took its inspiration from the same pre-absolutist monarchy as did the aristocratic monarchy of the Ultra-Legitimist exiles.
- 26 Blanc, Vol. 3, pp. 231 - 233.
- 27 Bertier de Sauvigny, La Conspiration des légitimistes, p. xi.
- 28 Ibid., Quotidienne, December 6, 1831. Gazette de France, January 2, 1832.
- 29 Constitutionnel cited in Gazette de France, February 4 and 11, 1832.
- 30 Moniteur, February 3, 1832.
- 31 Quotidienne, August 1, 1832. "Arrêt dans l'Affaire des Prouvaires prononcé par la Cour d'Assises de la Seine", July 25, 1832, Blanc, Vol. 3, pp. 437 - 441.

32 Vicomte René de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe (Paris: Gallimard, 1951) with notes by Maurice Levaillant and Georges Moulinier, Vol. 2, pp. 520 - 522. "Ferdinand de Bertier à la duchesse de Berry", February 18, 1832, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 97 - 98.

33 Chateaubriand, ibid., p. 524. See also Gazette de France, February 11, 1832.

34 Bertier de Sauvigny, La Conspiration des légitimistes, p. xii.

35 See for example the reports in Gazette de France, March 17, 1832 and Quotidienne, March 20, 1832.

36 The first case of cholera in Paris was reported in the Gazette de France, February 17, 1832 and in the Quotidienne, February 18, 1832. Both journals followed the spread of the disease closely. The epidemic appears to have peaked in late March - early April.

37 Quotidienne, March 16, 1832.

38 Constitutionnel cited in ibid., March 25, 1832.

39 Temps cited in Quotidienne, March 16, 1832. Quotidienne, March 18 and April 5, 1832.

40 Quotidienne, April 20, 1832. Émile Gabory, Les Bourbons et la Vendée (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1947), p. 212.

41 "Lettre à le comte de Mésnard", [April, 1832], Baron Hyde de Neuville, Mémoires et souvenirs, Vol. 3, Charles X - La Duchesse de Berry - Le Comte de Chambord, third edition (Paris: Plon-Norrit, 1912), p. 491.

42 See for example Gazette de France, March 22, 1832.

43 Gazette du Midi (Marseille), May 2, 1832 cited in Quotidienne, May 7, 1832. Émile Gabory's Les Bourbons et la Vendée, published in 1947, is the major modern history of the 1832 uprising. Gabory attempts to assess the failure of the Ultra-Legitimist enterprise in terms of the Restoration Bourbons' failure to reward the Vendée for its loyalty during the Great Revolution. A recent book, André Montagnon's Les Guerres de Vendée, 1793 - 1832 published in 1974, draws heavily upon Gabory and places the 1832 uprising within the tradition of the earlier Vendean wars and the chouannerie.

44 Alfred Nettement, Appel aux royalistes contre la division des opinions, second edition (Paris: Dentu, 1844), p. 79. See also Montagnon, pp. 323 - 324.

45 Gazette de France, May 7, 1832. Quotidienne, May 10, 1832.

46 Charles de Lacombe , Vie de Berryer, Vol. 2, Berryer et la monarchie de juillet (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 47. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, Vol. 2, p. 548. This opinion was also prevalent among "Ultra-Legitimists" in the West, see Gabory, pp. 230 - 232.

47 Montagnon, p. 326. Berry's letter was dated May 15, 1832 from the Château de Plassac. Marcel Rousselet, Le Grand avocat Berryer devant la Cour d'Assises: Son arrestation - Son procès (Paris: Édition Sirey, 1965), p. 23.

48 Gabory, pp. 234 - 235. Rousselet, p. 25.

49 Rousselet, p. 32.

50 Montagnon, p. 333.

51 Quotidienne, May 30, 1832.

52 National cited in ibid., June 3, 1832.

53 Moniteur, June 4, 1832. See Appendix , Map 4.

54 Moniteur, June 19, 1832. Montagnon, pp. 333 - 337.

55 Quotidienne, June 1/2, 1832.

56 Ibid., June 14, 1832.

57 Ibid., June 17 and 21, 1832. They were released without charges being laid on June 30. Berryer came to trial in Nantes and was acquitted of conspiracy by the jury. See Quotidienne, July 1, 1832.

58 See for example the complaints of the Legitimist Peer, the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé, published in the Quotidienne, September 23, 1832.

59 See the run of the Gazette de France, June 2 - 8, 1832.

60 Legitimist presses sealed by police on June 5, as the Republicans took to the barricades, included the Quotidienne, the Courrier de l'Europe and Brid'Oison. Left-wing opposition presses silenced at the same time included the Tribune, the National, the Courrier Français, the Journal du Commerce, and the Corsaire. Quotidienne, June 6/7/8, 1832.

61 Ibid., June 15, 1832.

62 Ibid., June 30, 1832.

63 Moniteur, June 13, 1832.

64 Montagnon, p. 319. It was the left-wing press during the western rising which had waxed the most violent, demanding stronger measures against the "Carlists". See for example excerpts reprinted in the Quotidienne, May 31, 1832.

65 The Général Dermoncourt, as quoted in Nettement, Appel, pp. 65 - 66.

66 Simon Deutz, an Alsatian Jew who had converted to Catholicism in Italy while attending the court of the Duchesse de Berry, had been bought off by police for 500,000 francs and had led the authorities to Berry's hiding place in the city. Blanc, Vol. 3, 355 - 361. Montagnon, p. 337.

67 Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du conseil-d'état (depuis 1788 par ordre chronologique), second edition (Paris: A. Guyot, 1838), with editorial footnotes by J.-B. Duvergier, Vol. 32, pp. 186 - 187.

68 Quotidienne, December 15, 20 and 29, 1832.

69 "Ferdinand de Bertier à la duchesse de Berry", September 21, 1832, La Conspiration des légitimistes, pp. 110 - 113. Falloux, Vol. 1, p. 220. Nettement, Appel, p. 146. Lacombe, Vol. 2, p. 47. No mention was ever made of the fact that shortly before the rising the plans for the attempt had been discovered by the authorities during a visite domiciliaire at the Château de la Charbrière. Montagnon, p. 334. Blanc, Vol. 3, p. 263. Jacques Crétineau-Joly, Histoire de la Vendée militaire (Paris: Hivert, 1842), Vol. 4, p. 574.

70 Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, Vol. 2, p. 481. Falloux, Vol. 1, p. 51.

71 See for example Quotidienne, September 29, 1832.

72 Ibid., November 10, 1832.

73 Edouard Lecanuet, Berryer: Sa vie et ses oeuvres 1790 - 1868 (Paris: Bloud et Barral, 1893), p. 148. See also Gazette de France, June 11, 1833.

74 Vicomte René de Chateaubriand, Mémoire sur la captivité de Madame la duchesse de Berry (Paris: Le Normant, 1833).

75 Ibid., p. 120.

76 The Quotidienne, the Gazette de France, the Revenant and the Mode were all seized by police on January 5, 1833 for reprinting this catch phrase. Their editors were all arraigned, with Chateaubriand himself, for inciting hatred of the King's government. Quotidienne, January 6 and February 16, 1833. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, Vol. 2, p. 617.

77 Gazette de France, December 23, 1832. Quotidienne, January 6, 1833.

78 The intimation of Berry's poor health appeared first in the Gazette de France, January 25, 1833.

79 Ibid., January 30, March 25 and 31, 1833.

80 Quotidienne, February 3, 1833.

81 Ibid., February 4, 1833.

82 Berryer, seconded by Dreux-Brézé and La Bourdonnaye-Blossac, had actually met the newly elected left-wing deputy Garnier-Pagès outside of Paris, a duel only being averted at the last minute. Ibid., February 6, 1833.

83 Gazette de France, February 7, 1833. Quotidienne, February 10, 1833. For accounts of the episode from both left and right sympathizers, see Blanc, Vol. 4, pp. 17 - 28 and Edmond Biré, La Presse royaliste de 1830 à 1852: Alfred Nettement, sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1901), p. 80.

84 Quotidienne, March 1, 1833. Gabory, pp. 294 - 295.

CHAPTER V

THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGITIMIST PARTY

JANUARY 1833 - MAY 1834

Legitimism in early 1833 had reached a turning point. For two years, since its emergence as a distinct political movement in French politics, it had opposed the Orléans Monarchy chiefly by refusing to enter into the political fray. Working from the premise that the regime was illegal and could not last, Legitimism abetted the internal emigration so as to disassociate itself from the inevitable political anarchy. However, under the Périer Ministry a trend towards permanence had emerged, and not even the armed insurrection of the West had been able to undermine the regime's growing stability. Thus, by the winter of 1832 - 1833, Legitimism was faced with the complete bankruptcy of its general opposition strategy.

The need for a complete re-evaluation of Legitimism's opposition strategy was brought home to the men of the French right-wing in February 1833. The revelation about the Duchesse de Berry's morganatic marriage and pregnancy, following as it did fast upon the Republican - Legitimist duels and a month of fervent denials in the right-wing press, threatened to engulf Legitimism in a wave of ridicule which could well have destroyed the party. However, at the same time as the Moniteur was printing the news about Berry, events were transpiring in a courtroom in Paris which not only would counter-balance the loss of credibility due to the sudden desanctification of Marie-Caroline de

Bourbon but also pointed out the new route to be followed by Legitimism in France.

"Madame, votre fils est mon roi"; the phrase used by Chateaubriand to end his Mémoires sur la captivité and taken as a rallying call by the Legitimist press, had been deemed, quite logically, by the Attorney General Persil to have called into question Louis-Philippe's title to the throne. Chateaubriand and those newspaper editors who had dared reprint the phrase were tried before the Paris Assizes. However, on February 27, the Legitimist defendants were acquitted by the jury. The accused, claimed the jury, had not incited their readers to overthrow Louis-Philippe but rather had merely stated their opinion as fact. And the charter of 1830 clearly permitted such free expression of a Frenchman's opinions in print.¹ It was a victory for Legitimism which thus won legal recognition of its political existence under the Orleanist regime.

The verdict of February 27 also gave pragmatic sanction to a change in attitude among the readers of the Gazette de France and the Quotidienne. As early as January 4, 1833, the Gazette had remarked upon a new-found Legitimist unity. This unity was the result of a growing realization that Legitimism must recognize at least the de facto existence of a regime which had survived the internal emigration and armed uprisings. Thus, having accepted political realities the French right-wing found itself free to really enter into the political arena and attack its enemies on their own ground.

Committing itself to acting within the letter of, if not the spirit of, the legal victory of February 27 the right was faced with the need to redefine itself in terms of the politics of the July

Monarchy. Seizing upon the one obvious difference between themselves and supporters of the conservative Orléans Monarchy, men who had long persisted in calling themselves "Royalists" gradually began to think and be "légitimistes".² Legitimism rededicated itself to the principle of hereditary legitimacy.

Hereditary legitimacy, for Legitimists of 1833, was made to encompass two constitutional ideals: kingship and liberty.

La royauté héréditaire et la liberté nationale étaient deux soeurs venues ensembles en même temps sur le territoire français, et l'antériorité de l'une sur l'autre était un mystère qu'elles avaient laissé dans les forêts de la Germanie.³

Thus, in the opinion of the Legitimists, the legitimate kingship was "le seul principe avec lequel la liberté soit compatible,"⁴ for neither could claim precedence or a primacy of interest over the other. This was the Legitimist-perceived error of Republicanism, that in championing liberty it had denied the equally French ideal of kingship. Orleanism, on the other hand, having in the Legitimist view trampled French liberty in its efforts to create a monarchy had soiled the French Monarchy by destroying its only true foundation, the legitimate hereditary kingship. Neither Republic nor Monarchy, the Orleanist regime, in the opinion of Legitimists, existed in a grey half-world of quasi-legitimacy.⁵

The quasi-legitimacy of the Orléans Monarchy, where the government represented no higher constitutional principle than the de facto possession of power, was considered by Legitimists to be intolerable for France.⁶

Parvenus au gouvernement de l'état par l'anarchie /les Orléanistes/ ont continué à faire de l'anarchie. Au lieu de chercher à adoucir les haines . . . ils se sont étudiés a

envenimer ces haines, à rendre ces divisions plus profondes.
 . . . on peut dire qu'il n'y a maintenant qu'un seul pouvoir
 dans l'état, l'anarchie, et que le gouvernement est son
 ministre.⁷

In their opinion the only way which such a quasi-legitimist government could maintain itself was by the judicious maintenance of internal divisions within the nation politic. It was at once the creator and the slave of political anarchy.

Where Orleanism was but a pale version of monarchy and Republicanism only represented liberty, Legitimism was seen by its adherents to represent the melding of these two ideals. Under Henri V France's internal divisions would, Legitimists claimed, be healed; what had been torn asunder in the name of liberty would be reunited, and liberty trampled by the anarchial Orleanist regime would be rescued.⁸ This increasingly articulated definition of Legitimism, in relation to the other political parties in France, was a major step in the process which would see the Party of Legitimism, that political movement of various Legitimist sympathizers, reborn into a political party, the Legitimist Party.

Early in February the Genoudists had admitted that they really had no fundamental quarrel with the conservative bloc of the Party of Legitimism, that post-Vendée amalgamation of conservative-parliamentary Legitimists and Ultra-Legitimists, the "partisans de la charte de 1814".⁹ And as the Spring progressed the Quotidienne acknowledged that its differences with the system of the Gazette de France were of very minor import in terms of real politics in 1833.

La Gazette et la Quotidienne sont deux journaux monarchiques, tous deux professent des principes d'ordre, et défendent des doctrines sociales; tous deux veulent le même résultat, le triomphe du droit . . . [et tous deux sont] parfaitement d'accord sur le fonds de cette grande pensée politique.¹⁰

Before the reburnished ideal of legitimate Bourbon Monarchy in France factional differences paled considerably. As a result the Legitimist Party was able to survive an event which months earlier would have shattered the Party of Legitimism.

On May 10, 1833, Marie-Caroline gave birth to the daughter of Count Hector Luchessi-Palli in the citadelle at Blaye. But, barring perfunctory demands for irrefutable proof of the Princess' motherhood, the Legitimist press paid little attention. Of more interest and relevance to the Legitimist Party were the stirrings of a renaissance of Legitimist legal opposition. New Legitimist journals began to appear alongside the veteran newspapers.¹¹ The "Association for Parliamentary Reform and Emancipation" and the "Young France Society", both founded in May, provided forums for Legitimist political discussion.¹² And there was a flurry of Legitimist activity in the Chambers which had opened for their second 1833 session on April 26.

It was French parliamentary custom that until a President was elected each new session of the Chamber of Deputies was chaired by a président d'âge, the eldest deputy present. Thus, on April 26 the chair was occupied by a deputy from Bouches-du-Rhône, the Marquis Gras de Préville. And France was treated to the spectacle of a Legitimist nobleman presiding over the very legislative chamber which was the mainstay of the Orleanist regime.

One of the major causes of the Spring increase in Legitimist activity was the Legitimist Party's impatience with the refusal of the government to lift the state of siege in the West. And with the opening of the Chambers the party was given an unlooked for opportunity to air its grievances. The Legitimist président d'âge made full use of the

occasion. On April 27, just before relinquishing the chair to the newly-elected President, the elderly Marquis harangued the assembled deputies. The government (he insisted upon calling it the "new" government) had, in his words, committed a serious outrage against the principle of individual liberty with the imposition of this ten month long state of siege, and he demanded its immediate rescission by the deputies.¹³ It was the opening shot in a major parliamentary offensive by the Legitimist Party.

At every opportunity Legitimist speakers brought the issue to the floor of the Chambers. In the Chamber of Peers, during the discussion of the new Law of Departments, the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé voiced his party's concerns for the principle of liberty languishing under martial law in the West.¹⁴ In the Chamber of Deputies the debate over the budget for public works became the occasion for Legitimist comments that "coupable de royalisme" the Midi was not receiving any monies or attention from the government.¹⁵ Five weeks after the opening of the second parliamentary session there was a climax to this unprecedented Legitimist offensive.

On June 5, in what the Quotidienne of the sixth claimed was a cold, dispassionate debate on the best way of leaving the Vendée in ruins, Thiers proposed and received from the Deputies twelve million francs for the construction of strategic military roads through the West. For five days, goaded into action by the success of the supply vote in the Lower Chamber, Dreux-Brézé and his young colleague the Duc de Noailles fought a delaying action in the Peers attacking the government's policy in the West. The Gazette de France applauded "la parole courageuse de M. de Brézé contre l'état de siège."¹⁶ Two days

later, on June 8, the efforts of the right's orators were lauded in the same newspaper for having been a voice for the cause of liberty. On June 9 the Quotidienne praised the Legitimist parliamentary defenders of the West.¹⁷ And, on June 10, in a decree published in the Moniteur on the thirteenth, Louis-Philippe ordered the lifting of the year-old state of siege.

The return to civilian rule in the West was most likely attributable to a combination of factors. Chief among these was the final recognition that Ultra-Legitimism within France was completely discredited; its royal leader, carrying the child of her morganatic marriage, was finally released from Blaye and deported to Italy simultaneously with the lifting of the state of siege.¹⁸ Also there were signs of a return to prosperity which held out the promise of an end to the unrest that had been endemic among the lower classes across France since the Revolution.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the ordinance of June 10 was claimed by the Legitimist Party as a great victory.²⁰

A taste of success defending the civil rights of the West in the Chambers and in the press whetted the appetite of the Legitimist Party. Thus, with the lifting of the state of siege, the party returned to the defence of the political rights of Frenchmen in general and reopened the debate over universal suffrage and the oath of loyalty required of electors by the regime. As early as February 10, 1833, and again on July 8 the Gazette de France had reiterated its pre-Vendée platform of hereditary kingship and universal suffrage. And on July 2 the Quotidienne, on behalf of the party's conservative bloc, had publicly capitulated. It redefined its support of the charter of 1814, in completely Genoudist terms, as support for a system which

would have produced representative monarchy if it had not been corrupted by doctrinaire Liberalism.²¹

In return for the conservative Legitimist journal's concession the Gazette de France recognized the right of conservative Legitimists to abstain from political activism.²² In fact, coming around to the Quotidienne's position, Genoude accepted that no Legitimist could take the oath of loyalty. While he still maintained that all eligible electors should present themselves at the electoral colleges, this action was only to make a solemn and mass protest against the illegal imposition of an oath of loyalty upon the representatives of the sovereign people.²³ Genoude himself could stand for election in Plessis and get elected twice to the communal council but by twice refusing to take the oath he remained faithful to the compromise which united the Legitimist Party.²⁴ The 1833 compromise, while uniting the vast majority of Legitimists and Genoudists, caused the temporary rebellion of a faction which had been closely allied with the conservative majority for over a year. On September 8, 1833, the Quotidienne published what was in effect a new Legitimist catechism:

Le légitimiste ne prête pas le serment demandé. Pourquoi cela? Parcequ'il est légitimiste.²⁵

However, this dogma was less than appealing or acceptable to the parliamentary Legitimists. Unlike Genoudists, who for all their vociferous support of political activism had never taken the oath, parliamentary Legitimists had committed the newly promulgated sin and sworn the oath. They could not now go back on their word, so they attacked the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France, opening the first rift in the emergent Legitimist Party.²⁶

Since the creation of the conservative-parliamentary Legitimist alliance in the Spring of 1832 there had been an intra-Legitimist agreement over the grounds upon which a parliamentary Legitimist could take the oath. Legitimist deputies and peers who had chosen to remain in the Chambers had given verbal explanations and justifications simultaneous to their taking the required oath. And this public justification had become acceptable practice among Legitimists who chose to give their loyalty to the Bourbons and still exercise their political rights. However, in the Summer of 1833, the Council of State ruled that oaths accompanied by justificatory addendums would not be accepted by authorities in the future.

The ruling of the Orleanist Council gave support to the "no oath" stance of the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France. The latter newspaper put the Legitimist Party's position succinctly when it claimed on August 28, 1833, that for a Legitimist to take the oath without adding a public explanation of his interpretation of the oath was to abdicate all Legitimist beliefs and pass over to the juste-milieu. The parliamentary Legitimist Rénovateur disagreed, and in defending the parliamentary faction's position it tended to throw back at the Gazette Genoude's 1831 arguments in favour of Legitimists taking the oath.²⁷

The answer of Genoude to his newspaper's apparent volte-face was that since the 1831 election campaign he had recognized that the unity of the party was of prime importance and since the Legitimist majority counselled abstention from the oath all Legitimists should abstain.²⁸ The response of the Rénovateur was that the cause of hereditary legitimacy would be best served by the Legitimist Party if

its members used not only their moral judgment but also their political judgment and exercised their franchise.²⁹ To abandon the political arena at this time would, claimed the Rénovateur on September 17, be a great error for Legitimists to make, and even if the regime would not recognize verbal restrictions a Legitimist might attach to his oath a published explanation. Separate from the act of oath-taking such an explanation was more than sufficient to protect parliamentary Legitimists from perjuring themselves.³⁰

The fate of these arguments put by the Rénovateur in 1833 appeared to be the same as that met by the arguments of parliamentary Legitimism in 1831. A majority of the Legitimist Party still viewed the oath as an insurmountable barrier to an increased Legitimist parliamentary opposition.³¹ However, if an increase in electoral activity appeared to be rebuffed by the 1833 Legitimist majority, the parliamentary Legitimists of 1833 were not to suffer the near-excommunication they had experienced in 1831. The conservative majority of the Legitimist Party was more tolerant and flexible, in practice, than the conservative majority of the Party of Legitimism. While the Gazette de France would argue with the Rénovateur over conflicting opinions the Quotidienne, for the most part, remained aloof from the conflict.

Finally, after nearly two months of intra-party debate, on October 19, 1833, the Quotidienne broke its silence on the issue of Legitimist electoral activity and the oath.

La guerre que nous aimons, c'est une guerre de drapeau, et non une mêlée de famille sous la même bannière. Aussi tant que le cours des événements ne ramènera pas la question du serment et des élections à l'ordre du jour, et ne nous mettra pas en demeure de nous prononcer, nous nous contenterons de demeurer dans nos opinions . . .

party solidarity was, for the Quotidienne, more important than a theoretical debate over the action to be taken in the future.

Les élections et le serment sont dans ce moment un sujet qui ne se présente point de lui-même et qu'il faut aller chercher dans les éventualités de l'avenir. Si ces éventualités se changeaient en fait, nous les accepterions comme nécessité, parce qu'il est du devoir de la politique d'apprécier toute question ouverte; mais tant que les choses n'en sont pas à ce point de maturité, nous regardons à la fois comme un droit et comme un devoir de la laisser de côté.

Conditions could change in the unseen future which would render pointless any resolution to the debate between the Rénovateur and the Gazette de France; thus the Quotidienne called for a cessation of hostilities. After all:

il est bien inutile de s'occuper d'une question du lendemain sous un pouvoir dont le lendemain même est une question.³²

The Quotidienne's counsel was well received by a large number of its readers for its logical appeal to Legitimist unity followed hard upon the success of a more emotional appeal.

Since late August 1833 the date September 30 had loomed large in Legitimist plans. On that day, according to the traditions of the Capetian-Bourbon Monarchy, the Legitimist King would enter his fourteenth year, thereby coming legally of age. A restoration of Henri V would thus no longer require a regency and a regent who might well inflame the passions of the past. Henri V, the boy-King, had no past to either live up to or to live down; he could thus be a truly modern King of France who could unite all political factions within the nation.³³ To celebrate this event, which Legitimists viewed as momentous, it was proposed to organize a vast pilgrimage of loyal Frenchmen to pay homage to their legitimate King, who had recently taken up residence in Hdraschin Castle in Prague.³⁴

The Legitimist pilgrimage to Prague was a serious political statement for the party; over 400 Frenchmen made the journey to Bohemia.³⁵ And, while it was scoffed at by the official press, it did receive daily coverage in Parisian journals of every political tendency; the Temps even had a daily correspondent reporting on the travellers' progress across Germany.³⁶ And there was no doubt in the left-wing anti-Legitimist press that they were covering an overt act of treason.³⁷ However, as the Gazette de France reasoned on September 29, if Chateaubriand had been innocent of treason when he published in the Mémoire sur la captivité that article of Legitimist faith, "Madame, votre fils est mon roi", then how could this act of Legitimist faith focused on the Hdraschin be treasonous? The French authorities obviously concurred in the Gazette's assessment, and there were no legal repercussions for the pilgrims when they returned to France.³⁸

The successful celebration of Legitimism in Prague marked a significant turning point in the development of the Legitimist Party. Not only had French Legitimists demonstrated in public their loyalty to Henri V but their demonstration had occurred in spite of the wishes of the Bourbon heir's grandfather and guardian, Charles X.³⁹ The Legitimist Party in France thus confirmed its Henriquinisme and, in effect, cut itself off from the dictates of the court-in-exile. As long as their king was under the tutelage of his grandfather and thus isolated from post-Revolution French politics, the Legitimist leadership in France would feel free to face and respond to the political realities of Orleanist France independent of the royal family.⁴⁰ And this new political independence was immediately evident in the resolution of the intra-party debate over the oath.

The Quotidienne, the erstwhile organ of orthodox conservative Legitimism and the prime mover behind the 1831 Legitimist election boycott, was, in mid-October 1833, more interested in keeping up the appearance of party unity than in discussing the as yet hypothetical question of Legitimist electoral participation. And without the support of the conservative daily the Gazette de France grudgingly accepted the possibility, if not the usefulness to the party, of Legitimists morally circumventing the oath by means of a prior, printed protest. Following this November 12, 1833, acknowledgment from the Gazette the Legitimist newspapers were inundated with notices from individuals and groups claiming that they understood the oath to be a mere formality or at most an engagement of loyalty to France rather than to Louis-Philippe.⁴¹ It was becoming increasingly evident that two distinct, if mutually tolerant, opinions about the oath were encompassed by the Legitimist Party as it entered the new year.

The Legitimist Party of 1834 was the focus of the oratorical skills of Pierre-Antoine Berryer in the Chamber of Deputies on January 6, 1834. Speaking in the stormy debate over the response to the King's last speech from the throne, Berryer served notice upon the government of the new Legitimism that it would be dealing with. Amid a rising clamour from the deputies of the Orleanist majority Berryer described the Legitimist Party. Legitimists were first and foremost men of honour, and among these men there were also those who refused to renounce the political rights guaranteed to them by the charter of 1830.

Ces hommes ont crus que le serment à la Charte ne leur enlevait pas le droit d'une manifestation libre de toute leur opinion politique, lors même qu'ils sont et doivent être d'une opinion toute contraire à celle du gouvernement.⁴²

Thus, in the view of the chief spokesman of the parliamentary wing of the party, parliamentary Legitimism was the advance guard of the Legitimist opposition to the Monarchy of Louis-Philippe.

This Monarchy, in Berryer's exposé of the Legitimist Party's opposition, had destroyed the fundamental principle of constitutional stability upon which France's ancient government had been built, the hereditary legitimacy of the kingship. As a result France:

est sortie de son état normal, divisée en deux . . . si la France est monarchique . . . par ses mœurs . . . par ses souvenirs . . . par ses intérêts, de fait elle est une république par ses principes . . . par la plupart de ses institutions.

Given this assessment of the French situation, the Republican solution was unacceptable to French interests and the Orleanist solution, neither monarchy nor republic, was worse for its lack of honesty. As Berryer exclaimed at the close of his speech, the juste-milieu was "ni gouvernement, ni justice, ni sagesse."⁴³

Berryer, with a nod in the direction of Genoude, had placed the Legitimist Party's opposition on the ideological plane as being a defence of French national interests rather than a merely dynastic difference of opinion, for it was the party's most fundamental belief that Henri V's restoration would reunite the two faces of modern France. There was, however, also a practical political side to the opposition of the Legitimist Party of 1834, in keeping with its recognition of the de facto authority of the regime. This opposition arose over the question of the franchise. As long as the Orleanists denied Frenchmen their right as citizens to vote, be it by the imposition of a test oath or the maintenance of a high cens requirement, the Legitimist Party claimed it would wage a united campaign against the government.⁴⁴

The post-Revolution phenomenon of honour-bound Legitimism, strict adherence to the dictates of the aristocratic ethos, was no longer the master but a partner of a more politically practical Legitimism. It had been touched by a measure of the pragmatism of the parliamentary Legitimists. Thus, in 1834 the internal emphasis of the Legitimist Party would be upon the continued harmony between its two component parts.

The primary external emphasis of the Legitimist Party was in proving to the public that it was not merely a party of the past adhered to by wizened aristocratic left-overs from the ancien régime. The Quotidienne of January 13, 1834 addressed these concerns claiming that:

. . . le légitimiste à vingt-cinq ans tout aussi bien que soixante; qu'il ne porte ni poudre, ni bas chinés, ni chapeau à trois-cornes: . . . il n'est pas toujours possesseur d'un château.

Nor did the real Legitimist have reactionary political aims but rather:

. . . qu'il demande un gouvernement établi sur des bases larges et grandes, sur de libres élections, sur un système vraiment national, qu'il ne veut rien que par la France et pour la France, qu'il vit dans l'avenir et non pas dans le passé.⁴⁵

If the Legitimist Party was reactionary asked Legitimists of 1834, why had Legitimists not emigrated after 1830 as the Royalists had done during the Great Revolution?⁴⁶

The answer to this question provides an insight into the conservatism from which sprang the Legitimist Party. According to the Quotidienne of February 9, 1834, if the Legitimists had emigrated they would have lost all credibility as a political force in France; having stayed in France they were in a position to work towards reforming the "prétendu gouvernement représentatif" which was oppressing the

nation and dividing French society.⁴⁷ In the Legitimist point of view society needed to be defended from the Orleanists.

La société française existe sans doute; mais divisée, troublée par un désordre alarmant . . . elle existe, mais fractionnée en trois partis bien distincts; le parti légitimiste qui a survécu à la violation de la loi d'hérédité, le parti républicain né de l'insurrection et du principe même du gouvernement et enfin le parti orléaniste, imperceptible avant la révolution, parti que le budget a grossi et qui subsistera tant que le budget ne lui manquera point.⁴⁸

The prime consideration of the Legitimist Party was to rescue France from Orleanism; or what the Quotidienne a year earlier had called "une aristocratie fiscale qui ne gouverne pas mais qui exploite."⁴⁹

The defence of French society from the Legitimist-perceived cancer of Orleanism, mirroring the divergence of opinion within the Legitimist Party, would be conducted on two fronts. While it did not condemn Legitimists who took the oath the Quotidienne preferred to continue the passive resistance of the last two years.

Eh bien! donc orléanistes, marchez; allez au bût où vous croyez trouver le despotisme tranquille et assuré; allez, nous n'avons jamais été vos dupes; nous pourrions bien être vos victimes . . . mais nous ne cesserons de vous dire que vous êtes perdus; car si vous ne l'êtes pas par vos ennemis, vous le serez par vous-mêmes . . . Il ne faut que vous laisser faire. Le méchant se nuit et le fou se tue. Vous êtes l'un et l'autre; et nous comptons sur vous, comme vous ne devez jamais compter sur nous.⁵⁰

However, within the party which had boycotted the by-elections and the elections of 1831 there was a growing interest in carrying the Legitimist opposition to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies.

On February 11, 1834, the Gazette de France took note of the growing support for active political resistance among French Legitimists.

On verra que . . . les organes de la presse royaliste de province sont pénétrés de la nécessité de n'être pas pris au dépourvu dans les élections prochaines, et de ne pas donner cinq ans au juste-milieu.⁵¹

And, as rumours that Louis-Philippe would dissolve the Chamber and call for elections in June began to float about Paris, the Gazette refurbished its 1830 and 1831 arguments and threw its support behind the Legitimist electoral movement.⁵²

Conditions in France and the Orleanist government's response helped to galvanize the Legitimist advocates of political resistance. Political unrest among the lower classes in Paris, the result of left-wing agitation, had lain just beneath the surface since the unsuccessful Republican rising in June 1832. Nor had the other cities of France escaped the disillusionment with the regime which affected the Parisian orders.⁵³ The government's answer to this phenomenon was a law against street newspaper hawkers, passed January 25, 1834, and a new police law, passed February 21. And on February 25 a near riot prompted by police harassment of the hawkers in the Place de la Bourse was dispersed by truncheon-wielding police.⁵⁴

Following a strike in Lyon that same month, representation was made to the government by the Lyonnais manufacturers asking for a legal proscription against future coalitions of workers.⁵⁵ The good bourgeois of Lyon got their law, but in outlawing worker associations the Orleanist government also outlawed all types of associations. The law of April 11, 1834, passed in the Deputies after fifteen days of debate on March 25 and passed in the Peers on the twenty-ninth, was attacked by both the right and the left oppositions as despotic and dictatorial.⁵⁶ However, if the law against associations was meant to squash any effective electoral efforts for the opponents of the juste-milieu, as claimed by the Legitimist opposition, it had a reverse effect upon that same opposition.

On March 16 the Quotidienne ran two articles which, when taken together, indicated an evolution in the thinking of conservative Legitimism. In the first of these articles the Quotidienne made it clear that "la grande association legitimiste" would resist the effects of the proposed law. In the second the conservative daily commented on the validity of the recent by-election in Verneuil, Eure. Five electors of Verneuil had, in taking the required oath, explained that they did not consider it religiously binding upon their consciences and that they considered it a mere verbal formality; yet the government had made no objection and the new deputy, M. Rancé, was permitted to take his seat on the centre left. That five votes could be cast and the election unquestioned given the nature of the "oaths" taken raised interesting possibilities for the Legitimist Party.

Certainly the Quotidienne could not and did not desert its ultra-conservative readership, the mainstay of Legitimist passive resistance, and it continued to re-enforce their belief in the inevitable destruction of the regime.

Jusqu'ici on connaissait le suicide par le charbon, la corde, le pistolet, etc. Le Neuf-août a inventé le suicide par les lois.⁵⁷

However, the Quotidienne had given notice of a new political pragmatism, and on April 26, 1834 it joined the Gazette de France and the Rénovateur in publishing the "Déclaration Royaliste à l'occasion des prochaines élections".

The 1834 Declaration, supported by all factions within the Legitimist Party, called for all Legitimists to take part in the inevitable elections.

L'action des royalistes dans les prochaines elections doit être généralement exercer. Leur concours est réclamé comme l'accomplissement d'un devoir.

Cette condition de concours embrasse toutes les positions; comme elle se concilie avec les convictions diverses, elle sera également remplie, sous des formes différentes, soit par les protestations des royalistes, soit par leurs déclarations, par leurs mandats ou par leurs votes.⁵⁸

The Legitimist press had come out entirely in favour of an end to the Legitimist electoral boycott. The Legitimist election campaign began in earnest.⁵⁹

The Quotidienne, in an article that caused its issue of May 2 to be seized by police, explained its apparent volte-face. "La première condition de force, dans un parti politique, c'est l'unité." Thus, because a majority of Legitimists had decided to abstain from the elections of 1831, party unity had been expressed by the Legitimist electoral boycott. However, the conservative daily recognized that circumstances had changed since 1831. "Le parti royaliste pouvait se diviser en deux grandes branches à peu près égales"; thus, in 1834, in order to maintain party unity one side had to bend a little and the Quotidienne expected its followers to do the bending.⁶⁰

This bending process, as counselled by the Quotidienne, would not require conservative Legitimists to compromise their honour.

La participation de tous les royalistes aux élections est proclamée en principe, le mode de cette participation est laissé à l'arbitrage de chaque conscience.⁶¹

Thus, as long as all eligible Legitimist electors presented themselves at their electoral colleges, the Quotidienne considered that party unity would be maintained even if some must obey their consciences and refuse all forms of the oath. However, the conservative daily made it abundantly clear that whether a Legitimist voted or registered his public protest against the oath restriction "l'inaction sera plus qu'une faute."⁶²

Ideally for the Legitimist Party general acceptance of the principle of electoral participation would result in Legitimists taking the oath and voting. And the Quotidienne, erstwhile the principal opponent to this event, set about trying to make this act more palatable for its readers. On May 11, 1834, it appealed to their pride as Frenchmen and called upon Legitimists to defeat the Orleanist cancer at the polls. On May 13 it declared that any form of protest or explanation of the oath, whether individual, collective or even, in the latter case, unsigned by each elector would enable a Legitimist to take the oath and vote. And on the twenty-second it described the oath as a "serment constitutionnel prêté sous condition" rather than a real oath, religious and binding, such as had been freely sworn before God to the Bourbons. By implication the Quotidienne was counselling its readers towards complete participation in the elections.

Thus, when the Moniteur of May 25, 1834, printed the ordinance of dissolution and the ordinance convoking the electoral colleges for June 21, the Legitimist Party had already swung into the election campaign. Whether the party press and the party's political leadership would be able to completely overcome the effects of three years of essentially conservative passive resistance remained to be seen. However, the united front produced to try to do so was a significant change from the divisions and bitter in-fighting of the past. The Legitimist Party was no longer a party only in name. With this decision to contest the election under the rules of the hated Orleanist regime it became a political party of the right, just as the Orleanists were a political party of the centre and the Republicans were one of the far left.

Notes to Chapter V

1 Vicomte René de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe (Paris: Gallimard, 1951) with notes by Maurice Levaillant and Georges Moulinier, Vol. 2, p. 615. Quotidienne, February 28, 1833. Gazette de France, February 28 and March 1, 1833.

2 Bagatelle as cited in Quotidienne, March 11, 1833. Gazette de France, April 30, 1833.

3 Gazette de France, March 14, 1833.

4 Quotidienne, January 13, 1833. See also Gazette de France of same date.

5 Quotidienne, January 5, 1833.

6 Ibid., July 27, 1833.

7 Ibid., June 7, 1833.

8 Gazette de France, July 13, 1833.

9 Journal de la Guienne (Toulouse) cited in ibid., February 8, 1833.

10 Quotidienne, April 16, 1833.

11 New Legitimist journals, such as the Légitimiste (Paris) and the Régénérateur (Lyon), came into existence accompanied by the appropriate fanfare in the established Legitimist press. Quotidienne, July 8 and 21, 1833.

12 Quotidienne, May 27/28, 1833. Gazette de France, May 27/28 and July 6, 1833.

13 Quotidienne, April 28, 1833.

14 Gazette de France, May 15, 1833.

15 Quotidienne, June 5, 1833.

16 Gazette de France, June 5, 1833.

17 Quotidienne, June 10, 1833.

18 Ibid., June 14, 1833. See also the Gazette de France, March 19, 1834 and the Quotidienne, March 24, 1834 for their condemnation of the Invariable (Fribourg), an émigré journal, as an example of how out of touch with French realities Ultra-Legitimism was in 1833.

19 Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet (Paris: Plon, 1884), Vol. 2, p. 204.

20 Supplément of the Gazette de France, June 13, 1833.

21 See also Quotidienne, August 16/17, 1833.

22 Gazette de France, July 11, 1833.

23 Ibid., July 17, 1833.

24 Quotidienne, September 5, 1833.

25 Ibid., September 8, 1833.

26 Rénovateur cited in Gazette de France, August 26, 1833.

27 Ibid., September 14, 1833. Also see Rénovateur cited in Quotidienne, October 10, 1833.

28 Gazette de France, September 14, 1833.

29 Rénovateur cited in Gazette de France, September 17, 1833.

30 Ibid., October 22, 1833.

31 Gazette de France, September 26, 1833.

32 Quotidienne, October 19, 1833.

33 Ibid., August 28 and September 20, 1833. Gazette de France, October 1, 1833.

34 See for example the Mode cited in the Quotidienne, August 19, 1833 and in the Gazette de France, August 21, 1833.

35 Marvin L. Brown, The Comte de Chambord: The Third Republic's Uncompromising King (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 26.

36 Temps cited in Quotidienne, September 14, 1833.

37 Temps cited in Gazette de France, September 29, 1833.

38 Nor had it been difficult for the Legitimist pilgrims to obtain the necessary passports for their trip as required under French law. Quotidienne, September 27, 1833.

39 The Legitimist pilgrims were unable to pay homage to Henri V in the Hdraschin in Prague, Charles X having removed his grandson and the court-in-exile to Butschirad. The move, according to Chateaubriand, Vol. 2, pp. 845 - 856 and to the Marquis de Villeneuve, Mémoires inédites du marquis de Villeneuve (Paris: 1889), p. 63 as cited in Marvin R. Cox, "The Legitimists under the Second French Republic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966), p. 82, was designed to frustrate any celebration of the majority of the prince. As it was only a small delegation was eventually permitted audience with the Bourbon heir. Also see Louis Blanc, Histoire de dix ans 1830 - 1840, eighth edition (Paris: Pagnerre, 1849), Vol. 4, pp. 57 - 60.

40 Quotidienne, November 4, 1833.

41 See for example Gazette de France, November 23, December 6 and 7, 1833.

42 Quotidienne, January 7, 1834.

43 Ibid..

44 Ibid., January 8, 1834. Gazette de France, January 9, 1834.

45 Quotidienne, January 13, 1834.

46 Gazette de France, January 25, 1834.

47 Quotidienne, February 9, 1834.

48 Ibid., March 19, 1834.

49 Ibid., June 27, 1834.

50 Ibid., March 23, 1834.

51 Gazette de France, February 11, 1834.

52 Ibid., February 15, 1834.

53 S. Charléty, La Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1921), Vol. 5 in the series Histoire de France Contemporaine, ed. Ernest Lavisse, p. 100.

54 Gazette de France, February 26, 1834.

55 Ibid..

56 Ibid., February 25, 1834. Charléty, p. 101.

57 Quotidienne, March 27, 1834.

58 Ibid., April 26, 1834.

59 Ibid., May 9 and 10, 1834, list provincial Legitimist newspapers supporting this new policy. The Gazette de France, May 12, 1834, claims all but one of the provincial journals is supportive of the "Déclaration".

60 Quotidienne, May 2, 1834.

61 Ibid..

62 Ibid., May 8, 1834.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the second general elections held under Louis-Philippe France was witness to a unique sight. The Legitimist Party, by its very nature opposed in principle to the political regime established by the Chamber of Deputies on August 7, 1830, was putting forth a concerted effort to obtain representation in the Parliament of the Orléans Monarchy. Both the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France filled their issues with the call to participate in the elections. In fact, where the Gazette "invited" Legitimists to choose acceptable candidates and work to get them elected, it was the conservative organ, the Quotidienne, which insisted that Legitimist electoral activity had become "a duty".¹ What had changed within the ranks of Legitimism since the Revolution of 1830 that would explain this development?

The Gazette de Bretagne in early June sought to explain the apparent contradiction between the conservative Legitimist majority's position in the 1831 elections and the Legitimist position in 1834.

Que nous avons abandonné nos principes?
Personne n'oserait le dire.
Que nous avons modifié notre politique?
On aurait parfaitement raison.²

Intra-party faction rivalries, the crushing military defeat of the Vendée and the demystification of the Duchesse de Berry and the House of Bourbon had left their marks upon French Legitimism. The Legitimist Party fighting the elections of 1834 had lost a considerable portion of its post-Revolution naivety. As the Quotidienne's writers could say on June 3, 1834:

nous légitimistes . . . notre pensée est bien simple, en vérité; nous voulons seulement ne plus payer pour être battu; et comme notre état de propriétaires nous donne le droit de l'empêcher, nous en usons.³

The pragmatic political needs of the party and of France, as seen by the party, were the prime motives behind the united Legitimist election campaign. Forced to exist under a political regime which they denounced as being a government for Orleanist party interests rather than a government for France, Legitimists, after four years, had politically come of age.

Beginning in the first week in June the Gazette de France began to publish lists of candidates who would be acceptable choices for Legitimist electors.⁴ And, on June 9, the Quotidienne began publishing a daily column, "Chronique Electorale", which reported who was proposing to run for election, who was the favoured Legitimist candidate and even who not to vote for if there were no suitable Legitimist candidates. This latter form of electioneering was premised upon the Legitimist belief that even Republican candidates were more acceptable than candidates of the juste-milieu. Republicans might be considered deluded by some Legitimists but at least all Legitimists considered them honest men.⁵

The Carlo-Republican electoral alliance which had been resolutely spurned by all Legitimist factions in the post-Revolution and pre-Vendée period was informally acknowledged by the Legitimist Party of 1834. At the start of the campaign the Quotidienne indicated its acceptance of such an electoral coalition.

La coalition étant défensive, ayant un bût unique, celui d'opposer une barrière aux tyrannies doctrinaires, . . . Les principes restent intacts, les convictions ne font aucun sacrifice. Chaque'un garde sa foi politique . . . car l'union

des opprimés contre les oppresseurs, dans l'intention de maintenir l'indépendance, la dignité, et l'existence même de la partie commun, est plus qu'un droit, c'est un devoir.⁶

The election of any opposition candidate would, in the Legitimist view, be a blow well struck at the juste-milieu and the quasi-legitimist regime it had created.

The new-found political pragmatism of the Legitimists of 1834 went further than just contesting the elections and accepting the need for an informal agreement with the Republicans. Steadfast in their belief that theirs was the only true vision of the future for France they nevertheless recognized that the approaching election would not give them victory overnight. On June 5 the Gazette de France assessed the party's chances at the polls.

Majorité ou non, nous sommes tranquilles.

Supposons que les royalistes n'aient que vingt à vingt-cinq voix dans les chambres et que l'opposition de gauche n'en ait que 40 à 50, nous soutenons que cette minorité sera plus forte que la minorité de 160 voix qui s'est trouvée souvent contre le ministère dans la session dernière.⁷

In the Gazette's opinion the tiers parti and the "dynastic left", the two blocs of deputies which had formed the old opposition, were just out-of-power supporters of the juste-milieu. Thus, the election of 60-75 deputies, elected specifically by the Legitimists and the Republicans in protest against the juste-milieu, would be a significant victory for the oppositions. And from such a modest beginning the fate of the censitaire quasi-legitimist regime would be sealed.⁸

It would indeed be a modest beginning. As the election results became known following the June 21 polling, the Legitimist press announced that 30 men of Legitimist opinions and Royalist backgrounds had been returned out of a field of 459. Nevertheless, as the

Quotidienne of June 29 claimed:

trente députés, bien franchement acquis à l'opinion royaliste, présenteraient un résultat assez étendu dans les circonstances actuelles, et avec une législation électorale essentiellement mauvaise, pour donner au parti royaliste le droit de s'applaudir d'être descendu dans la lice électorale. Ses efforts n'auront été perdus ni pour lui, ni pour le pays.⁹

Given the ever-present conservative Legitimist revulsion towards the oath, whether the object of reinterpretation and justificatory explanations or not, this election was a considerable victory for the political activists within the Legitimist Party. Even more sober counting of the number of seats won did not lessen the victory for the parliamentary Legitimist wing.

On July 2, 1834 the Quotidienne revised its earlier count of 30 dropping the total of Legitimist seats by one. And, when Berryer, elected in four departments, chose to sit for the First College of Marseille in Bouches-du-Rhône the total again decreased: Haute-Garonne returned the Duc de Fitz-James and Haute-Loire returned M. Calemard de Lafayette, both of whom chose to sit with Berryer in the Legitimist opposition, but the seat in Var was lost to an Orleanist candidate.¹⁰ While this loss was made good by the Vicomte de Saintenac who won a by-election seat in Ariège, other developments took their toll upon the numbers of Legitimists in the new Chamber.

The ralliement process, so noticeable after the Revolution of 1830, cut the Legitimist opposition down to 19, a number which approximates the estimate of Charles de Lacombe in his biography of Berryer.¹¹ Of the successfully elected "candidats légitimistes" listed in the Quotidienne, five appear to have found it politically convenient to hold themselves aloof from real in-Chamber party politics, preferring to act as independent members of a "conservative majority".¹² And

several of the successful "Legitimists" actually sat on the ministerial side of the Chamber.¹³ Nevertheless those elected "Legitimists" who actually sat with Berryer to form "le petit groupe légitimiste" would, with minor changes in personnel, constitute the Legitimist opposition in the Chamber of Deputies throughout the life of the Orleanist regime.¹⁴ And with the emergence of their group they marked the point at which the Legitimist Party's development into a modern, parliamentary party came to a halt.

The general elections of 1834 had been the occasion of a united effort by the Legitimist press to transform the Legitimist Party into what was in effect a "disloyal" parliamentary opposition to the Orléans Monarchy. After four years of flirting with passive resistance and the unsuccessful attempt at offering armed resistance, the articulate Legitimist leadership had rallied to the views of the parliamentary Legitimists. In the press, in the courts and in the Chambers, until the end of the July Monarchy, the voice of French Legitimism was the voice of political activism and parliamentary resistance. However the resistance offered by the Legitimist Party under the July Monarchy was of necessity weakened by the party's own historic development.

Conservative Legitimism, with its accompanying rejection of the oath, would remain a significant force within the party. After the push of 1834 was over the force of this conservatism would bring the party's parliamentary development to a halt. There would be no return to the conservative-inspired boycott of 1831, but neither would there be a significant increase in Legitimist parliamentary representation. The number of Legitimist-held seats in the Deputies might peak in the Chamber of 1842 - 1846 at 34 but for most of Louis-Philippe's

reign it hovered around the twenty seat mark.¹⁵ Thus the Legitimist Party came out of the general elections of 1834 having achieved an internal balance of forces which would not change over the next fourteen years.

Uniting in itself the conflicting values of the internal emigration and the parliamentary Legitimists, the Legitimist Party during the remaining years of the July Monarchy could offer very little real opposition to the regime. Having realized the ineffectiveness of passive resistance and having lost all credibility as the sponsor of an armed revolt, the Legitimist Party yet failed to throw itself fully into the only course of opposition left open to it, parliamentary opposition. Its commitment was only half-hearted, founded upon the bankruptcy of the alternatives rather than upon a general Legitimist belief in political activism. Arrested in its development in 1834, the Legitimist Party which fought and "won" the general elections of June 1834 was essentially the same Legitimist Party which would play its part in the destruction of the hated Orléans Monarchy and yet still be unable to effect a Third Restoration.

Notes to the Conclusion

- 1 Gazette de France, May 26, 1834. Quotidienne, June 8, 1834.
- 2 Gazette de Bretagne (Rennes) cited in Quotidienne, June 7, 1834.
- 3 Quotidienne, June 3, 1834.
- 4 See for example the exhaustive list of gentlemen which "on croit qu'il y a des chances pour les candidatures" in the Gazette de France, June 5, 7, 8, and 12, 1834.
- 5 Quotidienne, June 10, 1834.
- 6 Ibid., June 7, 1834.
- 7 Gazette de France, June 5, 1834.
- 8 Ibid..
- 9 Quotidienne, June 29, 1834.
- 10 Dictionnaire des parlementaires français 1789 - 1889, 5 Vols., ed. A. Robert, E. Bourloton, G. Cougny (Paris: Bourloton, 1891), s.v. "Calemard de Lafayette" and "Fitz-James, Edouard, duc de".
- 11 Charles de Lacombe, Vie de Berryer, Vol. 2, Berryer et la monarchie de juillet (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 120. Lacombe's estimate of about 20 Legitimist deputies in the Chamber of Deputies of 1834 - 1837 is flexible enough to include the incidence of ralliement as well as two by-elections, one in 1835 and one in early 1837, which returned Legitimists; M. Duchaffault (Vendée) and the Comte de Valon (Corrèze) respectively. See Appendix, Map 5.
- 12 MM. the Général Comte d'Hautpoul (Hérault), de Monnecove (Pas-de-Calais), d'Angeville (Ain), Girot de Langlade (Puy-de-Dôme), and Janvier (Tarn-et-Garonne) fall into this category according to the Dictionnaire des parlementaires.
- 13 MM. de Ranchin (Tarn), Jacquinet-Pampelune (Yonne), Vallet-Deshermieux (Lozère), Jacquier de Terrebasse (Isère), and Durozier (Loire) fall into this category. Ibid..
- 14 Ibid., s.v. "Grasset, Eugène, marquis de".

15 The count of Legitimist seats in the Chamber of Deputies during the July Monarchy has been given as: 20 in the Chamber of 1834 - 1837; 21 in the Chamber of 1837 - 1839; 24 in the Chamber of 1839 - 1842; 34 in the Chamber of 1842 - 1846; and 12 in the Chamber of 1846 - 1848. Lacombe, Vol. 2, pp. 120, 227, 256, and 358.

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
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APPENDIX

MAP 1




Departments of France: July Monarchy

MAP 2

Legitimist Departments of France

September 1830

Taken from the Comte de Bertier's letter to Charles X

MAP 3

Departments of France which elected Legitimists

General Elections of 1831

MAP 4



Departments of France affected by the Risings
of June, 1832

//// - Area of the Western state of siege

MAP 5



Departments of France which elected Legitimists

Chamber of 1834 - 1837

//// - General Elections of June 1834

\\\\\\\\ - By-election victories

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